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Abstract 
To assess the relationship between the two largest democratic countries of 
the world, India and America, it is essential not only to assess the relationship in 
the context of only the present or the recent past, but in the larger perspective of 
past history and future prospects. It is imperative to bear in mind both the 
similarities and the dissimilarities in outlooks and in attitudes. One should not be 
unduly swayed by the passing phases, sometimes the differences are exaggerated. 
Relations between India and the United States have been uneven - on occasion 
friendly, sometimes hostile, but more often, just estranged. Given their different 
historical, social and economic experiences, India and the United States were 
almost certainly destined to adopt conflicting policies on many issues. Their 
differences, however, might not have been as jagged in the absence of more 
profound sources of friction. 
When the Cold-War ended in the 1990s, the two largest democracies had 
the opportunity to start anew, the United States saw India as a big emerging 
market. It was infact, both India's largest foreign investor and its largest trading 
partner. In 1991 the United States expanded its military contacts with India. The 
United States was also eager to bring Russia into the democratic fold. How 
could it frown upon India's good relations with the new democratizing forces in 
Russia? With the cold war over, there were a number of developments and 
forces pushing the United States and India to cooperate. While some diverging 
interests continued to trouble the India US relationships, one heard more and 
more references to cooperative engagement, "strategic cooperation". And other 
promising developments coming out of both Washginton and New Delhi in the 
1990s. By early 1998 it appeared that the two largest democracies were indeed 
starting over and were prepared to construct a new set of closer, more 
cooperative relations. 
Any study that endeavours to explain the intricacies of India's interactions 
with the United States of America given the numerous ups and downs plugging 
the relations between the two countries. My study of Indo-US Relations starts 
since 1990 which seeks to elucidate the constraints under which India 
endeavoured to cultivate working relations with the United States. I have drawn 
a vivid feature of the relations between the two countries at a time that was 
perhaps not only very conducive for forging a fruitful dialogue with the only 
super power of the world. I have covered practically all the aspects of India-
American Foreign Relations in six chapters and the mutual suspicion of the 
successive Indian and American Governments regarding their foreign policy 
aims and objectives and the consequent chill in their relationship prior to 1990. 
There is one essential pre-condition - that the end of cold-war should in 
theory have a positive influence on Indo-US relations. By removing or reducing 
the significance of the two principal sources of past frictions - US arms to 
Pakistan and India's close ties with the soviet Union - the altered international 
environment has offered a new point of departure. Indo-US relations need no 
longer be hostage to US - Pakistan and Indo-soviet relations. Whether the two 
countries will take advantage of this opportunity remains uncertain - the history 
of past estrangement has left its scars. Public opinion, of particular importance in 
the case of democracies such as India and the United States, poses an obstacle to 
importance in relations. The same is true for the often negative attitudes among 
the foreign policy and natural security establishments. 
One of the most difficult issues before the two countries in the 1990s is 
the nuclear question. With both India and Pakistan now acknowledged as nuclear 
weapon capable countries, the proliferation issue and the related problem of 
missile capability are certain to remain major bilateral pre-occupations. This 
development has made conflict - avoidance between the two antagonists a key 
US regional security interest in South - Asia. The goal is to avoid a crisis that 
could lead to nuclear war between Indian and Pakistan, and, if possible, to reduce 
New Delhi and Islamabad to renounce nuclear weapons. The quasi-
nuclearization of the sub-continent could, indeed, mark as important a change in 
south Asia as the end of the cold-war. A Nuclear Pakistan has, in effect, achieved 
strategic parity with India, something it could never have hoped for with 
conventional weapons. How effectively and calmly Washington and New Delhi 
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deal with this difficult and dangerous problem is certain to have a major impact 
on future - course of the US Indian relationship. 
Rao's Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, immediately embarked on a 
bold strategy of reforms to address India's economic problems. Since mid 1991, 
the government has substantially inflation and the fiscal deficit, began privatizing 
or cutting subsidies to inefficient state - owned industries, made the rupee 
convertible in International trade, and reduced tariffs and industrial licensing 
controls in order to attract foreign investment. The United States has been very 
supportive of India's economic reforms, which have been helped along by 
international monetary Fund assistance and Producing. 
Although the end of the Cold-War freed U.S. India relations from the 
constraints of a bipolar world, bilateral relations continued for a decade to be 
affected by the burden of history, most notably the longstanding India-Pakistan 
regional rivalry. Recent years, however, have brought a sea change in US India 
relations which was reflected in India's swift offer of full support for the U.S. let 
war on terrorism following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on New York 
and Washington. The continuing US concern in South-Asia, however, is the 
prevention of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation and the reduction of 
tensions between India and Pakistan. During the 1990s, the United States 
Security focus in South Asia sought to minimize damage to the non proliferation 
regime, prevent escalation of an arms and missile race, and promote Indo 
Pakistani bilateral dialogue. In light of these goals, the Clinton Administration 
set forward five key "bench marks" for India and Pakistan based on the contents 
of U.N. Security council Resolution 1172 (June 1998) which condemned the two 
countries' nuclear tests. 
Progress in each of these areas has been limited, and the Bush 
Administration makes no reference to the bench mark frame work. Neither India 
nor Pakistan has signed the CTBT, and both appear to be continuing their 
production of weapons - grade fissile materials. (India has consistently rejected 
this treaty, as well as the NPT, as discriminatory, calling instead for a global 
nuclear disarmament regime. Although both India and Pakistan currentl> 
observe self imposed moratoria on nuclear testing, they continue to resist 
signing the CTBT - a position made more tenable by U.S. senate's rejection of 
the treaty in 1999), the states of weaponization and deployment is nuclear, 
though there are indications that this is occurring at a slow, but steady pace. 
Aside from security concerns, the governments of both countries are faced with 
the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programmes and the domestic 
unpopularity of relinquishing what are perceived to be patent symbols of national 
power. Early optimism in the area of export controls waned and then nearly 
vanished as it became apparent in later 2003 that Pakistanis were involved in the 
export of WMD materials and technologies. Some observers have lately called 
for a new U.S. approach that would provide technical assistance in enhancing the 
security of any WMD materials in South Asia. Through a series of legislation 
measures, Congress lifted nuclear related sanctions both on India and Pakistan. 
Among the concerns voiced by some members of Congress was that there 
continue to be "Contradictions" in U.S. non proliferation policy towards South 
Asia, particularly as related to the U.S. Senate's 1999 rejection of the 
comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indications that the Defence Department 
may continue to develop low yield nuclear weapons. 
Since early 2002 and continuing to the time of this writing, the United 
States and India have held numerous joint exercise involving all military branch. 
Unprecedented advanced air combat exercise took place in June 2003 and 
provided the U.S. military with its first look at the Russia built Su-30 MKI, 
among the most capable fighter aircraft in its class (mock air combat over India 
in February 2004 saw Indians plots in late model Russian built fighters defeat 
American Plot flying older F. 15 Cs). In September 2003, U.S. and Indian 
special forces soldiers held a two week joint exercise near the India China 
border, and the largest ever "Malabar 2003" Joint naval exercises off the 
Southern Coast of India included an American nuclear submarine in the 
cooperative cope Thunder Exercises in Alaska. Despite these developments, 
there remain indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S.A and 
Indian military, leaders are divergent on several key issues, including India's role 
in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, a approaches to continuing terrorism, and 
potential U.S. role in resolving the India Pakistan dispute. Moreover, the 
existence of a non-proliferation consistency in the United States is seen as a 
further hindrance to more fully developed military to military relations. 
Along with increasingly visible military to military times, the issue of 
U.S. arms also to India has taken a higher profile. In February 2002, Congress 
was notified of the negotiated sale to India of 8 counter battery radar sets (or 
Firefinder" radars) valued at more than $ 100 million (the following September, 
arrangements were made for the sale of four additional sets). Two of these were 
delivered in July 2003. In July 2004, Congress was notified of a possible sale to 
India involving up to $ 40 million worth of air craft self protection system to be 
mounted on the Boeing 737, that carry the Indian head of state. The state 
department authorized Israel to sell to India the jointly developed U.S. Israelis 
Phalcon Airborne early waning system, a $ 1.1 billion assets that some analysts 
believe may tilt the regional possess an extensive list of desired U.S. made 
weapons, including P 3 Orion maritime petrol aircraft, PAC 3 anti missile 
systems, and electronic warfare systems. The United States may provide Indian 
security forces with sophisticated electronic ground sensors that may help stem 
the tide of militant infiltration in the Kashmir region. Still, some in India 
consider the United States to be a "fickle" partner that may not always be 
relieved upon to provide the kinds of reciprocity, sensitivity, and high technology 
transfers sought by New Delhi. 
In a controversial turn, the Indian Government has sought to purchase a 
sophisticated anti missile platform, the arrow weapon system, from Israel. 
Because the United States took the lead in the system's development, the U.S. 
Government has veto power over any Israeli export of the Arrow. Although U.S. 
Defence Department officials are seen to support the sale as messing with 
President Bush's policy of cooperating with friendly countries on missile 
defence, state Department officials are reported to opposed the transfer, believing 
that it would send the wrong signal to other weapons exporting states at a time 
when the U.S. interest in maintaining a strategic balance on the sub-continent, 
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alongwith U.S. obligations under the missile Technology control regime, may 
preclude any approval of the Arrow Sale. 
Joint U.S. India military exercises and arms sales negotiations have 
caused disquiet in Pakistan, where there is concern that the developments will 
strengthen India's position through an appearance that Washington is siding with 
India. Islamabad is concerned that its already disadvantageous conventional 
military status vis-a-vis New Delhi will be further eroded by India's acquisition 
of additional modem weapons platforms such as the phalcon and Arrow. Infact. 
numerous observers have noted what appears to be a Pro-India drift in the U.S. 
Government's strategic orientation in South Asia. Yet the limited state regularly 
lands Pakistan's role as a key ally in the U.S. led counter terrorism coalition and 
assures Islamabad that it will take no actions that 
The fundamental conclusion of the review was that American conclusion 
of that review was that American policy with India had to be broken from the 
constraints on one-issue problem - that India was just too important to be viewed 
solely through the prism of American non proliferation policy. While American 
non-proliferation policy is important, and should not be neglected, it could not be 
the end all-be all of US relationship with India. Rather US had in mind what we 
call a multi-basket approach, in which US should deal with India across a wide 
range issues. Among these non-proliferation and our concerns about arms control 
and disarmament would be one, but economics and trade, energy, regional 
security, global security, the environment, climate change, everything would be 
on the table and US would deal with each issue without holding any one hostage 
to progress on others. The US first laid this approach out in New York in late 
1997, at a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly where the President 
met with the their Prime Minister Gujral. The US also had an opportunity to lay 
it out with Prime Minister Sharif. Almost immediately India had new elections, 
and US hopes of going to India in 1998 were put on the back burner. 
At the same time. Prime Minister Vajpayee embarked upon a process that 
would take him to Lahore and dialogue with India's neighbour to the west, a 
dialogue that promised to bring much in terms of regional peace and stability. 
The US strongly supported that effort. The US saw in it the kind of brave 
diplomacy that is needed as the world enters the new millennium. The President 
sent messages of support privately and messages of congratulation publicly to 
both Prime Ministers. The US President met with Prime Minister Sharif in 
Amman, Jordan, just before the visit to Lahore, to encourage him to grasp this 
opportunity. Unfortunately events intervened again to disrupt this very promising 
start. Lahore led not to dialogue, but to Kargil and to a war in the Himalayas, a 
war that ended only when the President met with Prime Minister Sharif at an 
extra-ordinary summit at Blair house on the fourth of July, 1999. Through a long 
weekend a negotiations directly with Prime Minister Sharif and on the phone 
with Prime Minister Vajpayee, the US is able to play some role in helping these 
countries walk back from a conflict that was very dangerous. Kargil had a silver 
lining in retrospect. From it emerged the new sense of confidence between Indian 
leaders and American leaders, particularly between the leaders at the top, the 
prime Minister and the President, the National Security Advisor Sandy Berger 
and his Indian Counterpart Brijesh Mishra, Foreign Minister Singh, and 
Secretary of State Albright and Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. 
The global system rewards and penalizes its participants by economic 
criteria. But, for the Public, these criteria are far too eroteric to evoke loyalties 
and commitments. In a crisis, the population will turn to its political leaders to 
care the impact of the economic Penalties. This is all the more true because even 
period of expansion take their toll on parts of the population, so that there exists 
in most countries and especially in the developing world - a near permanent 
minority ever waiting in the wings to act out the validity of its sentiments. 
To achieve global competitiveness, political leaders in developing 
countries are obliged to use up Political capital by restructuring their economics, 
eliminating waste and reducing overhead. This frequently implies massive 
dislocations and (hopefully temporary) unemployment for the sake of long-range 
benefits not demonstrable at the moment scarify are being demanded. Such an 
equation is often anathema to political or economic leaders if the promised 
benefits will arrive only long after they have themselves left the scene. 
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The massive changes in the structures and procedures of most of the 
societies participating in GlobaHzation are strongly encouraged and frequently 
insisted upon as a condition of assistance - by the United States government as 
well as by leading international financial and economic institutions. Yet the 
advocates of the new gospel often seem oblivions to the historical record, which 
shows that the practices of reform took many decades to evolve in their own 
countries. Adopting the American model is not primarily a technical challenge; 
for most developing countries, it implies nothing less than a revolutionary 
upheaval in familiar patterns. Only a very few nations have ever managed to 
combine conservative fiscal and monetary policy, government intervention 
through regulation rather than ownership or control, deregulation of financial 
institutions, encouragement of flexible labour markets, and a widely accepted 
and transparent legal framework. The American model presupposes that capital 
is relatively cheap and labour is relatively expensive, so that competitive success 
in the end depends on improvements in productivity sustained by constant 
technological progress. Comparative advantage is achieved by reducing the 
labour content of most productive processes to the greatest extent possible. 
The American experience demonstrates that, when all these factors 
combine and however difficult the initial stages, early dislocations will be 
justified by dramatic improvements in the standard of living. But the experience 
of most other countries has also shown that it is not easy to make the American 
model work rapidly. Continental Europe is still struggling with major domestic 
obstacles to the necessary structural reforms (especially in the labour market and 
agriculture) - though it now seems well launched on the process of adjustment. 
Ten years after the defeat communism, Russia, despite all western exhaustations 
and many billions of dollars in aid, is no closer to a normally functioning market 
economy than it is to domestic insfitutions, China's rate of growth is extra-
ordinary, but it has been achieved at the price of giving governmental stability 
priority over democratic reform. Even in countries with a less inhibiting past - in 
south-east Asia and Latin America, for example - Globalization has proceeded in 
fits and starts. During the 1990s the United States, almost alone in the world, 
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solved the problems of how to create jobs while revolutionizing its industrial 
technology of course, these phenomena are not entirely novel. Displacement by 
technology has probably occurred since the invention of the shovel. And 
migration have\ taken place in every economic revolution. What is unique in our 
age is the scale of the global impact and the rate of technology change. The 
challenge of humanizing the process is, therefore, unprecedented. 
Free market capitalism remains the most effective and, thus far, the only 
demonstrated instrument for sustained economics growth and for raising the 
standard of living. But just as the unrestrained laissez-faire capitalism of the 
nineteenth century spawned Marxism, so too literal a version of Globalization of 
the Twenty-first century could generate a worldwide assault on the very concept 
of free markets. Globalization views the world as one market in which the most 
efficient and competition will prosper. It accepts - and even welcomes - the fact 
that the free market will relentlessly shift the efficient from the inefficient, even 
at the cost of economic and social dislocation. 
But the extreme versions of globalism tend to neglect the mismatch 
between the world's political and economic systems. Unlike economics, politics 
divides the world into national units. And while political leaders may accept 
certain degree of suffering for the sake of growth in their economies, they cannot 
survive as advocates of near permanent austerity, especially if their policies can 
be presented as imposed from abroad. The temptation to reverse - or at least to 
buffer-austerity by political means can become overwhelming. Protectionism 
may prove ineffective or even backfire in the long term, but political leaders 
frequently necessitates. Even well-established free market democracies do not 
accept limitless suffering in the name of the market and have taken measures to 
provide a social safety net and curb market excesses by regulations. The 
international financial system does not as yet have comparable firebreaks. 
The demonstrations against globalization at meetings of the international 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2000 and at the Seattle meeting of the 
World Trade Organization in 1999 were early warning signs of the potential 
Political weight of those who believe themselves at the mercy of forces they feel 
powerless to influence. The exaltation of violence and self-indulgence of some of 
the demonstrators reflects ideological disdain for existing political and economic 
institutions that is, to a considerable extent, independent of specific grievances. 
To successfully contribute in the world economy we need build strategic 
agreements not just between trading blocks but also between corporation and not 
just between foreign partners and Indians but also between corporations and not 
just itself. Therefore, while opening up our economy to the world the 
Government must clearly lay down the terms and conditions and the sectors in 
which foreign capital and technology would be welcomed and in what way, what 
method and procedures they would have to accept and what factors they must 
have to keep in their mind. More particularly the government policy must 
assume a new dimension now to ensure a comprehensive and effective appraisal 
of technological needs and priorities in India's key growth centers and to 
strengthen and promote investment and technology. Thus, we have to put our 
own house in order as otherwise in the name of globalization and global 
competition import of foreign technology is sure to pave the way for colonial 
exploitation in a new grab. 
The proposition that globalization makes states unnecessary are even less 
credible than that it makes states impotent. If any thing, exact opposite is true, 
for at least three reasons. First, the ability of a society to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by international economic integration depends on the 
quality of public goods, such as protection of property rights, personal security, a 
non corrupt civil service and education. Without the legal arrangements, in 
particularly, the potential web of rewarding contracts is vastly reduced. This 
may seem a trivial point, but a very large proportion of the world's economies 
have failed to achieve these essential preconditions of success. Second, the state 
normally defines the identity of human beings. A sense of belonging is a part of 
people's sense of security. It is perhaps not surprising that some of the most 
successftilly internationally integrated economies are small, homogeneous 
countries with a strong sense of collective identity. Third, all forms of 
international governance rest on the ability of individual states to provide and 
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guarantee order. The WTO, for example, is not body of self executing rules. On 
the contrary, they can be exercised only by sovereign states. The bed rock of 
international order is the territorial state, with a monopoly of coercive power 
within its jurisdiction. Cyberspace does not fundamentally change this, since 
economies are ultimately concerned with and run for human beings, who have 
physical presence and, in consequence, physical location. Since states are 
territorial jurisdiction, they are the bed rock of global order. 
The implication is that, just as globalization does not make states 
impotent, it does not make them unnecessary either. On the contrary, for people 
to be successfully in exploiting the opportunities afforded by international 
integration, they need states, at both ends of their transactions. This is wh\ failed 
states, disorderly states, weak states and corrupt states are shunned state they are 
black holes of the global economic system. 
In the changed economic environment and deregulation measures. 
business and government will be working together for projecting India as the 
nation having capabilities for producing goods at competitive prices. The 
marketing aspects of a product which has received little attention so far should be 
accorded more importance in future. There is a need for making the domestic 
industry contestable. Competition after a long period of control would pose 
difficulties for the Indian Industry, but the problem could be overcome in due 
course. The government should pick up the best businessmen and help them to 
become internationally competitive. Indian management is slow to respond to 
changes in the world market. Global integration demands enlightened 
transportation, power and telecommunications policies. A competitive market 
structure with domestic and foreign competition is the route to globalization. We 
need to be competitive on all front i.e. prices quality and tight delivery as per 
schedule. The key to globalization is not how much ground is covered but how 
well it is covered. Strategic alliances among Indian partners could be a way to 
secure global orders. We need to take advantage of the market expansion in 
Asia, EEC, South Africa and Caribbean countries. Industry should sell by 
applying through consortiums and deliver the goods it promises to deliver. A 
search for consumer markets outside the country is essential. Globalization of 
the Indian economy is a step in the right direction. We should utilize the 
recessionary situation abroad to establish business links. The free flow of 
foreign goods is desirable in order to make domestic industry globally 
competitive. 
The neo-liberal thought found favour with donor agencies such as the 
World Bank and the IMF that were engaged in funding development projects of 
debt ridden Third World countries. The convergence of thoughts in regard to 
change reached its zenith in the newly emergent phenomenon of globalization, 
facilitated by the free flow of funds, goods, and services as dictated by the new 
conditionalities laid down by the World Bank, WTO and other overseas donors, 
and by the new IT revolution (Internet, fax, and web - based communication). 
This is also the moment of mergence of'good governance' as a novel conceptual 
rubric a mixture of politics, management, and ethics, Sound development 
management was at the core of the good governance idea. Its desired attributes 
such as accountability, transparency, rule of law, and respect of human rights 
served as yardsticks for governmental reform and performance appraisal. 
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Preface 
One might have expected the United States to embrace the new and 
independent India finally freed from its colonial status in the 1940s. It might 
have been so had it not been for President Eisenhower's embrace of Pakistan 
in 1954, the US dispatch of a carrier group to the region in 1971, and the 
debilitating distractions of the Cold War, where the driving force of American 
Policy was anti-communism. Because of India's emphasis on non-alignment 
and good relations with the Soviet Union, the United States was suspicious of 
India and insensitive to its distrust of American motive and power. 
When the Cold war ended in the 1990s, the two largest democracies 
had the opportunity to start anew the United States saw India as a big 
emerging market. It was infact, both India's largest foreign investor and its 
largest trading partner. In 1991 the United States expanded its military 
contacts with India. The United States was also eager to bring Russia into the 
democratic fold. How could it frown upon India's good relations with the 
new democratizing forces in Russia? With the cold war over, there were 
number of developments and forces pushing the United States and India to 
cooperate. While some diverging interests continued to trouble the India US 
relationships, one heard more and more references to cooperative 
engagement, "strategic cooperation". And other promising developments 
coming out of both Washginton and New Delhi in the 1990s. By early 1998 it 
appeared that the two largest democracies were indeed starting over and were 
prepared to construct a new set of closer, more cooperative relations. 
In May 1998 this mutual intent secured a major challenge. On May 11 
India conducted three subterranean nuclear explosions at the Pokhran test site. 
On May 13, it conducted two more tests nearby. The Official Indian 
Statement said that "the tests ... provided a valuable database for the design 
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of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and different 
delivery systems". 
Any study that endeavours to explain the intricacies of India's 
interactions with the United States of America given the numerous ups and 
downs plugging the relations between the two countries. My study of Indo-
American Foreign Relations starts since 1990 which seeks to elucidate the 
constraints under which India endeavoured to cultivate working relations with 
the United States. I have drawn a vivid feature of the relations between the 
two countries at a time that was perhaps not only very conducive for forging a 
fruitful dialogue with the only super power of the world. I have covered 
practically all the aspects of India-American Foreign Relations in six chapters 
and the mutual suspicion of the successive Indian and American Governments 
regarding their foreign policy aims and objectives and the consequent chill in 
their relationship prior to 1990. To study these aspects of their relations, this 
study formally has six chapters besides bibliography. 
In the preparation of my research work I have largely relied on official 
documents. Attempt is made to utilize all the existing material on the topic, 
such as books, articles and newspapers reports and comments. 
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Chapter -1 
Indo-US Relations - A Historical Background 
As India marks the 63'^ '^  anniversary of its independence, it would be 
relevant to undertake an analytical overview of India's relations with one of 
the world's most important powers and now the most "important power, the 
United States. In the forward to Ambassador Kux's book St. General Paul G. 
Cerjan President of the National Defence University of United States; "Since 
India achieved independence in 1947, Geo-Political relations between India 
and the United States have never been close and today a member of 
formidable obstacles hinder progress along the pathway towards closer ties 
between these two most populous democracies". 
It is significant that this assessment of a senior establishment figure of 
the United States was articulated in 1992 after the cold war ended, after Indo-
Soviet equations became non-existent and after India initiated steps to 
establish closer relations with the western led by the United States. Indo-US 
relations technically date back to 1792 when George Washington appointed 
Benjamen Joy as US Consul in Calcutta soon after he became President. One 
ships over a period of approximately, 150 years upto the early 40s of this 
century, because nothing of significance characterized Indo-US political 
relations and secondly because the United States interaction with India being 
a part of the British Empire. It was Franklin Roosevelt's advent to the Second 
World War which activated US interests in India.' 
In the period between the two world wars, India's struggle for 
independence won the support of American Progressives, but did not gain 
wide spread public backing. After Mohandas K. Gandhi - familiarly called 
the Mahatma, Hindi for "Great Spirit"—assured the leadership of the Indian 
National Congress, the major nationalist organization, his non-violent protest 
campaigns against British rule generated considerable Press coverage. The 
spindly figure wrapped in bedsheetlike garb became a sympathetic - if rather 
puzzling - figure for Americans. On the negative side, Katharine Mayo's 
1927 book, Mother India - nationalist political leaders. Reacting against the 
viceroy's death a heavy blow to India's image. This withering depiction of 
Indian Society as deprived, squalid, and without redeeming virtues sold a 
phenomenal 256, 697 copies in 27"^  editions.^ 
Roosevelt 
When Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933, New 
Deal liberals, influenced by the anti - imperialist tradition of the Democratic 
party, sympathized with India's desire for independence. Neither Roosevelt 
nor secretary of State Cardell Hull, however, actively engaged US influence 
in support of the Indian nationalist cause in the 1930s. On the eve of World 
War II, India remained a country about which the United States had limited 
knowledge and with which the United States had little political contact. 
American images of Indian flickered between exotic Hollywood portrayals of 
the British Raj and the adventure tale of Rudyard Killing. Bejewelled 
maharajas and British colonial Sahibs, impoverish beggars and fakirs, 
massive demonstrations of Indian nationalists and the complex problems of 
untouchability, caste, and Hindu - Muslim communalism all made for a 
bewildering melange. 
For Indians, the United States was equally unfamiliar terrain, a distant 
land that seemed vastly different from their own dusty, impoverished sub 
continent. Few people of Indian origin lived in the United States - as late as 
1940, the census counted only 2,400 - mostly Sikh farmers who had 
immigrated to California from the Punjab in northwest India at turn of the 
century. ^ 
Educated Indians tended to look at the United States through the often 
critical British lens, as a country dominated by materialism and crime. Racial 
discrmination against non whites, especially segregation in the US South, 
added to the unflattering picture. Indians, like others Asians, deeply resented 
US laws barring them from immigrant status and citizenship. Well publicized 
incidents further tarnished the American image. Rabindra nath Tagore, for 
example, cut short a lecture tour in 1929 when the Nobel Prize winner felt 
insulted by a US immigration officials. ^  
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who in the late 1920s became one of 
Gandhi's Principal Lieutenants and foreign policy spokesman for the Indian 
National Congress^, initially found the United States not only racist, but 
imperialist. In 1927, the Indian leader joined the criticizing US foreign policy 
toward Latin American at the Brussels International Congress against colonial 
oppression and Imperialism. A year later Nehru wrote, "It is the United 
States which offers us the best field for study of economic imperialism."^ 
Between Indian nationalists and Americans, the priorities ultimately 
differed for Indian Congress Party leader, even for those like Nehru who were 
emotionally supportive of the Allied cause, the top priority remained that of 
ending British rule and gaining India's independence. For Roosevelt, wining 
the war was the top order of business. Everything else came seemed 
including independence for India if - as was the case - this would risk a 
serious rupture with his British allies. Because Indians and Americans 
expected - and thought they deserve - each other's support, the course of 
events during the war sharpened the mutual disappointment. This first 
extended interaction between United States and India the foreshadowed that 
would follow during the next five decades. 
Truman 
The Truman era in the Indo-US relations was characterized by 
generally correct relations without any intensifies in interaction or 
cooperation. Indo US relations acquired both complexities and economic 
content during the Eisenhower federal. Personal relations between 
Eisenhower and Nehru were better than those which Nehru had with Truman. 
This positive chemistry was neutralized by John Foster Dulles's supercillious 
righteousness summed-up in his foreign policy doctrine. "Those who are not 
with us are against us". Indo US trade and economic relations expanded 
during the period 1953 to 1960. Significantly, Indo US Technological 
cooperation commenced during this period, specially in the high technology 
sectors like heavy industry and nuclear power.^ 
From New Delhi, American diplomats began to report signs of 
dissatisfaction about post war US Policy towards Asia. After President 
Truman reaffirmed US support for self determination for all peoples. Pandit 
Nehru welcomed the statement, but added his hope that it represented 
"something more than an expression of vague goodwill." Although 
everywhere in Asia and Africa people looked up to America, Nehru 
commented critically, there has been some disillusionment in India in regard 
to American championing independence for freedom."^ 
Commissioner George Merrell, who succeeded Philips as head of the 
New Delhi office, kept Washington informed regarding on going Indian 
criticism of the US failure to Press British, French and Dutch allies for 
decolonization of their remaining holdings in Asia.'° 
When the Philippines formally gained their independence, Pandit 
Nehru sent a barbed message of Congratulations. "Some countries that are 
called independent are far from free and are under the economic or military 
domination of some great power. "Nehru Cabled." We hope that is not so 
with the Filipinos." 
By the end of the Truman years, Indo-US relations had fallen into the 
pattern of chronic that had so perplexed observes over the years. Although 
there were positive aspects, especially with Bowles as ambassador, a sense of 
estrangement was only too evident. 
Underlying the estrangement was a sense of mutual disappointment led 
by unrealized expectations. Democratic and secular India expected the 
support of the US on issues like Kashmir. The US as of the democratic world 
expected that free and democratic India would back the general thrust of US 
policy in dealing with the Soviet Threat. Washington did not welcome India's 
effort to follow a path, western democratic and communist totalitarian camps, 
especially after the US began to shed its blood in the war in Korea. And thus, 
it was that Indo-US relations got off a rocky start in the early years of 
independence. '^  
Dwight David Eisenhower became President on January 20, 1953. The 
incoming Republicans favoured a more conservative approach to the national 
problems, they wanted government at home and a tougher policy towards 
communist adversaries abroad. Above all, Eisenhower pledged an early end 
to the Korean war, increasingly unpopular as the conflict dragged on into its 
third year. 
This emphasize that incoming Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
placed on collective Security arrangements worried the Indian leader, 
concerned, let us, sponsored military pacts embrace India's Principal 
antagonist and neigbour Pakistan. The new Republican administration also 
appeared more rapid than the democrats about economic assistance to the 
developing countries, a subject of growing interest to India as food production 
to lag. '^  
Relations with south Asia did not rank high on Eisenhower foreign 
poHcy agenda. Prime Minister Nehru was, nonetheless, uneasy, "The new 
administration in the USA has not yet came out clearly with its new policy', 
he wrote his Chief Minister. "All that we know is that it has a certain bent of 
mind which does not take us towards peace". '"^  
Hindi - Chini Bhai Bhai 
As if to compensate further for the diplomatic defeat India suffered 
when Pakistan gained US military assistance, Nehru worked hard through 
1954 and 1955 to buttress Indian foreign policy, pressing for a settlement in 
troubled French Indo-China playing the leading role in the first Afro-Asian 
summit at Bandung and improving relations with communist china. In a 
'Non-alignment' to describe India's policy'^. 
In October 1954, Nehru travelled to china where the communist 
leaders arranged for a wildly enthusiastic reception. In the bilateral talks that 
took place Nehru raised a question of concern to the Government of India. 
Chinese maps showing parts of the laddakh region in northern Kashmir and 
claimed as its territory as Chinese. 
Chou En-Lai's response that there were old maps, which the people's 
Republic had yet to revise, satisfied the Prime Minister. Unfortunately, Nehru 
could not take up Chou's suggestion for a joint communique at the end of the 
stay. They might have dealt publicly with the map question, sparing much 
grief when India and China later fell out over their differing border claim. '^  
On his way back to India Nehru visited the four Indo-China states 
North Vietnamese leader Ho-Chi Min made an excellent impression, "South 
Vietnam produced a completely opposite effect," Nehru stated.''' 
Eisenhower II 
Dramatic overseas events - the simultaneous Suez and Hungary crisis 
almost pushed the President election off the Front Page. In the case of Suez, 
Nehru reached rapidly, angrily condemning the anglo - French - Israeli attack 
on Egypt on a flagrant violation of the UN charter. 
"I can not imagine a worst case of aggression, Nehru 
cabled Dulles, the whole future of the relations between 
Europe and Asia hangs in the balance." 
Eisenhower's insistence that the Britich, French and Israelis withdraw 
impressed Nehru. He had not expected the US to take such a firm stand 
against its allies in favour of Nasser, a neutralist with whom Washington had 
poor relation. '^  
US - Indian Relations: "Increasingly CORDIAL " 
In 1956, the NSC's operations coordinating Board (OCB) charged with 
monitoring implementation of US Policy around the world, reported gloomily 
that there had been little if any improvement in Indo-US relations.'^ 
Despite Ambassador Cooper's having established friendly relations 
with Prime Minister Nehru and somewhat better atmospherics, the OCB 
concluded that basic policy differences remained unresolved. 
Four years later, as Eisenhower presidency was drawing to a close, the 
OCB assessment sounded much more positive notes. Indo-US relations were 
"increasingly cordial." The President had enjoyed an extraordinary successful 
visit to New Delhi. Large-scale American aid to India had became an 
important positive factor in relations Growing troubles between India and its 
erstwhile friend communist china added a new element to bilateral ties. Indo-
Pakistan relations, if not friendly, were at least improved as a result of the 
settlement of the Indus waters dispute 21 
On the Indian side, there was also satisfaction about the trend in 
relations, even if US arms for Pakistan remained a problem. US economic aid 
was forthcoming in increasing amounts. As troubled brewed with china, the 
implicit support of the United States was a confronting factor. India's non-
alignment no longer seemed an anathema to the United States - Nehru could 
tell his Chief Minister after the 1959 talks with Eisenhower, "He appreciated 
and understood our desire to keep out of military alliances; indeed he would 
not have it otherwise". 
Kennedy 
The 1960 presidential election race Between vice president Richard M. 
Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy, one of the closest in American history, 
was watched closely around the globe, but especially in India and Pakistan. 
Pakistan Saw Nixon as good friend. India regarded the vice president, 
unlike President Eisenhower, as an unrepentant cold warrior and a foe of 
Indian non-alignment. Kennedy caused uneasiness in Pakistan and stirred 
hopes in India. As a senator, he cosponsored the 1958 senate resolution 
calling for increased economic aid for India and criticized the Republican 
Policy of relying on military pacts to meet the communist threat in the third 
world. Kennedy appeared considerably more sympathetic than Nixon to the 
aspiration of developing nations and less antagonistic towards non-alignment. 
The fact that Kennedy's foreign policy advisor during the 1960 election 
campaign was non- other than former Ambassador Chester Bowles was 
another big plus in India and minus in Pakistan. 
Kennedy's Policy toward south Asia marked a continuation of the shift 
in emphasis toward India already begun in Eisenhower's second term. While 
the approach may have been similar, the contrast in operating styles between 
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the two administrations was striking with the "New Frontier" emphasis on 
youth and action, Kennedy promptly disbanded the elaborate NSC Machinery 
used by Eisenhower. Kennedy's NSC, herded by Harvard academic 
McGeorge Bundy, was a much smaller, informal, and collegial body. Unlike 
Eisenhower, Kennedy became personally engaged in the details of issues that 
interested him, such as Incia and Pakistan. According to Talbot and his 
deputy James P. Grant, the President frequently called them directly to 
discuss current problems, by passing the formal organizational structure. NSC 
staffers like Robert Komer, speaking for the President, Played an active and 
energetic role along with state, Defence, AID, and CIA representatives in 
shaping and implementing South Asia Policy. 
NCS staffer Robert komer said he was skeptical about the chances for 
success but was convinced by Talbot to go along with the Kashmir efforts 24 
Neither India nor Pakistan, infact, showed any real enthusiasm about 
the Kashmir talks, with pressure from Washington and London the only 
reason for their agreeing to participate. After departing from South Asia, 
Dean Rask panned a gloomey assessment about the prospects for any early 
settlement. Ted Sorenson quoted President Kennedy as saying, all too 
accurately that India and Pakistan regarded the Kashmir dispute as "More 
important than the struggle against the communists." Reconciliation 
between the foes was not in the cards. 
Johnson 
Although Lyndon Johnson broadly supported the bipartisan Policy of 
containment of commission and assistance to the power making of the world, 
he was skeptical about the favoured position Kennedy gave to India in US. 
South Asia Policy, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan greatly impressed 
Johnson during his visit to Karachi in May 1961. 
On the same visit he was less taken with Jawaharlal Nehru. After 
meeting President Johnson moved somewhat closer to Kennedy position, 
NSC staffer komer, who strongly suffered patting the major emphasis on 
India not on Pakistan, said the most Panasonic argument with Johnson related 
to the relative population of the two countries - the President agreed, it made 
more sense for the US to line-up with India, a country so populous rather than 
to chose its enemy Pakistan. 
Johnson first meeting as President with a senior Indian came in April 
1964, when he received Prime Minister Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, who 
was traveling in the United States. She gave the President a letter from her 
ailing father, in which Nehru praised Johnson's efforts for a nuclear accord 
with the Russians, assured the President India would persist in seeking better 
understanding with Pakistan, and expressed appreciation for the US economic 
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and military assistance. 
In their discussion, Johnson took friendly exception to remarks by Mrs. 
Gandhi to the New York Times that the United States favoured Pakistan on 
the Kashmir issue. With a smile, the President said "the Indian should 
realised that Pakistan were for more unhappy about our policy towards 
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India than India seemed to about our policy towards Pakistan. 
During the meeting with Indira Gandhi, Johnson did not discuss 
military assistance, the most important item then on the Indo-US agenda. 
Americans were also disenchanted. India seemed to be going nowhere 
economically - unable to feed itself India was hardly the model of democratic 
development - Washington hoped other third world countries would emulate 
as a rival to china. Official Washington was asking what the point was 
pouring hundred of millions of dollars into a country that had performed 
poorly and remained at odds with much of the US foreign policy? 
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Was it worthwhile to continue to pay so much attention to south Asia, 
especially at a time when 500,000 American troops were fighting to save 
South Vietnam from a communist takeover? All the US had to show for more 
a decade of trying to promote peace between India and Pakistan was the 1965 
war. The two countries had made graphically clear that they were far more 
worried about each other than any external threat. 
As the clock ran down in the Johnson administration, a sense of 
exhaustion with south Asia and its seemingly inseparable problems had taken 
hold even among liberal democrats favourably inclined towards India. 
The glum mood of 1969 about India, John F. Kennedy became 
President. In the intervening eight years, because of the Vietnam war, and the 
revised appraisal of the subcontinents relevance to US interest. New Delhi no 
longer seen as having major strategic importance. India, in Washington's 
eyes, had became just a big country full of poor people.^ ° 
Nixon 
When Richard Nixon replaced Lyndon Johnson in the white house, in 
January 1969, his main policy concern lay on widening down the unpopular 
war in Vietnam. He was content to continue the disengaged approach towards 
South Asia which Johnson began after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war '^. As 
Henery Kissinger wrote in his memoirs when the Nixon administration took 
office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid 
another complication to our agenda. "'^  
Nixon took office usually experienced in foreign affairs after his eight 
years as vice President under Eisenhower. He continued to pursue this interest 
as a private citizen in the 1967, his travels taking him to south Asia in 1964 
and again in 1967. On both occasions, the Indians received him with the 
minimum of appropriate protocol, the Pakistanis lionized the former vice 
President. 
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This treatment presumably did nothing to lesson Nixon's preference 
for Pakistan, the erstwhile ally of the United States, and his dislike for India 
and its policy of non-alignment - "Nixon, to put it mildly," Kissinger Stated, 
"was less susceptible to Indian claims of moral leadership than some of his 
predecessors; indeed, he viewed what he considered their alleged 
obsequiousness towards India as a Prime example of liberal soft -
headedness." ^'^ 
The Bangladesh Crisis 
In November, the tempo of military action increased the Bangladesh 
"Freedom fighters" were becoming more aggressive on their cross-border 
forays, receiving artillery support from the Indian military. Late in the month, 
Mrs. Gandhi authorized Indian forces to enter East Pakistan to "Pursue" the 
Pakistan forces. Tensions mounted. An all out Indian military assault against 
the East seemed imminent. 
Although there is dispute whether or not India fixed a Day to invade 
East Pakistan, if Yahya resolved the problem for New Delhi.^^ On the night of 
'y^ December, Pakistan attacked eight Indian airfields in the western part of 
the country and the next day declared war on India.^ ^ the Indian countered, 
attacking in the east and mounting probing operations in the west to pin down 
Pakistan forces. On 6 December, Indian recognized the Awami League 
government - in - exile as the government of Bangladesh. 
As badly outnumbered Pakistani forces retreated from the borders 
towards Dacca, the war in the east was for all intents over within a week. It 
was only a question of how long the Pakistanis would hold out. On 16 
December, the Pakistanis ended the struggle, with some 93,000 soldiers 
surrendered - when a week earlier, they discussed giving up, Yahya urged the 
troops in the east to fight on, apparently hoping for intervention from the 
United States and China. 
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The US role during the crisis is reasonably clear, the rationale for the 
Nixon - Kissinger policy has remained less clear. Part of the difficulty has 
been that the President and Kissinger perceived the crisis almost entirely in 
terms of its global implications, as they interpreted there and the US 
government's south Asia hands and most other observers considered the crisis 
as a regional affairs with limited broader implications. For Nixon and 
Kissinger, the tilt was not just a means of expressing appreciation to the 
Pakistanis for their help in the opening to China, but for more important, 
trying to impress the Chinese by the US handling of the crisis. Then NSC 
south Asia staffer Harold saunders recalled Kissinger saying on several 
occasions : 
We are opening a relationship with China 
based on the proposition that we are both 
concerned about soviet intentions. While we 
are In the process of opening up over 
dialogue with China, we face a crisis in South 
Asia for Pakistan, our traditional ally. China 
will be looking to see how we treat that ally if 
the United States stands by and sees an ally 
dismembered what will the Chinese think 
about our reliability? ^^  
After the Bangladesh crisis the relations with United States went under 
a low - ebb, the Shimla accord, nonetheless, led to a change in the US stance 
towards the Kashmir dispute. Previously, the United States stood behind 
relevant UN resolutions, including the call for a plebiscite. After 1972, 
Washington shifted ground, the US position since Simla has been to support 
any settlement the Indians and Pakistan were able to work out. 
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India Becomes the World's Sixth Nuclear Power 
On 18 May 1974, just three months before Watergate drove Richard 
Nixon from office, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission exploded an 
underground nuclear device at Pokhran in the deserts of Rajasthan, several 
hundred miles west of New Delhi. The explosion made India the world's sixth 
nuclear power. 
India's going nuclear badly damaged its standing in the United States 
among its tradition liberal supporters. Although not happy about the test, 
Republicans like Kissinger, in effect, shrugged their shoulders. They did not 
believe trying to punish the Indian would do much good. In contract, liberal 
democrats, may of whom bitterly criticized Nixon's handling of the 
Bangladesh crisis, turned their wrath on New Delhi for breathing the nuclear 
barrier. 
The action in mid 1974 to absorb the tiny protectorate of Sikkim was 
married to a former US citizen Hope Cooke meant the Indian action received 
considerably more publicity than would otherwise have been the case. 
Gerald Ford 
The new president had limited experience in dealing with South Asia. 
As in most foreign policy matters, he took his lead from secretary of State 
Kissinger. 
In October 1974, Kissinger, nonetheless, took a personal step to repair 
the danger with India, spending three days in New Delhi. His trip signaled 
Washington's interest in patching things in an organized manner. 
Kissinger appeared upbeat on arrival and throughout the stay in New 
Delhi. At a 28* October official dinner, he spoke of part misunderstandings as 
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removed and of a "better, more realistic relationship" between the two 
countries in the future. 
The next day, the secretary delivered a major policy statement in a 
speech to the Indian council of World Affairs. Kissinger underscored US 
hopes for a "mature" relationship, stirred US acceptance of India as the 
preeminent power in the region, and indicated Washington had no quarrel 
with India's policy of non-alignment. 
"The United States recognizes India a one of the major powers of the 
world and conducts its policy accordingly," Kissinger declared. '^ ° 
There were all words the Indians had long hoped to hear from the 
United States, especially from someone like Henry Kissinger, regarded by 
New Delhi as antagonistic. 
At the same time Kissinger attended to sensitivities over US aid, 
commenting, "Our relationship can not be based on dependence of one on the 
other." The secretary added, "Nor can our relationship survive constant 
criticism of one by the other," a reference to India's habit of sniping at US 
policies and Mrs. Gandhi's Periodic allegations of US interference in India's 
internal affairs. In a Press conference on 30"^  October, Kissinger flatly denied 
that the CIA was interfering in Indian affairs. He stated, "the United States is 
not engaged, directly or indirectly, in any attempt to influence the democratic 
situation in India."*' 
The bilateral relationship sustained graves damage during the 1970, 
first from the US policy during the Bangladesh crisis and later form Indian 
action - the 1974 nuclear test and then 1975 proclamation of the emergency. 
Psychologically, the US approach during 1971 - especially the Enterprise 
episode - etched an image of US hostility into the Indian historical memory. 
Nikon's termination of the economic assistance programme, previously a 
positive offset to political frictions, removed another important element of the 
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bilateral relationship. Even though the aid links brought their own problems, 
US help was a tangible sign of American interest in supporting the economic 
development of the worlds largest democracy. 
Even more so, India could not ignore Washington. US South Asia 
Policies, especially ties with Pakistan and China, could directly affect Indian 
Security. Through the strong US voice in International financial institutions, 
the Americans also influenced multilateral aid flows, of growing importance 
as a source of external finance for Indian development. As much as US policy 
during 1971 offended New Delhi, if was not in India's national interest to 
make hostility with Washington a permanent foreign policy feature. Despite 
Indira Gandhi's chronic sniping at Washington, she was wary of India's 
becoming so closely linked to the Soviet Union that non-alignment would 
become a fiction. A firm nationalist, the Prime Minister wanted to maintain 
her country's freedom of maneuver in the international arena. To realize this 
goal, India needed at least the resemblance of a working relationship with the 
United States.'*^ 
Jimmy Carter 
As Jimmy Carter led the democrats back to the White House, the 
prospects for Indo-US relations were mixed. If Ford and Kissinger were 
willing to look the other way about dictatorship in India on the ground that 
internal political arrangements of Foreign Countries were not a concern of the 
United States, Carter felt differently. The new President pledged to make 
respect for human rights a cardinal principles of US foreign policy. Carter's 
thinking was not far from that of liberal congress - man Donald Eraser (D-
Minnesota), who declared in hearings just after the inauguration, that the 
United States ought to avoid "endorsing implicitly or otherwise India's 
suspension of civil rigts."'*'' The new President's emphasis on human rights 
threatened to collide head on with the Emergency. 
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In Washington, there was a quick and enthusiastic reaction to the 
Indian elections. Jody Powell, white House Press spokesman, called their 
"Something that should be an inspiration." The state Department sounded 
equally upbeat, "This naturally is very good news that the world's second 
largest country has once again carried out a free and fair election." ''^  With 
former Vice President Hubert Humphrey, again a senator from Minnesota, 
taking the lead, the US congress repealed the law adapted after the 1974 
nuclear test requiring the United States to Vote against all world Bank loans 
to India. ^^ 
Carter's Visit to India 
In the fall of 1977 preparations were under way for Jimmy Carter to 
visit India. As Ambassador Goheen Pul it, the trip would help show "the 
assistants of the part have been removed, and now the groundwork for better 
relations, better mutual respect and trust is there."''^ In keeping with the new 
approach to South Asia, and unlike Eisenhower and Nixon, the two previous 
Presidential travellers to the subcontinent. Carter did not couple his trip to 
India with a stop in Pakistan. 
Just a week before the elections, on 27 December 1979, the world was 
stunned and the superpower relationship shaken when the soviet Indian 
intervened militarily in Afghanistan to oust President Amin and install the 
more reliable Babrak Kamal regime. As a shocked President Jimmy carter 
reversed course, the cold war again became the order of the day. Disarmament 
talks collapsed. The President tried to prevent further erosion of the west's 
strategic position through stepped-up defense spending. Washington sought to 
punish the Soviets through measures like boycotting the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics and embargoing grain exports. 
In New Delhi, the Ministry of External Affairs decided to clear the 
statement India would make on Afghanistan with the incoming Prime 
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Minister. Besieged by the Preparations for taking office, Mrs. Gandhi turned 
the task over to T.N. Kaul, long known for his pro-soviet views, and G. 
Parthasarathy, another veteran foreign policy advisor. Ministry officials tried 
to soften the languages but were able only to gain acceptance for a few 
changes.''^ Delivered in New York by Indian UN Representative Mishra on II 
January, the statement white washed the soviet action : 
We are against the presence of foreign 
troops and bases in any country. However, 
the soviet government has assured our 
government that its troops went to 
Afghanistan first at the request of the Afghan 
Government on December 28, 1979 and we 
have been further assured that soviet troops 
will be withdraw when requested to do so by 
the Afghan Government. We have no reason 
to doubt assurance, particularly from a 
friendly country like Soviet Union with when 
we have may close ties.''^  
By chance, Ambassador Goheen met with President Jimmy Carter the 
afternoon Mishra spoke in the UN General Assembly on Learning of the 
Indian statement. Carter was livid.^ ^ Goheen calmed him down saying, "we 
don't really know the circumstances. Let me go back to New Delhi and report 
before we do anything about this."^' 
Unlike the mid 1950s when some one in Washington questioned the 
wisdom of providing US arms to Pakistan, Indian expression of concern in 
1980 found few sympathetic American ears. Given the soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, Carter administration officials listened to the Indians, but paid 
little attention to their complaints about US help for Pakistan.^^ 
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Ronald Reagan 
On 20"^  January 1981, Ronald Reagan took the oath of office as 
President of the United States. Within an hour, Iran set free the American 
Embassy hostages it had held for over a year, relieving Reagan from having to 
deal with the Problem that consumed Jimmy Carter's final year in the White 
House. The new administration could devote full energy to its primary foreign 
and national security Policy goal: rebuilding US military Power so that the 
United States could counter the spread of soviet influence in various parts of 
the world - in central America, in the horn of Africa, in Angola, in South Asia 
and in Afghanistan. 
Mrs, Gandhi for a number of reasons wanted to narrow, not widen, the 
gap between New Delhi and Washington. Indira did not want India to loose 
its freedom of maneuver or to become a soviet sattelite or surrogate. 
Achieving this goal required greater distance between New Delhi and 
Moscow and a better relationship with the United States. Although she 
discouraged Morarji Desai's attempt to bring greater balance in India's non-
alignment between the two superpowers, Mrs. Gandhi pursued a similar goal 
after settling back into office in 1980.^' 
Realizing the limits of soviet technology, the Indians hoped for greater 
access to the more advanced technologies of the west, especially the United 
States, not only in the defence sector but across the economic spectrum. 
Better ties might also, the Indians hoped, influence Washington to continue a 
positive attitude towards India in International financial institutions and to 
take greater account of India's views in US dealing with Pakistan. '^* 
The Prime Minister arrived in Washington on 30"^  July. To greet her at 
Andrews Air Force base was George Shultz, the new secretary of state, who 
had just repJaced Alexander Haig after the latter's stormy resignation. 
Landing a bit later by helicopter on the white House lawn, Mrs. Gandhi was 
19 
welcomed by a smiling and relaxed Ronald Reagan, a marked contrast with 
Richard Nixon's tense reception eleven years before. Reagan spoke of his 
hope "To broaden and deepen the dialogue we began last autumn at cancun" 
and of "renewed recognition of the mutual importance of strong, constructive 
ties between India and the United States."^^ replying Prime Minister Gandhi 
described her journey as "an adventure in search of better understanding and 
for friendship to find an common area, howsoever small, on which to build 
and enhance cooperation."^* 
Gradually that view changed. After Mrs. Gandhi was all smiles during 
her 1982 visit Washington perked up. When Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his 
mother, the United States saw new opportunities with India. Washington 
eased barriers to technology transfer and approved some advanced technology 
cooperation with India's defence industry. Although the bilateral rhetoric 
became more positive, adding substance to the better atmosphere was not 
easy. Basic policy differences continued and legacy of mutual distrust 
remained. Despite skepticism about how for the improvement in relations 
could carry, however, neither capital gave up the effort. During Reagan's 
eight years in office high - level dialogue greatly increased. The Vice 
President, secretary of State, two secretaries of Defence, and three other 
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cabinet members visited India. Indira and Rajiv paid Reagan three visits to 
Washington. Mutual understanding increased at the top levels of government. 
By 1988, both India and United States seemed more realistic about 
what they could not expect from each other. Even though the bilateral 
framework remained fragile and progress towards substantive cooperation 
was uneven, there were smiles not frowns in New Delhi when Vice-President 
George Bush, a friend of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, defeated the 
Democrats in the November 1988 elections. 
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George Bush 
President George Bush was familiar with the issues in South Asia from 
his eight years as Vice President, as well as from his earlier service at the 
United Nations, and his tenure as Director of CIA. Most others in his 
administration, however, had limited previous exposure to India and the 
subcontinent. Although Washington had at first no need to undertake 
initiatives in South Asia, the dramatic shifts in Soviet Policy greatly affected 
the US stance towards the region. 
A year later, in October 1990, in the middle of the Persian Gulf crisis, 
although not directly relate to it, the shoe finally fell. With the soviet military 
departed from Afghanistan and mounting information regarding the scope of 
Pakistan's nuclear Program, the administration concluded it could no longer 
defer taking action the President decided he would not certify that Pakistan 
did not possess a nuclear weapon, and as a consequence in keeping with 
Pressler amendment slopped US military and economic assistance. Press 
reports attributed the decision to Islamabad's refusing to roll back its uranium 
enrichment program, a key element in its covert effort to develop a weapons 
capability.^^ 
As the Bush administration got under way, Rajiv Gandhi was preparing 
to face the Indian electorate with his five-year term as Prime Minister nearing 
its end. His overall record was mixed considerable economic progress, much 
less in dealing with India's domestic difficulties. The central government's 
heavy - handed management of Sikh separatist unrest failed to calm the 
Punjab where terrorist intimidation rather than law and order became the 
norm, as if the crisis in the Punjab and unrest in Assam in eastern India were 
not sufficient trouble, Rajiv began to full major turbulence in Kashmir. 
As the General election held in December 1989, congress got 195 seat 
which lacked sufficient allies to form a new government, the National front 
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which came through with 145 seats formed a minority government headed by 
V.P. Singh, with support from BJP on the right and communist on the left 
Rajiv became the leader of the opposition in Parliament. Like the Janata in 
1977, the National Front and its allies agreed on opposing the congress but a 
little else, as well as policy contradictions with the BJP and the communist 
supporters, suggested V.P. Singh was going to have a difficult time staying in 
power. 
The Super 301 dispute: a new Source of friction 
In June 1989, when Bush White House issued the first 301 watch list, 
Japan, India, and Brazil were cited as trade offenders with three complaints 
about India. The first concerned India's policy towards foreign investment, 
which in the US view effectively excluded foreign companies by limiting 
their equity participation to 40 percent. Although the Indians vehemently 
denied the accusation, the extremely small size of foreign investment lent 
credibility to the charge. In 1989, over all investment from abroad was $200 
million, that of the United States only $37 million - a minuscule amount for 
an economy as large as India's.^^ 
When Chandra Shekhar replaced V.P. Singh his government 
maintained India's support for UN actions against Iraq and agreed to 
continued US refueling even after diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis 
failed and the bombing of Iraq began. Chandra Shekhar's basically supportive 
stance drew increasing criticism from his main bulwark, Rajiv's Congress 
party, which thought by taking a different tack it could bolster prospects for 
new elections anticipated in 1991. Rajiv fell restless about India's being on 
the sidelines, playing no role in the Persian Gulf crisis. 
Rajiv felt restless about Indian's being on the sidelines, playing no role 
in the Persian Gulf crisis, and calculated that his party would gain at the ballot 
box by playing to a combination of non-alignment, Indian nationalism (i.e. 
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opposing superpower domination), and Indian Muslim support for Iraq. Like 
coreligionists elsewhere in Asia, some Muslims in India sympathized with 
Baghdad, especially after the air attacks against Iraq began in January 1991. °^ 
1991 General Elections - Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
Indian's tenth General election since independence and the second in 
two years, focused entirely on domestic issues. Although both V.P. Singh and 
Chandra Shekhar as Prime Ministers India's intention to renew the Indo -
Soviet Treaty. The relations with Moscow in either economic or security 
terms was of increasingly questionable relevance. New Delhi was much at sea 
in adjusting to the new realities in the wake of the collapse of the familiar 
soviet counter weight. Regionally India remained the dominant power, but 
relations with Pakistan continued to be tense and nerves prayed over the belief 
that Islamabad was fanning the flames of unrest in Punjab and Kashmir.^' 
A half century of diplomatic relation between the US and India 
concluded in the summer of 1991, the end point of the history. In New Delhi, 
there was a desire for better relations with the US after the end of cold war the 
Indian authorities seemed, however, ensure how to go about this and more 
broadly how to define India's foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In the US there was a similar lack of clarity about US policy towards 
South Asia and towards India. Washington seemed unsure how it wanted to 
relate to India in the changed global environment and where India fit into 
President Bush's New World Order. Bilateral ties between Washington and 
New Delhi were thus superficially friendly, but a considerable uncertain by 
just below the surface. 
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An Overview 
Despite the lifting of cold-war constraints, in many policy spheres 
India remains shackled to the past. Rivalries with neighbours, separatist 
tendencies, and sectarian tensions continue to divert attention and resources 
from basic needs of economic and social development. Moreover, fallout 
from their unresolved problems - particularly nuclear arms proliferation and 
human rights issues — presents serious irritants in US-Indian relations. 
Three wars and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides 
of the border have marked the half-century of bitter rivalry between India and 
Pakistan. The acrimonious nature of the partition of British India in 1947 and 
the continuing dispute over Kashmir have been major sources of tension, 
leading both countries to devote comparatively large resources to building 
defense establishments that include a nuclear weapons capability as well as 
programmes for developing ballistic missile delivery systems. The Kashmir 
problem is rooted in claims by both countries to the former primely state, 
divided by a military line of control, since 1948, into the Indian state of 
Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan - controlled Azad (Free) Kashmir. India 
blames Pakistan for supporting a separatist movement raging in the Muslim-
dominated Kashmir valley since 1990. Pakistan admits only to lending moral 
and political support to the rebellion, while accusing of India of creating 
dissention in Pakistan's Sindh province. 
Adding to India's bitterness towards Pakistan is the latter's historically 
close ties with China. India and China fought a short border war in 1962, and 
china since then has occupied territory claimed by India. Although sino-
Indian relations have greatly improved in recent years, the two countries have 
yet to reach a boundary agreement. Moreover, India remains suspicious about 
China's nuclear weapons capability as well as its long-time support for 
Pakistan. During a visit by Rao to China in September 1993, however, the 
Indian Prime Minister and Chinese Premier Li Peng signed an agreement to 
24 
reduce troops and maintain peace along the line of actual control (LAC) that 
divided their forces. Agreements on trade, environmental, and cultural 
cooperation were also signed. In Decemberl995, after eight rounds of talks by 
an India-China joint working group, both sides pulled back troops from four 
points along the eastern sector of the border. A visit by Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin to India in late November 1996 concluded with an agreement by 
India and China not to attack each other across their disputed border and to 
negotiate a partial withdrawal of troops from the border. Despite expanding 
border trade and continuing meetings of the working groups, by early 1998 
little progress was apparent on boundary demarcation. 
Whatever policy conclusions Washington and New Delhi ultimately 
draw, here the lesson of the past are transparently clear. The United States 
needs to respect India's security sensitivities and to avoid actions, in 
particular a renewal of a major arms relationship with Pakistan, that New 
Delhi finds threatening to its vital interests. India's apprehensions about a 
military threat from Pakistan - a country with one- eight India's population 
and a greatly inferior military capability - may be irrational and illogical; they 
are, nonetheless, real for Indians. 
For Washington, the most logical policy would be to continue along 
the trial begin in the late 1970s and resumed in the made - 1980s: to treat 
India as a significant Asian power with which the United States should seeks 
fi-iendly relations, including expanded security cooperation. India and the 
United States non have a shared interest in stability in the Indian ocean region 
and a viable balance of power in Asia. India is large enough, and 
economically and military of sufficient importance, that the Indo-US 
relationship could have strategic importance in its own right. 
There is one essential pre-condition - that the end of cold-war should 
in theory have a positive influence on Indo-US relations. By removing or 
reducing the significance of the two principal sources of past frictions - US 
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arms to Pakistan and India's close ties with the soviet Union - the altered 
international environment has offered a new point of departure. Indo-US 
relations need no longer be hostage to US - Pakistan and Indo-soviet 
relations. Whether the two countries will take advantage of this opportunity 
remains uncertain - the history of past estrangement has left its scars. Public 
opinion, of particular importance in the case of democracies such as India and 
the United States, poses an obstacle to importance in relations. The same is 
true for the often negative attitudes among the foreign policy and natural 
security establishments. 
For India, a better relationship with the United States requires a 
strengthening of the approach initiated by the Janata government in the late 
1970s and resumed after Mrs. Gandhi's 1982 visit to Washington. Without 
the double burden of the US - Pakistan and the Indo- Soviet relationship, the 
pace of improvement could quicker if encouraged by the government of India. 
But relations are unlikely to became more cooperative if India decides almost 
viscerally that opposing the United States is the natural state of affairs for 
Indian foreign policy. Related to this is the future of non-alignment, after the 
end of the cold-war more a slogan than a guide to policy. The prospects for 
improved relations would dim should New Delhi redefine non-alignment in 
North-South terms - positioning itself as a leader of the Third world in a 
strident struggle against the United States and the industrialized west. 
One of the most difficult issues before the two countries in the 1990s is 
the nuclear question. With both India and Pakistan now acknowledged as 
nuclear weapon capable countries, the proliferation issue and the related 
problem of missile capability are certain to remain major bilateral pre-
occupations. This development has made conflict - avoidance between the 
two antagonists a key US regional security interest in South - Asia. The goal 
is to avoid a crisis that could lead to nuclear war between Indian and Pakistan, 
and, if possible, to reduce New Delhi and Islamabad to renounce nuclear 
weapons. The quasi-nuclearization of the sub-continent could, indeed, mark 
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as important a change in south Asia as the end of the cold-war. A Nuclear 
Pakistan has, in effect, achieved strategic parity with India, something it could 
never have hoped for with conventional weapons. How effectively and calmly 
Washington and New Delhi deal with this difficult and dangerous problem is 
certain to have a major impact on future - course of the US Indian 
relationship. 
The first half century of relations between the United States and India, 
in retrospect, has been dis-appointing. The clash of interests that began during 
World War II when Indians and Americans differed on basic priorities 
continued through the more forty years of the cold-war. The two countries 
found themselves on opposite sides of major foreign and security policy 
issues despite their common adherence to the democratic system. With the 
cold was over, Indo- US relations could become more positive. It is uncertain, 
however, that the two governments will take advantage of this opportunity. 
Even though past problems are for the moment out of sight, they are not out 
of mind, New Delhi and Washington need to study and absorb the lessons of 
the past five decades if India and the United States are to forge a more 
constructive relationship in the years ahead. 
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Chapter - 2 
Improvement in Relationship 
The Kashmir Dispute: US Relation Disappoints India 
Neither the Cold War, dollar diplomacy, nor anti colonialism caused the 
first major bilateral difference between the United States and independent India, 
the problem arose over the princely state Jammu and Kashmir. Under the British 
ground rules, the rulers of the several hundred princely states were encouraged to 
join either India or Pakistan, taking into account factors such as geography and 
the religious make up of their populations. By August 1947, all but three of more 
than 350 states had acceded to India or Pakistan. Two of the three still standing 
apart were, unfortunately, the largest states, Kashmir and Hyderabad. 
Strategically located in the Himalayas in the northwest portion of the 
subcontinent, Kashmir had a Hindu ruler and Muslim Majority Population. The 
natural beauty and cool climate of the central valley or vale of Kahmir had 
attracted the Mughal Emperors and then the British as a Heaven from the soaring 
heat of Indian summers. When the temperature mounted in May to over 50 
degrees on the plains, the British flocked to houseboats on the lakes near the 
5,000 foot high capital in Sri Nagar, where the soaring Himalayas provided a 
magnificent back drop. 
Governor General Lord Mountbatten convinced Nehru that Kashmir's 
accession should be conditional until the people of the state could vote on the 
final status. Mountbatten's acceptance of accession for the Government of India 
started explicitly that when law and order were restored and the invaders gone, 
"the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the 
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people." A few days later, in a 2 November, 1947 radio broad cast, Prime 
Minister Nehru similarly stated that a plebiscite would settle the state's fate. 
A dramatic airlift of Indian troops, secured the Srinagar airport, 
preventing the fall of Kashmir's capital, the Indian soldiers than gradually drove 
back the Pathan tribesman, the invaders having failed to seize Srinagar when it 
lay defenseless, wasting their advantage on looking and pillaging. After bilateral 
attempts to end the fighting failed, Nehru - following Mountbatten's Counsel -
took the issue to the United Nations security Counsel, believing that India's legal 
and moral case against Pakistan was strong. 
Quite apart from political considerations, Jawaharlal Nehru had a strong 
emotional attachment to Kashmir, his family's home land. The Indian leader was 
a Kashmiri Pandit, a Brahmin Sub caste that ranked near the top of the Hindu 
Social order. Nehru was also a personal friend of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, 
the Charismatic leader of the nationalists in Kashmir, to whom the Maharajah 
turned over effective power after joining India. Politically, the Sheikh had close 
ties with the Indian Congress Party, supported the idea of a secular state, and 
opposed the concept of Pakistan."* 
The United States, a nonetheless, cooperated with the British when the 
Kashmir issue came before the UN Security Council. The initial presentation by 
India and Pakistan made clear the enormous gap between the two parties. As 
Indian political scientist Sisir Gupta wrote, "Both appeared as the aggrieved 
parties, both as the complainants. To India, Pakistan had committed aggression 
and violated her territory, to Pakistan, India was always hostile and was intent on 
undoing the creation of Pakistan itself."^ 
Despite Nehru's negative reaction, the United States continued to Press 
for Indian acceptance of Mc Naughton's ideas. In a 9 January 1950 meeting with 
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Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, who had become ambassador to Washington, and 
External Affairs Ministry Secretary General Bajpai, Dean, Acheson Strenuously 
urged India not again to refuse UN Kashmir proposal. 
Angry about the US demarche, Nehru sharply replied via Bajpai that 
Achieson's message; 
It is not only unfriendly in tone and substance 
but appears to us to be seeking to bring pressure on 
our government under threat of consequences .... It 
appears to be totally forgotten that we are not the 
aggressors, but that we are the victims of 
aggression on .... I would like to add that it is a 
matter of great personal regret to me that the 
secretary Acheson should have sent us message of 
this kind.^ 
After the failure of Mc. Naughton's efforts, the Security Council sent 
prominent Australian jurists Sir Owen Dixon to South Asia to try his hand. 
Arriving during the oven-like heat of May, Dixon toiled through the summer of 
1950, working quietly with Nehru, Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, 
and others. When he concluded that a state wide plebiscite was impractical, the 
Australian suggested an approach similar to an idea put forward earlier by Girja 
Bajpai - limiting the vote to the valley while partitioning the rest of the state on 
the religious basis. In the end, this proposal failed after Nehru rejected the idea 
of UN control of the valley during the Plebisite.^ 
For Indians, the Kashmir question was a central and a vital foreign policy 
issue inevitably linked with the traumatic partition of British India and the 
creation of Pakistan. As Josef Korbel, one time chairman of UNCIP, wrote: 
The struggle for Kashmir is in every sense 
another bottle in this continuing struggle and by 
now irrational was of ideals. In the minds of Nehru 
and the Congress, Kashmir is, in miniature, another 
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Pakistan, and if tiiis (Muslim nation can be 
successfully governed by India, then their 
Philosophy of secularization is vindicated.^ 
The United States looked at Kashmir quite differently. Washington 
regarded the problem as a serious dispute between the two countries with which 
the United States had friendly relations, but not as an issue involving vital US 
interests. Kashmir also appeared to be the type of regional dispute that the 
United Nations should be able to resolve, especially as India's original 
suggestion for a Plebiscite provided a basis for settlement. The concern in 
Washington was that in the absence of a settlement fighting would again break 
out between India and Pakistan. Although at first Washington took no strong 
position on the merits, the United States back the UN call for a Plebiscite and 
gradually became exasperated by Nehru's backsliding on this question and by 
incremental steps, New Delhi took to formally incorporate Kashmir into the 
Indian Union.^ 
George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs through much of this period, commented that the main US concern 
was about the possible out break of war over Kashmir. "We wanted to avert full 
scale war between India and Pakistan, this was always a threat. Our efforts failed 
because of Nehru," McGhee asserted.'° 
The end of Cold War and its Implications for Indo-American 
Relations 
Once the Korean war started in June 1950, Cold War considerations 
became an even more dominant element in US foreign policy. Discussions 
between Ambassador Henderson and Prime Minister Nehru in November 1950 
mirrored the shaip differences between the two countries on this basic problem, 
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the United States stressing collection security and India following a neutralist 
approach as the best way to pressure the peace. 
In December, 1950 just after the Chinese routed UN forces in North Korea 
a state Department Policy review of South Asia made it clear that Washington 
main concern about India was that country not be "lost" the way China was. 
"With China under communist domination," the study stated, "Soviet power now 
encroaches along the perimeter of the Indian sub continent. India has become the 
pivotal state in non-communist Asia by virtue of its relations power, stability and 
influence.'' 
The policy paper hoped India would agree "voluntarily to associate itself 
with the United States and like minded countries opposing communism, "and 
supported Ambassador Henderson's recommendation that an aid Program be 
initiated. '^  
The continuing incompatibility of US and Indian views was, however, 
underscored in April 1951 discussions that Assistant Secretary McGhee and 
Ambassador Henderson had with Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi, these talks 
confirmed a wide gap between US and Indian thinking on the major foreign 
policy issues of the day handling the war in Korea, the Soviet Union, and 
Communist China. As Henderson put it, there remained a fundamental 
difference between US about the aggressive intent of international 
commission".'^ 
Obviously, cold war is the competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union for the friendship, good will, diplomatic support, allegiance and 
alliance of other countries. It could as well be termed as the struggle for the 
domination of the world. Therefore, the United States has been an inevitable 
major participant in the Cold War World Strategy. It was difficult for India to 
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identify herself with either of the blocs. Though it had adopted the Parliamentary 
democracy of the West, it could not trust the western powers due to the legacy of 
imperialism, the evils of imperialism were much more real and obvious to the 
Indians than those of the distant bugbear of communist totalitarianism'''. 
Relations between Gorbachouv and Reagan's successor, George Bush 
were good and there were several summits. These produced two historic 
agreements. The conventional forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed in 
November, 1990 and the strategic Arms Reduction treaty (START) signed in 
July 1991. But opposition by the Soviet General staff undermined the CFE treaty 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in August 1991 halted Progress on the 
START treaty. One of the objects of Soviet foreign policy had been to 
strengthen socialism around the world. By 1990 it was clear that this mission 
had failed. The Soviet Union's only allies were under developed third world 
state such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Cuba and they were all liabilities requiring 
more and more aid to stay afloat.'^ 
In a report to Congress on National Security Strategy, President Bush in 
March 1990 outlined his administrations approach towards South Asia. He said 
that both India and Pakistan were friends of the United States. With Pakistan 
they would try to maintain a special relationship and at the same time try to 
improve relations with India. They would also try to, "encourage India - Pakistan 
rapprochement and a halt to nuclear proliferation.'^ 
In February 1992, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif gave the 
call to support the cause of the Kashmiri people and to free Kashmir from India. 
Pakistan wanted to bring up the Kashmir issue in the United Nations Security 
Council, thereby calling for the United Nations preventive diplomacy. The 
United Nations Preventive diplomacy. The United States did not want to alienate 
India in the United Nations Security council as now the United States is the only 
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super power. "Thomas Pickering US permanent Representative in the UN said 
that the US is opposed to UN role in settHng the Kashmir issue and would prefer 
both the countries to settle it bilaterally.'^ 
In a speech made at the United Nations in January 1992 Prime Minister 
P.V. Narsimha Rao set forth India's well known position on the nuclear issue, 
1 R 
and declared that India would not sign the NPT." 
After meeting George Bush, he suggested bilateral talks on the issue. The 
foreign secretary of India, J.N. Dixit then visited Washington D.C. in March 
1992 for discussions with state Department officials, there he told the Indian 
correspondents that India would neither sign the non proliferation nor participate 
in the proposed 5 power conference. Since then officials of both the countries 
have held two more rounds of talks. A statement made by Bartholomew in March 
1992 indicates a narrowing of the gap between the two countries. Bartholomew 
said: "We have begun a more productive nuclear dialogue with India than we 
have had in (Sie) Some Time."'^ 
After the end of the cold war the question then arises non alignment with 
whom or what. If we look at it logically then the non aligned movement will 
continue to be a force against any global domination, multipolar, bipolar, or 
unipolar. Therefore, non alignment is a movement against the domination of 
great powers over the weak powers. May be with passage of time the texture of 
the struggle might change but not the nature, that is the demand for the 
fiinctioning of the system as independent, sovereign and equal states, irrespective 
of size and strength.^" 
To conclude, the new global order that has emerged after the end of the 
cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union requires a recording of the 
old ties and the relationships. In undoubtedly, for India, it pores fresh challenges. 
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But it also offers new opportunities which, if handled with diplomatic skill and 
single mindedness, can be exploited to India's advantage. The common interest 
and values shared by the two countries should help in reshaping their mutual 
relations. India and the United States stand to gain from looking at the world 
with a unified point of view. 
Indo-U.S. Economic Relations 
The summer of 1953 saw India and the United State embroiled in an 
acerbic dispute over the battle act. - a US law sponsored by Congressman Laurie 
C. Battle, Democrat of Alabama - barring American aid to any country that 
traded in strategic goods with communist China. The trouble arose after 
American officials became aware of the Indian Governments rare Earths 
corporation had shipped to China a Strategic commodity called thorium nitrate 
used in the production of Uranium. When Ambassador Allen raised the issue 
with Nehru, the Prime Minister reacted Vehemently, stating flatly India would 
never permit the United States to tell India with whom it could trade as a price 
for aid. 
Although American officials explained US legislative requirements tied 
their hands, the Indians refused to budge. Secretary, General of the Ministry of 
External Affairs Pillai pleaded with Allen to "bear in mind that (the) GOI is 
young and perhaps supersensitive and its soverignity."^^ 
In the end, after much teeth gnashing in the state Department, Secretary 
Dulles decided not to cut off aid even though India remained unwilling to bend. 
Dulles agreed aid could legally continue because the thorium nitrate shipment 
was "not knowingly permitted" and an arrangement under which the United 
States bought out all Indian surplus production prevented future sales of the 
commodity. ^^  
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As Dulles cabled Allen on 3 September, he feared a cut off would hurt 
India's work as the Chairman of Neutrals Nations Repatriation Commission in 
Korea since the action would be seen as punishing India, and would provide, a 
great boost for communist propaganda. Dulles also doubted that aid could be 
resumed easily if it were terminated, putting the United States in the awkward 
position of supporting India's stability and being able to do nothing about it. ^^  
The Lesson Ambassador Allen drew from the affair was that the United 
States had been too soft with the Indians on aid. Instead of insisting on a clear 
cut required, Allen felt the United States allowed the Indians " to simply let us 
know how much aid they needed without having to ask anyone for anything " 
I believe continuation of this essentially dishonest fiction would be fraud on 
American people as well as continue to place US Indian relations on false and 
therefore unsound basis. 
A trend most evident in the virtual absence of foreign policy issues from 
all of the Presidential Campaigns between 1992 and 2000 in the United States. 
Liberal and some conservative internationalists watched with alarm what they 
saw as the rise of anti international and isolationist thinking. Samuel Huntington 
bemoaned the inability of President to articulate a new vision to commensurate 
with the great strategic transformation of the decade the demise of the Soviet 
Union. To him, the absence of a new doctrine meant that foreign policy was 
taken over by two kinds of "Particularistic" interests: Ethnic Politics and 
Commercialism. 
But neo conservative internationalists lamented a lost opportunity for the 
United States to take matter in its own hands. Charles Krauthammer, a leading 
neocon voice, wrote that the United States "unipolar movement" was squandered 
not merely by the failure to drive Saddam Russian from power in Iraq. The 
United States should have been "unashamedly laying down the rules of world 
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order and being prepared to enforce them." With regimes such as North 
Korea's and Iraq's able (or so the Neocon claimed) to threaten the United States 
with nuclear weapons, this was no time for depending on multilateral 
cooperation. 
Here was a radical version of an emerging new realism - radical in its 
belief that the time was ripe for the United States to impose its power and its 
values in the world affairs - whereas the realism of Dole and Helms suggested 
paring down US overseas commitments to those it would lead and Clinton's 
realism relied on soft power and a high threshold for the unilateral use of force, 
Krauthammer explicitly endorsed foreign policy crusading. All these view points 
were firmly rooted in US Nationalism, but Krauthammer's meant carrying the 
flag around the world. And he wrote, the country could early afford to do so. 
The cost of ensuring a safe world for American commerce - 5.4 Percent 
GN.P.(in military spending) and falling is hardly exorbitant. "^ ^ 
To more traditional realists, the neocons were over- compensating for the 
past, hell bent on involving the United States everywhere, seeking to control 
everything, and engaging in a kind of dangerous utopianism about the virtues of 
the United States. But Krauthammer, those realists were deluding themselves 
into believing that the end of the Soviet Union allowed the United States to 
return to normalcy. 
Krauthammer's brand of unilateralism - or "offensive realism", as some 
observes called it found home in the Project for the New American Century 
(PNAC), the group was found in 1997 to advance the neo-cons.' Cause, which 
they explicitly defined as "hard handed internationalism". The group's choice of 
name could hardly have been accidential, for its arguments echoed those of 
Henry Luce's "American century" speech over fifty years earlier: US power and 
ideals needed to assume center stage in world affairs. Ronald Rorgan was its 
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hero; Jimmy Cater and Bill Clinton were cast as appears and apponents of US 
hegemony. ^ ° 
To assert that the Brilton woods institutions benefit industrialized and 
capital exporting economies is only to admit the obvious; they were meant to do 
so by preventing recurrence of pre-war instabilities. Further, as McNamara put 
it, the World Bank was a development investment institution, not philanthropic 
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organization and not a Social Welfare agency. 
Investments brought returns, World Bank bands were secure because they 
were backed by the strongest currencies. World Bank Loans were made only to 
countries with demonstrated ability to repay them in fall, and to projects which 
were economically sound and open to international tender. In addition, the 
World Bank and the IMF fostered environments favourable to direct foreign 
investment, as in India's fertilizers industry. Thus, capital chanelled through 
multilateral institutions were assured of long range profit at almost no risk, and 
new market were opened for the industry and products of the developed world. 
Monies going out to the developing countries flowed back, augmented, into the 
coffers of the North, with the developing countries carrying the service charges. 
However, the gams were not exclusive. 
The IMF was more remote and conservative than the World Bank and 
more closely linked with the Central Banks of the developed World.^ ^ Its 
Managing Director was always an European, the IMF was only reluctantly drawn 
into the problems of the developing world, primarily to ensure that their balance 
of payments crisis did not bank rupt private creditors in the North. When stable 
exchange rate broke down and the US dollar lost credibility as an international 
reserve currency in the late 196-Os, the IMF cautiously approved a new kind of 
currency in the form of special Drawing Rights (SDR). 
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Economic cooperation among developing countries ranked high in New 
International Economic Order (NICO) Pronouncements. The concept of 
collective self reliance could be made operational only if developing countries 
looked to each other as much, as more, than they looked to the developed 
countries for supplies of their needs. Whenever they did so, and whenever 
multifaceted economics such as India's were able to supply them, they built 
'bridges across the south'. 
India's contributions to economic and technical cooperation among 
developing countries made soon after independence and increased over the years. 
They were channed through the Colombo plan, the Common Wealth fund for 
technical cooperation, the UN Development Programme, the Asian Deveopment 
Bank, ESCAP, the special commonwealth African Assistance Plan and same 
bilateral Programmes between India and recipient countries. India's financial 
outlay^ were not large, but its services were correspondingly in expensive. The 
Principal beneficiaries were India's immediate neighbours as also countries in 
eastern and southern Africa and in the Indian and Pacific Ocean."'^  Also 
benefiting were Indian experts and consultant employed under these schemes, 
and Indian exporters of good purchased with some of the funds. Notwithstanding 
Indian rhetoric or 'intermediate technologies' and ahemative paths to 
development, ' no systematic efforts appears to have been made to adopt them 
within India or sponsor them else where in the third world. As prospects of the 
NIEO receded, the resemblance of economic cooperation and development to 
that in the already industrialized world increased. 
End of Cold War: An Improvement in Relations 
Just before the 1988 US elections, P.V. Narasimha Rao, when Rajiv had 
reappointed as foreign minister, called on President Raagan and had a friendly 
breakfast with Secretary George Shultz during UN session in New York. The 
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amicable talks underscored the change in Indo-American relations during eight 
years Ronald Raagan occupied the white House. In January 1981, Prospects for 
friendlier relations seemed bleak, yet the two terms of the Reagan Presidency 
saw a gradual warming between Washington and New Delhi. Although neither 
country substantially altered their basic and often conflicting policies either 
globally or towards the sub continent, Indo US relations paradoxically improved. 
Despite septicism about how far the improvement in relations could carry, 
however neither capital gave up the efforts. During Reagon's eight years in 
office high level dialogue greatly increased, the Vice-President, Secretary of 
state, two Secretaries of Defence, and three other cabinet members visited 
India.^ ^ 
President George Bush was familiar with the issues in South Asia from his 
eight years as Vice-President as well as from his earlier services at the United 
Nations, and his tenure as Director of CIA. Most others in his administration, 
however, had limited previous exposure to India and the sub continent. Although 
Washington has first no need to under take initiatives in South Asia, the dramatic 
shifts in Soviet Policy greatly affected the US Stanced towards the region. 
In October, 1990 in the middle of the Persian Gulf Crisis, although not 
directly related to it, the shoe finally fell. With the Soviet military departed from 
Afghanistan and mounting information regarding the scope of Pakistan's nuclear 
Programme, the administration concluded it could no longer defer taking action. 
The president decided he would not certify that Pakistan did not possess a 
nuclear weapon, and as a consequence in keeping with the Pressler amendment 
stopped US military and economic assistance. Press reports attributed the 
decision to Islamabad's refiising to roll back its cranium enrichment programme. 
A key element in its covert efforts to develop a weapons capability.^^ 
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Whatever the reason, Bush's action caused much satisfaction in India, 
uneasy about Pakistan's nuclear aspirations, New Delhi had believed the United 
States was applying insufficient pressure against Islamabad to stop the move 
towards weapons. In addition to the nuclear dimension, the Indians were pleased 
that the flow of US arms aid to Pakistan had for the time being at least ended. 
Reports of alleged human rights violations by India, especially in the 
Punjab, began to draw criticism in the US congress. Active lobbying b) 
supporters of separatist movement and disapproval of harsh Indian tactics b> 
human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch, stirred 
Congressional interest. One of the most outspoken and Presistent critics was 
Republican wally Herger of California, whose district included Vuba City, the 
home of many Sikh immigrants, including Didar Singh Bains, an outspoken, 
supporters of Khalistan, the name of the Sikh homeland and the largest peach 
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grower in the United States. 
To help combat this chronic image problem and to improve relations with 
capital Hill, Indian Ambassador P.K. Kaul, the former cabinet secretary, when 
Rajiv sent as successor to K. Shankar Bajpai, proposed that India hire a lobbyist 
familiar with the byways of political Washington. Despite the fact that Kaul was 
one of India's most senior Civil Servants, having served as Secretary to the 
Ministeries of Finance and Defence, as well as cabinet Secretary, he could not 
convince his fellow mandarins, colleagues in the prestigious Indian 
Administrative Service, the elite career cadre that filled Indians most important 
Civil Service Portions - that hiring a lobbyist was an appropriate way to spend 
Indian Government money.^ ^ 
India's rival, Pakistan had no such reluctance in seeking support for its 
cause in Washington, during most of the 1980s, Pakistan was represented by 
Denis Neill, regarded as one of the more skilled Washington Lobbyists.'"'. 
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The most significant item of defence cooperation remained the US Air 
Force Collaboration on the Hght combat Air craft Progress on the LCA qwas 
slow, but continuing. No new projects came to Fruition, however, nor did these 
appear to be many serious consideration about major military procurement 
initiatives. In the absence of a push from the political level, the Pentagon's 
traditional reluctance to expand high technology sales to India again became 
apparent. Even though the MoU was supposed to facilitate technology transfer, 
the export review process began to drage once more. 
The licensing for export of a $ 1.2 million combined Acceleratio vibration 
climatic Test System (CAVTS), a sophisticatd rocket Testing device that 
simulated the heat and vibration of re-entry into the earth's atmosphere, became 
an issue. Although Washington initially leaned towards approval, after India 
successftiUy tested the Agni, the Bush Administration reversed field. The United 
States refered to approve the export on the grounds that CAVTS could aid in 
developing a nuclear missile system.'" 
The export of a second super computer, discussed during Rajiv Gandhi's 
1987 visit, also encountered serious delays. When India asked for Acray XMP-
22, twice as powerful as XMP- 14, US export review authority regard the pros 
and cons of selling a super computer to India. Defence, ACDA, and energy 
expressed unhappiness about proceeding because the Acray XMP- 22 could help 
develop a nuclear weapons capability, state and commerce urged approval of the 
license for the $ 50 million sale.''^  
It was only in December, 1990, over two years after the Indians brought 
the subject, that president Bush finally ruled in principal in favour of the export 
license. Opponents of the sale gained some satisfaction, however, when Bush 
required the negotiation of supplementary controls to guard against the 
computer's use in nuclear weapons development.''^ 
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One side light of the fracas was highUght the tiny size of foreign 
investment in India. As bad as the figures were for 1989, they were worse in 
1990, with political instability and rising violence further damaging the 
investment climate, foreigners put only a paltry $ 76 million in India. US 
investment shrank to a derisory $ 19 million. The only positive US investment 
note during 1990 was Indian government approval for pepsico to enter the 
Indian market in a food precessing soft drink venture. Accepting the 40 percent 
ownership restriction, the US Conglo merate agreed to a joint venture with Tatas 
to produce and market its soft drink and other food products. The V.P. Singh 
government as weak as it was, held fast against lobbying by domestic Indian soft 
drink interests, who were fearfiil they would lose market share to the better 
known foreign brands. 
The Indian economy, both under the Congress and National Front 
Governments, remained relatively closed to the outside world with high level of 
protection for domestic industry and an investment climate that foreign business 
judged as unfriendly the lengthy and bitter legal controversy that followed the 
tragic industrial accident at the Union Carbide Chemical Plant in Bhopal 
involving vast separations claims and criminal charges against US based carbide 
executives hardly reassured American investors. 
Overall Indian economic growth more than kept pull with the increase in 
population, but was less dynamic than that of the "young tigers" of Asia -
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hongkong, Taiwan and South Korea or of 
Communist China. The large Public sector industries, developed in the heyday 
of Nehruvian Socialism, continued to run large deficits, proving a major drag on 
the economy. Much of the Private sector, working in close harness with 
government officials and politicians, enjoyed large profits from a protected and 
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highly controlled domestic market. The economist spoke of India's condemning 
itself to the Hindu rate of growth/^ 
During the last decade of the 20'^  century, American productivity became 
the engine of global economic growth, American capital under wrote a 
staggering array of new technologies and promoted their broad distribution 
around the world, American enterprise nurtured vast markets and stimulated a 
level of personal consumption that In previous centuries, was accessible only to 
the wealthiest the last decade of the twentieth century may one day be 
remembered as the good old days, in the Indo American relations.''^ 
Unlike US Pakistan military ties which date back to the 1950s, military 
cooperation between the United States and India is in the early stages of 
development. In recent years, joint Indo-US steering committee have been 
established to coordinate relations between the two countries armed services, 
including exchange visits technical assistance and military exercises. Naval 
cooperation so far has included a 20 day special operations joint exercise focused 
on marine. Counter terrorism and peace keeping operations at Ratnagiri in 1994. 
Indo-US naval forces also conducted joint exercises 1995 and 1996. An Indian 
naval contingent supported the US led UN Peacekeeping mission in Somalia 
starting in December 1992. India's ground troops in Somalia, which numbered 
5, 000 in mid 1994, received high praise for their humanitarian as well as 
peacekeeping efforts. In 1997, India had about 900 U.N. peacekeeping forces, 
mainly serving in Angola and Bosnia - Hezegovina. In June 1997, a high level 
team of Indian officials was in Washington to sign a US India treaty for the 
extradition of fugitive offenders. The Treaty was described by both sides as an 
important step in efforts to combat the problems of international terrorism and 
narcotics trafficking.''^ 
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U.S. Aid to India : The relatively small US aid programme for India for F. 
4 - 1998 includes an estimated $ 51.35 million in development assistance, $ 
91.874 million in P.L. 480 funds and $ 475,000 for international military 
education and Training (IMET). For F4-1999, the Clinton Administration has 
requested $ 56-5 million for development assistance, $ 91.752 million in PL 480 
funds and $ 450,000 for IMET. In recent years, the US Agency for international 
Development (AID) increasingly has focused on sustainable development 
programmes that support India's efforts to restructure and privatize its economy. 
The major AID goals in India for F4 1997 include : encouraging broad based 
economic growth, stabilizing population growth, enhancing food security and 
nutrition, protecting the environment, reducing transmission of HIV infection, 
and expanding the role and participation of women in decision making. P.L. 480 
funds go to providing food assistance, largely through private voluntary agencies. 
First lady Hillary Clinton visited India in 1995 as a part of five nation tour of 
South Asian projects in support of Women's Economic and Social Development. 
The first lady announced that India would receive the first grant, for $ 500,000 of 
a new U.S. Agency for International Development initiative for educating girls 
and women. In 1997 - 98, the United States provided about 2.5 % of the $ 6.6 
billion in donor assistance to India and is its sixth largest donor. Major donors 
includes the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, 
Japan, Germany and the United States."*^  
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An Overview 
Although India suffers from several militant regional separatist 
movements, the Kashmir issue has proven the most Lethal and intractable. The 
problem is rooted in claim by both India and Pakistan to the former princely 
state, divided since 1948 by a military line of control (LOC) separating the India 
state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan controlled Azad (free) Kashmir. 
Spurred by what were perceived as rigged state elections that unfairly favoured 
Pro-New Delhi candidates in 1989, an ongoing separatist war between Islamic 
militants and their supporters and Indian security forces in the Indian held 
Kashmir valley has claimed 40,000-90,000 lives. Indian blames Pakistan for 
fomenting the rebellion, as well as supplying arms, training and fighters. It insists 
that the dispute should not be "Internationalized" through the involvement of 
third-party mediators. Pakistan, for its part, claims only to provide diplomatic 
and moral support to what it calls "freedom fighters" who resist Indian rule. 
Islamabad has sought to bring external major power persuation to bear on India, 
especially from the United States. The longstanding U.S. Position to bear on 
Kashmir is that the issue must be resolved through negotiations between India 
and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. 
In 2001 and 2002, a series of violent incidents worsened the region's 
security climate and brought India and Pakistan to the brink of full-scale war. In 
October 2001, Islamic militants attached the state assembly building in Srinagar, 
killing 38, and a brazen December attack on the Indian parliament complex in 
New Delhi left 14 dead. Indian government officials blamed Pakistan - based 
military mobilization that brought hundreds of thousands of Indian troops to the 
border with Pakistan. In May 2002, in the midst of this armed showdown, 
militants attacked an Indian army base in the Jammu town of Kaluchak, leaving 
34 dead, many of them women and children. New Delhi leveled accusation that 
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Islamabad was spousing Kashmiri terrorism; Indian leaders talked of making 
"pre-emptive" military incursions against separatist, training bases on Pakistani 
territory. The solution was further exacerbated with the assassination of two 
moderate kashmiri separatist leaders in late -2002 and early 2003. 
International pressure included numerous visits to the region by top U.S. 
diplomats and led Pakistani President Musharraf to Publically state that no 
infiltration was taking place at the LOC. On receiving assurances from secretary 
of State Powell and other that Pakistan would terminate support for infiltration 
and dismantle training camps, India began the slow process of reducing tensions 
with Pakistan. In October 2002, after completion of redeploying troops to their 
peacetime barrackes had began. Islamabad responded with a stand-down order of 
its own, although the Indian and Pakistan armies continue to exchange sporadic 
small arms, mortar, and even artillery fire along the LOC. 
Indian Kashmir remains volatile. October 2002 elections to the state 
assembly resulted in the ouster of the National conference and the establishment 
of a coalition government of the Congress party and the people's Democratic 
Party. While the seating of this new and seemingly more moderate state 
government renewed hopes for peace in the troubled region, continued separatist 
violence dampened early optimism. The United States welcomed the election 
process as a necessary first step towards the initiation of meaningful dialogue 
between India and Pakistan to peacefully resolve their dispute. Secretary of State 
Powell asserted that, "the problems with Kashmir cannot be resolved through 
violence, but only through a healthy potential process and a vibrant dialogue. 
Caught off guard by the precipitious end of the cold-war, India has sought 
over the past several years to adopt to new global realities that have antiquated 
many of its former policies, roles and alliances. With the demise of the Soviet 
Union, India lost a reliable source of economic assistance and military 
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equipment, a key trading partner, and the promise of Political support in its 
adversial relationships with neighbouring china and Pakistan. Moreover, the end 
of a bipolar world has made India's traditional role as a leader of the non-aligned 
world something of an anachronism. 
Both India and the United States are actively exploring the opportunity 
presented by the end of the cold-war for a more normal relationship between the 
world's two largest democracies. The 6 day visit to the United States by Indian 
Prime Minister Narsimha Rao, in May 1994, marked the beginning of a 
significant improvement in US India relations. Rao addressed a joined session of 
the congress and met with President Clinton. Although discussions were held on 
nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, and other issues, the main focus of the 
visit was rapidly expanding U.S. India economic relations. 
New Delhi's fixation with quasi-socialist economic planning - the results 
of which had, the spectacular growth of the market - oriented east-Asian 
countries suffered a further blow in the rejection of that model by the former 
U.S.S.R. and its successor states. On taking power in 1991, the Narasimha Rao 
government inherited a desperate financial situation. India's budget deficit 
exceeded 10% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and inflation was running 
above 15% with only a few week's worth of foreign exchange reserve on hand, 
the country was thought by some analysts to be on the brink of defaulting on its 
$80 billion foreign debt. All of these factors, however, were symptomatic of 
deeper economic problems created by decades of central planning and 
bureaucratic regulation that had stunned economic growth. 
Rao's Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, immediately embarked on a 
bold strategy of reforms to address India's economic problems. Since mid 1991, 
the government has substantially inflation and the fiscal deficit, began privatizing 
or cutting subsidies to inefficient state - owned industries, made the rupee 
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convertible in International trade, and reduced tariffs and industrial licensing 
controls in order to attract foreign investment. The United States has been very 
supportive of India's economic reforms, which have been helped along by 
international monetary Fund assistance and Producing. 
Although the end of the cold-war freed U.S. India relations from the 
constraints of a bipolar world, bilateral relations continued for a decade to be 
affected by the burden of history, most notably the longstanding India-Pakistan 
regional rivalr>'. Recent years, however, have brought a sea change in US India 
relations, which was reflected in India's swift offer of full support for the U.S. let 
war on terrorism following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on New York 
and Washington. 
The continuing US concern in South-Asia, however, is the prevention of 
nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation and the reduction of tensions between 
India and Pakistan. 
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Chapter - 3 
Indian Response to American 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Shifts in Policy and Priorities since 1991 
India's Foreign Policy along with its economic policy had been passing 
through a period of restructuring, since the end of the Cold War there had 
been a significant shift in the basic thrust and priorities. As a result 
economies became the guiding principle of Foreign Policy and Vice Versa. 
For the first time since its independence, India had been found to reconsider 
the basic principles of its Foreign Policy.' 
Three possibilities confront India's Foreign Policy Priorities. At the 
first instance India had to reconcile to the fact that, its long time ally Soviet 
Union is no more there to protect its interests. The successor state, namely 
Russia had been reduced to a symbolic power. No doubt, it continued to 
possess nuclear weapons and even retain the permanent seat in the United 
Nations Security Council. But it had been grapping with domestic problems 
and international pressures. So, India cannot think of the continuation of the 
same kind of relationship with Russia. Russia now needed aid and India was 
not in a position to provide to it. Similarly, India needs Russia's assistance 
and if could not afford it, as it could do before. 
The Second aspects pertain to the fastening of closer economic and 
security ties with the developed countries particularly the U.S. But, India's 
position on NPT, NTCR and Intellectual property Rights were regarded as 
irreconciable propositions. As a result, the U.S. continues to view India with 
suspicion. 
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It is a fact that, the US and India had passed through the decade of 
1980 with extensive bilateral cooperation relating to trade and technological 
matters.^ With the economic liberalization underway in India since 1991. 
there is scope to continue the fruit ful relations with the US at a broader level 
in the 1990s. 
The third aspects could be regarded as a predicament of India's 
Foreign Policy namely, the continuation of the Non-alignment policy. India 
does not enjoy the element among the developing countries as before. India 
had been trying to appropriate a new role to itself in the Post-Cold-War 
period. India was instrumentally informing the G-15 group of developing 
countries in 1992. But, unfortunately. It had not been successful due to intra 
group bickering and complacency. Similarly, South Asian Associations of 
regional cooperation (SAARC) had not been too impressive either, in terms of 
concrete achievement. 
So, the spirit of solidarity among developing countries prevalent during 
the Cold War years had been slowly eroding. Hence, Indira finds herself as a 
cat on the world. It would neither outrightly dump the nonaligned policy nor 
it could afford it to compromise. On basic issues of national interest and 
accept the dominant status of the US in the world. 
As per these three caveats, the 1990s presents a challenging task before 
India's foreign policy. Therefore, there had been an attempt, to evolve 
relations and practical re-orientations of its Foreign Policy, India's efforts to 
accelerate industrial policy. India's efforts to accelerate industrial 
development and improved International competitiveness received a boost 
with the announcement of the New Industrial Policy (NIP) in July 1991. 
Launched in conjunctive with a Liberalized trade policy and vigorous reform 
of the monetary and fiscal sectors, the NIP was a part of comprehensive 
Programme of economic reference that aimed at better macro economic 
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management and full realization of the country is considerable economic 
potential. 
The main threat of the NIP was the fresh approval towards Foreign 
Investment and technology tie ups.^ The Policy changes that have been 
initiated since 1991, were designed to attract significant capital flows into 
India on a sustained basis. They were also aimed at encouraging technology 
collaboration between Indian and Foreign Companies. 
Foreign Equity participation even upto 100 percent had been allowed 
in several key sectors such as energy and telecommunication, under the new 
policy. Foreign Investment upto 51 percent in 36 high priority area was to be 
given approval by the Reserves Bank of India with in two weeks of making an 
application. The rupee Exchange rate had been allowed to be determined by 
market factors. Apart from that, restrictions on foreign exchange transactions 
have been relaxed to a large extent the Foreign Exchanged Regulation Act 
(FERA) had been amended to allow free amount of Foreign Exchange. 
An important element of the new trends between integration with the 
global economy have been taken to open the Indian Capital markets to 
overseas investors. These includes, the free entry of Foreign Institutional 
Investors (FII's) into the capital markets. As a result, there had been an 
increase in foreign investment inflows. Moreover, wide ranging measures 
such as delivering and deregulations have given impetions to foreign 
investors. But the Government had provided special concession for investors 
who would bring technology along with investment, the norm for the approval 
of foreign technology agreement have also been considerably liberalized. 
Nuclear Irritants and Indian Missile Programme 
The world has gone through on momentous revolution with the 
collapse of communism in the erstwhile, Soviet Union and Eastern European 
states. The consequences of the rapid and catastrophic changes are so 
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profound and for reaching that is impossible to visualize in the so called new 
order. It would, therefore, be foolhardy to frame any long termed and 
grandsire design for the future of Indo-US cooperation in this fluid situation. 
India and the US will take time to adjust their policies to the developing 
enviroment. 
For most of the past 40 years, US and Indian foreign policies have 
worked at cross purposes for more often than not. But there are reasons to 
hope that this will change, particularly with regards to arms control and 
nuclear non proliferation, chances for success will improve dramatically if the 
United States treats non proliferation as a first order interests not sub merged 
by competing foreign policy concerns, and simultaneously places relations 
with India on a more regularized and institutionalized basis." 
In the last few years there has been a change in US perception in so far 
as it is trying to see South Asia as region in its own right conscious efforts to 
improve relations with India has been made. There are also indications that 
the US no longer views its relations with India as the outcome of a zero sum 
gave between India and Pakistan. Its recent statements on the Kashmir issue 
and recognition of Pakistan's role in aiding terrorist and secessionist activity 
in India are testimony to this approach.^ 
In the post Cold war period out of the key challenges facing the Indo-
US relations is the contentions issue concerning the signing of NPT. It has to 
be realized by both sides that management of security and stability in the post 
cold war period will have to take the geo-political relations of changing 
equations of power and capabilities in the world. 
The recent US Russian efforts at arms control, China is contribution to 
this efforts, the impact of post cold war dynamics on the strategic doctrines 
and calculations of the countries in the South Asia.^ etc. are some of the issues 
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which will determines the dimensions and influences of Indo-US nuclear 
relations. 
In this backdrop, it would be worthwhile to examine the US Policy 
initiatives regarding non - proliferation measures vis-a-vis Indian and India's 
response in the post cold war period. 
US Policy initiatives 
In the words of a US State Department report entitled, "Security and 
Arms Control", relating the reforms of nuclear weapons and guiding nuclear 
development towards the peaceful ends have been central policy objectives of 
every US administration since 1945." According to the same report, '"US 
efforts today centre on strengthening international non proliferation regime at 
three levels : the Institutions of the Int. Atomic Energy Atency (IAEA), the 
legal framework of the Nuclear non -proliferation treaty and the treaty of 
Tlstelolcoi and the legislation and policy structure of the US Nuclear non -
proliferation Act.^. 
President Clinton's April, 1993 "Report to Congress on Progress 
towards regional non-proliferation in South Asia outlined the current policy 
towards South Asia. This policy aims "First to cap, then over time reduce, and 
finally eliminate the possession of weapons of Mass detention and means of 
deliverly.'°. 
Broadly, there are three areas with which American non-proliferation 
intest is concerned. 
1. Purely nuclear related concerns: Slowing down or controlling military 
nuclear programmes by stemming or stopping the flow of nuclear 
material and technology to India and Pakistan, protecting the NPT, etc. 
2. Till recently, containment of erstwhile Soviet influence in South Asia. 
With the disintegration of former USSR, further cooperation with 
62 
Russia regarding nuclear non proliferation issues becomes a policy 
imperative for the US. It is also important to ensure that if regional 
proliferation occurs it will not destabilize that will already be a very 
complicated global order. 
3. Finally, there are a number of regional American interests at stable. 
American should favour the emergence of a stable and cooperation 
South Asian regional system based on Indian and Pakistan cooperation 
so that all regional states might better solve their rising economic and 
developmental problems.". 
From the US prospective, nuclear proliferation is seen as troubling not 
because of the number of weapons that it would produce, but because of the 
number of new decisions centres it would produce, subsequently by 
increasing the risk of nuclear accident, nuclear theft, nuclear transfer or 
nuclear war.'^. 
From the perspective of proliferating states, who believes that in South 
Asia, India and Pakistan have achieved the states of designed ambiguity, that 
is consciences and structured manipulations of their ambiguous nuclear states. 
The Central challenge facing American non proliferation policy in South Asia 
is to formulate policies which will be effective in this contest of designed 
ambiguity, especially since both regional states seems to find the situation at 
least acceptable'^ 
Out of number of alternatives, Cohen suggests that the US would 
adopt a modified, action, regional strategy that focused on freezing or 
containing the Indian and Pakistan Programmes at the Post proliferation stage 
while protecting the NPT and other international agreements. He suggests 
three kinds of policy recommendations in this regard: 
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1. Short term to medium terms efforts to encourage Indian and Paicistani 
policies to name in directions compatible with important American 
interests. 
2. Longer terms policies or actions which attempt to inform and enrich 
policy debates within India and Pakistan nuclear decisions by stopping 
their strategic Political and economical environment.''' 
India's continual refusal to the application of IAEA full scope 
safeguards and opposition to the NPT is considered to be at odds with the Post 
Cold War developments most notably the deep reductions order the ' START' 
agreements, South Africa's dismantlement of its nuclear devices and 
Washington's freeze on the production of missile material and its decision not 
to deploy tactical nuclear weapons areas - that have collectively diminished 
the importance of nuclear armaments in International affairs. '^  
From the U.S. perspective nuclear proliferation is the most serious 
potential obstacle to improve relations between India and the United States. 
While recognizing India's Sovereign right to retain its nuclear option and its 
belief that the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is discriminatory, New 
Delhi is often urged to show sensitivity to this concern by making two 
important policy changes : 
1. Without signing the NPT, India should unilaterally make a formal 
pledge to abide by the NPT provisions barring the export of nuclear 
weapons or of military related nuclear technology 
(a) requiring that any nuclear exports would be subject to 
international Atomic Energy inspection in the recipient country 
to verify that military related technology is not involved and 
(b) Withholding from other states any technological or other 
Assistantive nuclear weapons. 
64 
2. India should agree to join the five power regional nuclear dialogue 
proposed by Pakistan and the United States, provided that all states 
involved agree to participate as equals and to accept an agenda in 
which reciprocal obligations involving all participants can be 
discussed.'^ 
Among some sections of the US policy makers the integrated and 
missile development programmes of India is seen as a regional problem. 
According to some, India's missile programme is basically a regional 
questionl. Its Prithvi and Agni missiles look like regional city busters; the 
Prithvi against Pakistan and the longer range Agni against China as well''' 
other views that a subcontinental ballistic missile race has already begun. 
Agni may be a step forward in India's development of a long range nuclear 
I Q 
Strike force. 
Despite India's reiteration that Agni is a "technology demonstrator", 
the US is apprehensive regarding its deployment and end use. Discussing the 
testing of Agni missiles, Leonard specter says that no state has ever 
undertaken the enormously costing and complex task of developing 
intermediate range missiles without arming them with nuclear warheads. It is 
improbable that India would devidate from this pattern , particularly when the 
principal adversary it hages to Delhi through deployment of the Agni 
passesses nuclear armed missiles of sufficient range to reach targets through 
out India." 
The Agni, can carry a payload of between 500 and 1000 kilograms to a 
distance of about 1,000 to 15000 miles. US officials worry that if it is 
deployed, India hold arm it with a nuclear war head.20. 
India has already developed the Prithvi, a military missile capable of 
carrying a nuclear war head to about 1500 miles, sufficient to hit the majority 
of major cities in Pakistan ^'. 
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In May 1992, the Bush administration imposed trade sanctions for a 
two years period on glavbosoms, a Russian space trade company, and the 
Indian space Research Organization for a deal that would provide Russia 
Research Engines and production technology with military application to 
India. Washington argued that technology could be used in the Agni 
Programme and therefore violated missile technology control regime 
guidelines. India claimed that technology would only be used for non-
military satellite launches.^^ 
During the summit meeting between the Indian Prime Minister P.V. 
Narsimha Rao and President Clinton in May 1994, both leaders agreed that 
the most acceptable method would be to change the agenda from a bilateral 
one to a larger multilateral form to endorse the proposed global 
comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and fissionable weapons productions, 
both issues which India supports. 
Rao in his speech to the Congress, favoured starting with a global 
agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal would be on 
elimination of nuclear weapons and a ban on missile testing and development. 
Indian Response 
India's response to the continued pressure to sign the NPT in the post 
Cold-War would reflects a continuation of the Principled adherence to 
comprehensive global disarmament alongwith a pragmatic approach of 
keeping the nuclear options open as an assertion of its national sovereignty. 
Before giving into the details of Indian response to recent US initiates, 
it would be relevant to note that: 
• India, even more than the United States has been committed to non 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
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• At the same time there has been a substantive difference in approach to 
the very issue, especially towards nuclear weapons and long range 
missiles. This, in the past has constituted a notable source of fraction 
between the two countries. 
• India's security is adversely affected by both the Chinese and Pakistani 
nuclear symmetry, infact, places Indian security interests in serious 
jeopardy. 
• India needs to seek into cooperation to work for denuclearization at 
least of non strategic weapons) of Asian and the catigums oceans (out 
of a distance of 5,550 km.) in order to move the more immediate threat 
and danger of nuclear weapons in the region. This would naturally be 
an interim measure in working towards complete nuclear disarmament. 
• The proliferation of ballistic and crises missiles also leaves India with 
no option but to develop its own missile capability to provide an 
effective defence through strategic deterrence at the same time there is 
need to work for universal elimination of missile of ranges in excess of 
30 - 50 km.^ ^ 
• The Indian responses to the US initiatives have largely addressed itself 
to the discriminatory nature nuclear of the treaty and the relationship 
defined by the divergent security perceptions of both countries. 
According to Indian strategic Analysts the debate on the question of 
nuclear weapons versus national security in the third world countries has two 
dimensions more broad and realistic dialogue may themselves as well as with 
great powers. A country like India or Brazil is greatly influenced by its 
regional atmosphere and security imperations rather than that will be the 
reaction of the world of it decides to go nuclear. The widely prevalent view is 
that the technical fixes coupled with the denial of economic assistance and 
other developmental aid can dissuade a country from going nuclear. The 
analogy of how the erstwhile USSR, the UK, France and China taken the 
67 
nuclear decision even when they were under pressure makes it clear that 
external pressure does not have only limited effects. 
Referring to the attempt by western Nations to make India a signatory 
to the NPT, Cecil vector contends that the logic of strategic consensus 
epitomizes the ulterly discriminatory nature of the nuclear milieu. India's 
nuclear dilemma is genuinely moral . Having pleaded to the world to disarm 
and destroy nuclear stockpiles, it would be difficult for any Indian leader to 
order the manufacture of an atom bomb. 
In this context some strategic analysts have suggested some policy 
imperatives in a comprehensive manner : 
1. Mature, stable and pray metric policy options for govt, if perceptives 
are indication of exercising the nuclear option. 
2. High light the problem areas in assuming nuclear stance thus providing 
parties pointers for adaptation of pacific policies So as to arrive at a 
comprehensive organization that would given credibility to the 
possession of nuclear weapons. 
3. Indicate the areas in which urgent steps must be taken to achieve 
technological self sufficiency other than nuclear weapons production. 
4. An Analysis of doctrinal options relevant to India's security needs and 
the structuring of a credible and cost effective military organ.^ ^ 
India has consistently called for all nuclear weapons states to join in a 
truly multilateral nuclear disarmament effort. India has ever suggested a time 
bound action plan to help this endeavours, with a set of matching obligations 
on the part of nuclear weapons states to undertake negotiations aimed at 
eliminating nuclear weapons, and undertaking by threshold states not to cross 
the threshold. Despite demonstrating nuclear capability in 1974, India's 
record is not weaponizing the option since then there has been exemplary and 
stands at as a Singular example of unwavering restraint in the atomic age.^ ^ 
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During the US Deputy Secretary of State strobe Talboth's visit to India 
in April 1994 and the subsequent visit of P.V. Narasimha Rao to the US in 
May 1994, a perceptible change in the US Policy orientation towards non 
proliferation issues were evident. The US objective, under the new approach 
on the nuclear issue in the region are : 
• First to cap, their over time reduce and finally eliminate the possession 
of weapons of mass destruction. 
• A unilateral or regional cut off of fissile material production. 
• A regional agreement not to conduct nuclear detioratives and placing 
safe guards on a new and existing nuclear facilities. 
Brahma Chalaney pointed out that the starting US pressure to other, the 
test launch of Agni Ballistic Missile in May 1989 and the subsequent efforts 
to showdown the Indian IRBM Programme reflected the increasingly 
assistance US non proliferation role and the kind of potential hurdle India is 
likely to face in the future. In spite of all the differences there is a parallel and 
paradoxical prospect for US India cooperation on non proliferation issue -
underscored by India's emergency as a second tier supplier. The US faces a 
painful policy dilemma; it can not pursue an effective non proliferation 
strategy without receiving cooperation from a country like India that itself has 
been a major target of western technology control regime. On the other hand, 
India's own long term security interests demand that it contribute to non 
proliferation by seeking to deter the spread of mass destruction weapons to 
countries in the middle east and Indian Ocean Region.^ *' 
Nuclear proliferation remains the pinnacle of interests and concern of 
the U.S. Policy. No new states has openly joined the Nuclear Club since the 
creation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, the recent 
addition of South Africa, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and France 
suggest that the region will be excluded when the treaty is up for review in 
1995.^' 
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If the US seeks permanent extension of the NPT in 1995 while also 
asserting its right to possess nuclear weapons in perpetuity, it may find that 
the Cold War vintage bargain on nuclear weapons is no longer sustainable 
within the international community. Some States may opt to build nuclear 
bombs as a way to gain states in an international system dominated by nuclear 
powers, essentially as a potentially response to a political act by the US and 
almost without attentions to local consequences. Thus, US efforts to further 
delegilimise nuclear weapons and shrink its own desire. 
The trend towards seeking an indefinite extension of the NPT into 
perpetuity can only make the goal of complete nuclear disarmament more 
opaque. The NPT emerged from a unanimously adopted resolution that called 
for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Making an interim arrangement 
permanent would be repungement to the conscience of the international 
community. The NPT Review and Extensive Conference in 1995 is a 
opportunity for states to Pounder the future of Nuclear Proliferation. The 
world requires a nuclear non proliferation consensus based on the twin pillars 
of universally and non discriminative and the 1995 conference can help as a 
forum for this consensus to emerge. 
India's Nuclear Evolution 
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a total of five underground 
nuclear tests, breaking a 24 year old self imposed moratorium on nuclear 
testing. The tests, which appear to have completely surprised the U.S. 
intelligence and policy community set off a world wide storm of protest. 
President Clinton announced on May 13, that he was imposing wide ranging 
sanctions mandated under U.S. nuclear non proliferation legislation. Japan 
and other nations joined the United States in expressing their dismay and 
condemnation of the tests. 
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Although the Indian government gave concern about the detoreating 
security and nuclear environment, "as its reason for testing, many observers 
believe that domestic political factors may have been responsible for at least 
the timing of the tests, the current Bhartiya Janta party (BJP) government is a 
weak coalition of 13 disparate parties, in power only since late March, 
following inconclusive parliamentary elections by rallying strong national 
sentiment that supports development of India's nuclear programme. 
According to the Indian government, the three nuclear tests conducted 
on May 11 included a fission device, a low yield device, and a thermonuclear 
device. Two days later, India announced that it had conducted two additional 
nuclear tests, each with a yield a less than one kiloton. Many analysts believe 
that the size and type of weapons tested hold significant implications for 
India's future intentions, including the likelihood of additional tests, as well 
as for threat for threat perceptions by China and Pakistan. Analysts also note 
that these tests validate past intelligence estimates that India has conducted a 
wide spectrum of nuclear weapons research spanning several decades. 
The U.S. response to India's nuclear tests thus far has centered on the 
importion of wide ranging sanctions under the Arms export control Act and 
other legislation. Major aspects of the sanctions include : termination of U.S. 
development assistance to India; termination of U.S. Government sales of 
defence articles and service, termination of foreign military financing, denial 
of credit guarantee, or other financial assistance by the U.S. Government 
opposition to loans or assistance by any international financial institution, 
Prohibition on U.S. bank loans or credit to India; and Prohibition on exports 
of "specific goods and technology". The Administration reportedly is 
reconsidering President Clinton's trying to South Asia, scheduled for late 
1998. S. Res. 227 (Feinstein), submitted May 12, expressed the sense of the 
senate regarding India's May nuclear tests and resolved that the senate 
condemn the Government of India's decision to tests in the strongest possible 
terms. 
71 
The Clinton Administration imposed tiie mandatory sanctions and 
mobilized other nations, in particular Japan, to cut economic assistance to 
India. Although France and Russia were more sympathetic to India, they 
could not stand in the way of the United States creating an International 
Framework in the form of the unanimous United Nations security council 
Resolution 1172 on June 11, 1998 that laid down a full set f markers for India 
including the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the 
addressal of the "root cause" of Indo-Pak tensions, the Kashmir dispute. And 
during his travel to China in June 1998, where Clinton announced a new 
strategic partnership with China, and condemned the nuclear proliferation in 
the sub continent, the worst fears of those Indians who believed nuclear tests 
might be counter productive appeared to come true. India was under U.S. and 
Japanese sanctions, the UNSC had put in a resolution under chapter seven that 
was mandatory and non compliance could lead to collective international 
measures. On top of it, the UNSC Res. 1172 seemed to open the door for the 
dredged "Intemationalizations" of the Kashmir dispute and UN intervention 
in Kashmir, which Pakistan had long sought. And the apparent Sino -
American convergency of interests in putting nuclear India down appeared to 
be the last straw. 
Having defined a set of outcomes from India, the United States was 
ready to directly engage India. Within a month of the nuclear tests there was 
a tentative contact between the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State strobe Talbott 
and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Jaswant Singh, the 
two leaders agreed to initiate a dialogue to reconcile India's Security concerns 
with the non proliferation objective of the United States. Talbott insisted that 
the U.S. was not looking for a "deal" that would find the way out of the 
apparently irreconcilable objectives of India and the United States the U.S., he 
said, was looking for Indian compliance with five bench marks derived from 
the UNSC 1172. There were signatures on the CTBT, joining the 
negotiations on the fissile material cut off-treaty, tightened Indian controls 
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over the exports of sensitive technologies and commodities, adoption of non 
threatening nuclear weapons posture, and reducing Indo Pak Tensions through 
dialogue. Singh too suggested that he was not in talks with Mr. Talbott to 
work out a "compromise" which would demean India. New Delhi was 
engaging Washington to make it appreciate India's security concerns. 
Singh and Talbott began to meet frequently almost every month until 
early 1999. While neither side would acknowledge they were in search of a 
political deal, that is precisely what the talks were about the United States was 
looking for legally binding restraints on Indians nuclear programme that 
would limit its size and sophistication. Washington was neither willing to 
give up its political opposition to India's nuclear weapons programme nor 
would it legitimatize it by accepting the new reality. In return for India's 
acceptance of limits on its programme, Washington was willing to care some 
of the sanctions that were imposed India, on the other hand, declared that by 
its own violation, it had no interest in pursuing an untrammeled nuclear 
weapons programme and it was interested only in a limited credible deterrent 
that would be guided by a "no first use" policy. India was also willing to 
consider binding constraints on its nuclear programme, but was unwilling to 
accept any suggestion of its roll back. In return for its restraints India wanted 
an American political acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons capabilities 
and the removal of all sanctions against India, including those technology 
restrictions imposed after the first nuclear test of May 1974 and not just those 
that followed Pokharan II. 
The essence of the deal boiled down to an Indian adherence to the 
CTBT, which was so emblematic to the Clinton Administration's arms 
control policies in return for a substantive easing of U.S. sanctions against 
India. In interviews given to the author within a spare of a few weeks, Singh 
and Talbott hinted at how far the two sides had gone in making towards 
nuclear accommodation. Mr. Singh in his interview at the end of 1999. '^' 
hinted at the possibility of India signing the treaty while holding back on the 
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satisfaction of the treaty and distanced the government from some of the more 
expansive plans for the Indian nuclear weapons programme of the Draft 
Nuclear Doctrine that was issued by the National Security Advisory Board. 
Talbott on the other hand, suggested the U.S. while disagreeing with the 
Indian decision to go nuclear would not insist on India joining the NPT and 
gave up the nuclear weapons that is permitted by the CTBT . After many 
rounds of dialogue, India and the U.S. appeared close to clearing a deal, but in 
the end it could not be consummated. In India, the governments efforts to 
build a consensus on signing the CTBT did not take off, thanks to the 
appearance of a rapid turnaround in the Indian position. Getting the political 
establishment to agree to sign the CTBT foundered amidst the refusal of the 
U.S. Senate to consider the satisfaction of the Treaty. In the United States, 
there was a strong reluctance within the non proliferation establishment to lift 
the many high technology sanction that had accumulated, the arms control 
community in the U.S. was dead set against being seen as rewarding India for 
its violation of nuclear non proliferation norms. 
Despite the failures to conclude a nuclear understanding. President 
Clinton chose to go ahead with his visit to India in March 2000 and begin the 
process of a Political rapprochements with New Delhi. India's campaign with 
the political establishment in Washington against the policy of not engaging 
India was beginning to pay off President Clinton himself moved from a 
position of punishing India for its nuclear transgressions to one of building a 
new partnership despite the continuing differences over the nuclear issue. In 
his address to the Indian parliament on March 22, 2000 President Clinton 
went into an extended critique of India's decision to go nuclear. But the tone 
was respectful and gave the sense of a debate among equals. But he went 
beyond that critique and unvested a fijture vision of Indo-U.S. relations that 
was appeal and warm the Clinton major was such that the entire Indian 
Parliament, for long the deepest sceptic of American intentions towards India 
was swooning over the American President Clinton had transformed in one 
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speech, the atmosphere of 'Indo US relations, the long accumulated 
bitterness in bilateral relations was finally beginning to yield to a framework 
in which the two sides could engage each other despite strong differences. 
But as it turned out the nuclear reconciliation was not to be completed 
during the Clinton Administration. President Clinton transferred the political 
contact of the relationship but there was a no cutting of the Gorddan knot of 
the nuclear differences. Despite the senate refusal to rectify the CTBT. the 
Clinton Administration continued to hope for an Indian signature on the 
treaty. Weighed down by the non proliferation Lobbey's pressures, the 
Clinton Administration continued to insist right till the very end of its term 
that the full potential of Indo U.S. relations "would not be realized "Until 
India met the nuclear bench makers." In other words, while nuclear 
differences were set aside, they did not disappear relations. Crucial 
technology sanction imposed after 1974 and 1998 remained in place. It was 
only with the advent of the republicans to power in 2001 that created the basis 
for nuclear reconciliation. 
The Clinton Administration talked metaphysically about a dog house 
and a club house in thinking about India and non proliferation. The U.S. saw 
Jaswant Singh's interest in taking India to the nuclear club house, or the 
recognition one way or another of India's new standing as a state in 
possession of nuclear weapons. Talbott and his non proliferation advisers, 
especially Robert Einhorm, refused to countenance any such move on the post 
of the United States. While they recognized the problem of leaving a billion 
people armed with nuclear weapons in the nuclear dog house, Talbott and his 
colleagues were not ready to let India into the nuclear club house. That would 
have to wait control the advent of the Bush Administration. 
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An Overview 
Policy analysts consider the apparent arms race between India and 
Pakistan posing the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear 
weapons. Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries -
India seeking to achieve deterrence against china, and Pakistan seeking to 
gain an "equalizer" against a conventionally stronger India. India currently is 
believed to have enough fissile national for 75 -100 nuclear weapons; 
Pakistan is thought to have approximately half that number. Both countries 
have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs. India's military has 
inducted short and intermediate range ballistic missiles, while Pakistan itself 
possesses short and medium range missiles (allegedly acquired from China 
and North Korea. All are assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear 
warheads over significant distances. In May 1998, India conducted five 
underground nuclear tests, breaking a 24 year, self imposed moratorium on 
such testing. Despite international efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly 
followed. The test created a global storm of criticism, and represented a 
serious set back for two decades of U.S. nuclear non proliferation efforts in 
South Asia. Following the tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions 
on non humanitarian aid to both India and Pakistan as mandated under section 
102 of the Arms Export Control Act. Almost immediately, congress acted to 
case restriction in some areas. In September, 2001, President Bush increased 
remaining sanctions on India Pursuant. 
In August 1999, a quasi governmental Indian body released a Draft 
Nuclear Doctrine for India calling for a "minimum credible deterrenf (MCD) 
based upon a trial a delivery systems and pledging that India will not be the 
first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. (Islamabad has made no 
comparable public declaration, but it also seeks to maintain in an MCD while 
rejecting a no first use pledge). In January 2003, New Delhi announced 
creation of a Nuclear Command Authority. After the body's first session in 
September 2003, participants vowed to "consolidate India's Nuclear deterrent 
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"and review the readiness of its strategic forces. As such, India appears to be 
taking the next step towards operationalizing its nuclear weapons capability. 
During the 1990s, the United States Security focus in South Asia 
sought to minimize damage to the non proliferation regime, prevent escalation 
of an arms and / or missile race, and promote Indo Pakistani bilateral 
dialogue. In light of these goals, the Clinton Administration set forward five 
key "bench marks" for India and Pakistan based on the contents of U.N. 
Security council Resolution 1172 (June 1998) which condemned the two 
countries' nuclear tests. 
Progress in each of these areas has been limited, and the Bush 
Administration makes no reference to the bench mark frame work. Neither 
India nor Pakistan has signed the CTBT, and both appear to be continuing 
their production of weapons - grade fissile materials. (India has consistently 
rejected this treaty, as well as the NPT, as discriminatory, calling instead for a 
global nuclear disarmament regime. Although both India and Pakistan 
currently observe self imposed moratoria on nuclear testing, they continue to 
resist signing the CTBT - a position made more tenable by U.S. senate's 
rejection of the treaty in 1999), the states of weaponization and deployment is 
nuclear, though there are indications that this is occurring at a slow, but 
steady pace. Aside from security concerns, the governments of both countries 
are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programmes and 
the domestic unpopularity of relinquishing what are perceived to be patent 
symbols of national power. Early optimism in the area of export controls 
waned and then nearly vanished as it became apparent in later 2003 that 
Pakistanis were involved in the export of WMD materials and / or 
technologies. Some observers have lately called for a new U.S. approach that 
would provide technical assistance in enhancing the security of any WMD 
materials in South Asia. Through a series of legislation measures, Congress 
lifted nuclear related sanctions both on India and Pakistan. Among the 
concerns voiced by some members of Congress was that there continue to be 
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"Contradictions" in U.S. non proliferation policy towards South Asia, 
particularly as related to the U.S. Senate's 1999 rejection of the 
comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indications that the Defence Department 
may continue to develop low yield nuclear weapons. 
Unlike U.S. Pakistan military ties, which date back to the 1950s, 
security cooperation between the United States and India is in the early stages 
of development. Since September, 2001, and despite a concurrent U.S. 
rapprochement with Pakistan, India U.S. Security cooperation has flourished. 
Both countries acknowledge a desire for greater bilateral security cooperation 
and a series of measures have been taken to achieve this. Joint steering groups 
between the U.S. and Indian armed services hold regular meetings. The India 
U.S. Defence Policy Group (DPG) - moribuned since India's 1998 nuclear 
tests and ensuing U.S. sanctions - was revised in late 2001. An August 2003 
session of the DPG reviewed accomplishments since the provisions such 
meeting in May 2002 and set plans for a missile defence workshop in India, 
among other activities. A June 2004 session led government some analysts 
have louded increased U.S. India security ties as providing potential counter-
balances to growing Chinese influence in the region. 
Since early 2002 and continuing to the time of this writing, the United 
States and India have held numerous joint exercise involving all military 
branch. Unprecedented advanced air combat exercise took place in June 2003 
and provided the U.S. military with its first look at the Russia built Su-30 
MKJ, among the most capable fighter aircraft in its class (mock air combat 
over India in February 2004 saw Indians plots in late model Russian built 
fighters defeat American Plot flying older F. 15 Cs). In September 2003, U.S. 
and Indian special forces soldiers held a two week joint exercise near the 
India China border, and the largest ever "Malabar 2003" Joint naval exercises 
off the Southern Coast of India included an American nuclear submarine in 
the cooperative cope Thunder Exercises in Alaska. Despite these 
developments, there remain indications that the perceptions and expectations 
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of top U.S.A and Indian military, leaders are divergent on several key issues, 
including India's role in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, a approaches to 
continuing terrorism, and potential U.S. role in resolving the India Pakistan 
dispute. Moreover, the existence of a non-proliferation consistency in the 
United States is seen as a further hindrance to more fiilly developed military 
to military relations. 
Along with increasingly visible military to military times, the issue of 
U.S. arms also to India has taken a higher profile. In February 2002, 
Congress was notified of the negotiated sale to India of 8 counter battery 
radar sets (or Firefinder" radars) valued at more than $ 100 million (the 
following September, arrangements were made for the sale of four additional 
sets). Two of these were delivered in July 2003. In July 2004, Congress was 
notified of a possible sale to India involving up to $ 40 million worth of air 
craft self protection system to be mounted on the Boeing 737, that carry the 
Indian head of state. The state department authorized Israel to sell to India 
the jointly developed U.S. Israelis Phalcon Airborne early waning system, a $ 
l.I billion assets that some analysts believe may tilt the regional possess an 
extensive list of desired U.S. made weapons, including P 3 Orion maritime 
petrol aircraft, PAC 3 anti missile systems, and electronic warfare systems. 
The United States may provide Indian security forces with sophisticated 
electronic ground sensors that may help stem the tide of militant infiltration in 
the Kahmir region. Still, some in India consider the United States to be a 
"fickle" partner that may not always be relied upon to provide the kinds of 
reciprocity, sensitivity, and high technology transfers sought by New Delhi. 
In a controversial turn, the Indian Government has sought to purchase 
a sophisticated anti missile platform, the arrow weapon system, from Israel. 
Because the United States took the lead in the system's development, the U.S. 
Government has veto power over any Israeli export of the Arrow. Although 
U.S. Defence Department officials are seen to support the sale as messing 
with President Bush's policy of cooperating with friendly countries on missile 
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defence, state Department officials are reported to opposed the transfer, 
believing that it would send the wrong signal to other weapons exporting 
states at a time when the U.S. interest in maintaining a strategic balance on 
the sub-continent, alongwith U.S. obligations under the missile Technology 
control regime, may preclude any approval of the Arrow Sale. 
Joint U.S. India military exercises and arms sales negotiations have 
caused disquiet in Pakistan, where there is concern that the developments will 
strengthen India's position through an appearance that Washington is siding 
with India. Islamabad is concerned that its already disadvantageous 
conventional military status vis-a-vis New Delhi will be further eroded by 
India's acquisition of additional modem weapons platforms such as the 
phalcon and Arrow. Infact, numerous observers have noted what appears to 
be a Pro-India drift in the U.S. Government's strategic orientation in South 
Asia. Yet the limited state regularly lands Pakistan's role as a key ally in the 
U.S. led counter terrorism coalition and assures Islamabad that it will take no 
actions that disrupt strategic balance on the sub-continent. 
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Chapter - 4 
New Dimensions in the Indo-U.S. Relations 
India - US Relations and Bilateral Issues; 
President Clinton in a message on the occasion of the 50"" Anniversary 
of India's Independence said that India and the US must work more closely 
than ever in a way that would benefit the two of the world's greatest 
democracies. He said that both countries must re-double efforts to strengthen 
peace, stability and democracy in South - Asia and around the world. Prime 
Minister had a very Cordial meeting with the President Bill Clinton in New 
York in September 1997 at which the US President showed keen interest in 
deepening relationship with India. 
The US Secretary of State, Madelime Albright visited Delhi in 
November 1997 and held extensive discussions with the PM on important 
bilateral, regional and international issues. US commerce Secretary, William 
Daley visited India for nearly two weeks with a sizable trade delegation to 
India during December 1997. At the official level, US under secretary of state 
for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering and Assistant under secretary for 
south Asian Affairs, Karl Inderflirth held wide ranging discussions with the 
Indian officials in Delhi. President Clinton himself was scheduled to visit 
India in February 1998. It has been indicated that the visits would now be 
rescheduled at a convenient time in 1998 after the Lok Sabha election in 
February 1998.' 
Visits from the members of US senate and congress continued during 
the year. Congressman Benjamin Oilman, Chairman, House International 
Relations Committee led a 22 member congress delegation to India from 
August 14-18, 1997. Senator sam Browmback, Chairman of the key Near-
East and South Asian Affairs sub-Committee of the senate Foreign Relations 
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Committee alongwith several prominent congressman visited India for the 
funeral of Mother Teresa from September 13-14, 1997. After the funeral the, 
delegation called on the President and Prime Minister besides meeting the 
foreign secretary, Mrs. Hillary Clinton also Mother Teresa's Funeral. A 6-
member American Jewish Committee delegation led by Mr.Robert S. Rifkind 
visited India from December 18-27, 1997 with a view to promote Indo-US 
relations.^ 
The Government of India and the USA signed an Agreement on 1 ^ ' 
November, 1997 to increase the maximum length of visas for ten years of 
tourists, temporary visitors and business visas - An Investment Agreement 
was also signed during the visit of US secretary of state. The US 
Administration impored export carbs on the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre, 
Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research and Indian Rare Earths Limited for 
their alleged involvement in weapons of mass destruction or missiles used for 
delivery. The US had earlier taken similar action against Bharat Electronics 
Limited of Bangalore. Subsequently, the Federal department removed 
sanctions against seven of the nine Bharat Electronics Ltd. Units two BEL 
units in Hyderabad and Bangalore still continue to be under scrutiny. 
The United States seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and Ballistic missile in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan have resisted US 
and international pressure to sign the major non-proliferation treaties. In May 
1998, India and Pakistan conducted unannounced nuclear tests that evolved 
international condemnation. Wide ranging sanctions were impored on both 
countries as mandated under the Arms Export Control Act, but were lifted 
through congressional-executive cooperation from 1998-2000.'' 
The United States supports India's efforts to transform its once quasi-
socialist economy through fiscal reform and market opening since 1991, India 
has been taking steps to reduce inflation and the budget deficit, privatise state-
owned industries, and reduce tariffs and licensing controls. Coalition 
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governments have kept India on a general path of economic reform, although 
there continues to be US. Concern that movement has been slow and 
inconsistent. Plans to expand US-India high-technology trade and civilian 
space and civilian nuclear co-operation have become key bilateral issues in 
the recent years. 5 
US and congressional interests in India cover a wide spectrum of 
issues, ranging from the militarized dispute with Pakistan and weapons 
proliferation to concerns about human rights and trade, and investment 
opportunities. In the 1990s, India-US relations were particularly affected by 
the demise of the soviet union - India's main trading partner and most reliable 
source of economic assistances and military equipment for most of the cold 
war - and New Delhi's resulting need to diversify its international 
relationships. Also significant were India's adoption of sweeping economic 
policy reforms beginning in 1991, a deepening bitterness between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir, and India's growing pre-occupation with China as a 
potential long-term strategic threat. With the fading of cold war constraints, 
the United States and India began exploring the possibilities for a more 
normalized relationship between the world's two largest democracies. A visit 
to the United States by Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1994 
marked the onset of improved Indo-US relations. Rao addressed joint session 
of congress and met with President Clinton. Although discussions were held 
on nuclear non-proliferation, human rights and other issues, the main focus of 
the visit was rapidly expanding Indo-US economic relations throughout the 
1990s, however, regional rivalries, separatist tendencies and sectarian 
tensions continued to divert India's attention and resources from economic 
and social development. Fall out from these unresolved problems -
particularly nuclear proliferation and human rights issues created serious 
irritants in bilateral relations. ^ 
President Clinton's visit in March, 2000 to India represented a major 
U.S. initiative to improve cooperation across a broad spectrum, including 
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economic ties; regional stability nuclear proliferation concerns; security and 
counter - terrorism; environmental protection; clean energy production; and 
disease control. Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Jajpayee 
agreed in a vision statement to institutionalize dialogue between the two 
countries through a range of high-level meetings and working groups on the 
various areas of cooperation, capped by regular Bilateral Summits" between 
the leaders of the two countries. Economic ties were a major focus of 
Clinton's visit, during which US companies signed agreements in $4 billion in 
projects with Indian and Bangladeshi firms. Clinton also announced $2 billion 
in government financial support for US exports to India through the US 
Export Import Bank. To further expand bilateral economic cooperation, the 
United States and India agreed to establish working groups on trade; clean 
energy and environment; and science and technology. US - India agreements 
also were signed on environmental protection, clean energy production, and 
combating global warming. The President also lifted sanctions on some small 
US assistance programmes, including a US Agency for International 
Development Initiative to provide technical assistance to strengthen Indian 
financial markets and regulatory agencies. On the social welfare side, US 
India cooperation agreements were signed on efforts to combat Polio, 
Tuberculosis, Malaria an HIV/AIDS, as well as the trafficking of women and 
children in South Asia. ^ 
During his 10 day visit to the United States in September 2000, Indian 
Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed a joint session of US congress and was 
the guest of honor at a state dinner at the White House. During the course of 
the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, US officials announced $900 
million in Export-Import Bank Financing to help Indian businesses Purchase 
US goods and services. US companies also signed agreements to construct 
three large power projects in India, valued at $6 billion, as part of increased 
energy cooperation between the two countries. On September 15, President 
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Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed a joint statement agreeing to 
cooperate on arms control, terrorism, and AIDS.^ 
Reduce bilateral tensions, including Kashmir 
Beginning in 1990 - with the increasing friction between Indian and 
Pakistan over Kashmir - the United States strongly encouraged both 
governments to institute confidence building measures in order to reduce 
tensions. Measures agreed to so far include: agreements on advance notice of 
military monuments; establishments of a military commander "Hotline"; and 
exchange of lists of nuclear installations and facilities; agreement not to attach 
each other's nuclear facilities; a joint ban on use and production of chemical 
weapons; and measures to prevent air space violations. In February 1999, 
Prime Minister Vajpayee took an historic bus ride to Lahore, Pakistan, to hold 
talks with the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif The two leaders signed the 
Lahore Declaration in which they agreed to intensify efforts to resolve all 
issues, including Jammu and Kashmir and to take a number of steps to reduce 
tensions between their countries. The promise of the Lahore Skirmish near 
Kargil in May-July 1999.^ 
Challenges on the Road Ahead 
President Clinton made it clear in his speech to parliament and in his 
private discussions with the Indian leadership the view that India's May 1998 
tests were a mistake - a mistake not just for the world non-proliferation 
regime but in the end, more so far India's security interests. India is not more 
secure today than it was in April 1998 and some, even in India, would argue 
that it is less secure. But he also made it clear that it is up to India and Indians 
to make the decision on how they will proceed in this arena. It will not be an 
American imposed view. It is a decision that Indians need to make. We 
cannot undo the part nor can we make India's decisions forward into the 
future but we can have a dialogue in which we try to jointly reason together 
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on what the appropriate steps are. This is the same message President 
delivered in Islamabad to the Paicistan leadership and people. "^  
The second very tough issue between two countries that is both a 
challenge and an opportunity is how India deals with its neighbour to the 
west, Pakistan and how it deals with the future of the Kashmir dispute. The 
President spoke to this issue during his visit and his message was the same in 
New Delhi as it was in Islamabad. We outlined our poling as four "R's"— 
restraint by both sides. Respect for the line of control. Rejection of violence 
and Renewal of dialogue. Above all, there can be no military solutions to the 
problems between India and Pakistan, neither in terms of the movements of 
borders, nor on the imposition of borders solely by military force. Only trough 
dialogue and respect for human rights can these relations be improved." 
Since the President's visit, India has taken a series of modest, but I 
think, quite important steps to signal its desire to find a resolution to its long 
standing quarrel and to find a dialogue with those in Kashmir who have 
rejected Indian rule. We believe that at the right time, India should resume its 
own bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. We have made it clear that the United 
States will not mediate this dispute because India asks us not to do so. But at 
the same time, we ask India to take steps directly with Pakistan and with the 
Kashmiri people to address the issues that divided them. At the end of the 
day, India needs a healthy relations with Pakistan more than the United States. 
It needs a peaceful and prosperous Kashmir more than the United States does. 
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has told US eloquently many times that US 
can not change geography. The vision that took Prime Minister Vajpayee to 
Lahore more than a year and a half ago is still the right vision - one of trying 
to find ways to unite the peoples of south - Asia in pursuit of peace and 
Prosperity. '^  
During the 1990s, the United States security forces in South-Asia 
sought to minimize damage to the non-proliferation regime, prevent 
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escalation of an arms and missile race and promote Indo-Pakistani bilateral 
dialogue. In the light of these goals, the Clinton Administration set forward 
five key "benchmarks" for India and Pakistan based on the contents of UN 
security council Resolution 1172 (June 1998) which condemned the two 
countries' nuclear tests. There were: '^  
1. Signing and satisfying the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT); 
2. Halting all further Production of fissile material and participating in 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations; 
3. Limiting development and deployment of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) delivery vehicles; 
4. Implementing strict export controls on sensitive WMD materials 
and technologies; 
5. establishing bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan to 
resolve their difference. 
In a controversial turn, the Indian Government has sought to purchase 
a sophisticated anti-missile platform, the Arrow weapon system from Israel. 
Because the United States took the lead in the system's development, the U.S. 
Government has veto power over any Israeli exports of strategic orientation in 
South-Asia. Yet the United States regularly lauds Pakistan's role as a key ally 
in the US''* led counter-terrorism coalition and assures Islamabad that it will 
take no actions that disrupt strategic balance on the sub-continent. '^  
Regional Dissidence and Human Rights 
As a vast mosaic of ethnicities, languages, cultures and religions, India 
can be difficult to govern. Internal instability resulting from diversity is 
further complicated by colonial legacies such as International borders that 
separate members of the same ethnic groups creating flashpoints for regional 
dissidence and separatism. Kashmir and Assam are two regions that continue 
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to suffer from violent separatist campaigns; Punjab saw significant struggle in 
the 1980s. The remote and underdeveloped northeast of India is populated by 
numerous ethnic and religious groups, both tribal and non-tribal. Migration of 
non-tribal peoples into less populated tribal areas is at the root of many 
problems in that region. Insurgents also have created international tensions by 
operating out of neighbouring Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, and Nepal. 
Gujarat 
Gujarat is a relatively prosperous western state on the Arbian-sea. In 
February 2002, a group of Hindu activists returning by train from the city of 
Ayodhya - site of the razed 16 century babri Mosque and a proposed Hindi 
Temple - were attacked by a Muslim mob in the town of Godhra and 58 
people were killed. In the communal rioting that followed, up to 2,000 people 
died, most of them Muslim. Many observers criticized the BJP led state and 
national governments for inaction; some even saw evidence of state 
government complicity in anti-Muslim attacks. Leading human rights groups 
have been harshly critical of the Central Government's alleged inaction in 
bringing those responsible to justice. The governments' inability to 
successfully quell violence in Gujarat led to rifts within India's BJP - led 
National democratic Alliance, with secular coalition members condemning 
the BJP role. Some of the criticisms of the Arrow. Although US Defence 
Department officials are seen to support the sale as meshing with President 
Bush's Policy of cooperating with friendly countries on missile defence, state 
Department officials are reported to opposed the transfer, believing that it 
would send the wrong signal to other weapons - exporting states at a time 
when the US interest in maintaining a strategic balance on the sub-continent, 
alongwith US obligations under the Missile Technology control Regime, may 
preclude any approval of the Arrow Sale.''* 
Joint US - India military exercises and arms sales negotiations have 
caused disquiet in Pakistan, where there is concern that the developments will 
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strengthen India's position through an appearance that Washington is siding 
with India. Islamabad is concerned that its already disadvantageous 
conventioned military status vis-a-vis New Delhi will be further eroded by 
India's acquisition of additional modem weapons platforms such as the 
"Phalcon and Arrow." Infact, numerous observers have noted what appears to 
be a pro-India drift in the US government's leveled by rights groups were 
echoed by the Indian supreme court in September 2003, when justices 
strongly admonished Gujarati authorities for their mishandling of attempts to 
prosecute some of there charged with riot-related crimes. In June 2003, a 
lower court acquitted 21 Hindu accused of burning alive 12 Muslims at the 
Best Bakery, and the Gujarati High Court later rejected a motion for a re-trial. 
In April 2004, the Supreme Court ordered that a new trial be held in a 
neighbouring state. It is hoped that a congress-led government in New Delhi 
will be more energetic in seeking justice in Gujarat riot-related cases. '^  
The North East 
The Kashmir region is home to India's most widely known separatist 
movement, but other significant and lethal internal conflicts are ongoing. 
Since the time of India's foundation, numerous separatist groups have fought 
for ethnic autonomy independence in the country's north-east region; some of 
the tribal struggles are centuries old. It is estimated that more than 25,000 
people have been killed in such fighting since 1948. The United Liberation 
front of Assam (ULFA), the National liberation Front of Tripura, the National 
Democratic front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the National Socialist Council of 
Nagaland are among the groups at war with the New Delhi government 
(though the decades old Naga Compaign may be ending). In addition, the 
People's war group has for many years wrecked havoc in the southern state of 
Andhra Pradesh. 
The state government lifted an eleven year ban on the group in 
preparation for expected negotiations. The affiliated moist communist Centre 
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has been active in West-Bengal and Bihar. Indian Government officials have 
at times blamed Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan for "Sheltering'* one 
or more of there groups beyond the reach of Indian security forces, and accuse 
Pakistan's intelligence agency of training and providing them with material 
support. '^  
U.S. - Economic Assistance 
The United States is the third largest bilateral aid donor to India, after 
Japan and Britain. According to the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, India has more people living in object poverty - upwards of 
300 million - than do Latin America and Africa combined. From 1847 
through 2000, the United States provided more than $14 billion in economic 
loans and grants to India. Current USAID programmes in India concentrate on 
five areas given below:'^ 
1. Economic Growth: Increased transparency and efficiency in the 
mobilization and allocation of resources. 
2. Health'. Improved overall health with a greater integration of food 
assistance, reproductive services, and the prevent of HIV/AIDS and 
other infectious diseases; 
3. Disaster management 
4. Environment Protection: Improved access to clean energy and water; 
an reduction of Public subsidies through improved cost recovery; 
Promoting more efficient Technology and management; and 
5. Education: Improved access to elementary education, and justice and 
other social and economic services for vulnerable groups, especially 
women and children. 
Reaching a New Level of U.S. - India Understanding 
As we noted earlier, the President has been looking forward to this trip 
since the end of his first term. Our goal now on this trip is to reach a new 
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level of understanding both with the Indian government and with the Indian 
people about the relationship between our two countries. Prime Minister 
Vajpayee, who interestingly was the Foreign Minister of Indian during the last 
Presidential trip in 1978, said last year that the United States and India are 
"natural allies," we fiilly agree. Now we need to find ways to give meaning to 
that phrase by developing the kinds of contacts and confidences that bind 
nations together. 
We can and we should build on the good will created after last year's 
Kargil crisis when India saw that the United States would take positions on 
issues crucial to India on their substantive merits and could help deliver 
important changes that favoured Indian interests. In the last six months, 
secretaries Richardson and summers, as well as deputy Secretary Talbot, and 
the Pacific commander in Chief, Admiral Danny Blair, have had extremely 
productive visits to New Delhi and have pushed the process of Indo-US 
dialogue along. The state Department's special coordinator for Counter 
Terrorism, mike Sheeshan, has also had an especially successful visit and has 
set-up a joint counter terrorism committee to work together. We feel it is now 
times to put our quarterback on the field, the President.'^ 
After this trip, of course, we will need to find ways to follow up as this 
cannot be a one trip relationship. We are looking for ways now with our 
Indian partners to figure out how to institutionalize a closer relationship and 
to ensure that it is not another quarter century before another President visits 
India, and that the Indian Prime Minister come to the United States hopefijlly 
within the year. Energy cooperation, in particular, and enhanced economic 
ties, in General, will need to be an especially important part of this new 
relationship. And we are looking for ways to institutionalize that and to 
strengthen it. Bill Richardson in his view that will have the leading role in 
making that happen. Most of all, we will need our two governments to jointly 
lay out a vision of the fiiture of our relationship. There will need to be a road 
map of how our two countries plan to work together in Asia, and in the world 
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as a whole. Secretary Albright and Deputy Secretary Talbot have been tasked 
by the President with developing such a roadmap. 
But great countries also have difference and in this visit will also have 
to discuss those things that divide India and the United States. There still are 
serious differences between our countries as important issues and the most 
important issue on which we continue to disagree is the issue of non-
proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. We believe India's nuclear tests 
in May 1998 were a mistake. We said that then and we continue to believe it 
now. We do not believe India's national security was enhanced by those tests, 
rather, it suffered. I think those who look back on what has happened since 
those tests would generally tend to agree. But as I said earlier, since those 
tests, we have had the closest and most serious strategic dialogue in our 
country's bilateral history with the possible exception of 1962 during the 
Chinese invasion. We still have areas of disagreement. We still have areas to 
work on. But we have stopped talking past each other and we have reached an 
agreement on road map on how to proceed. 
There was increased dialogue and engagement with the United States 
of America on a broad range of bilateral regional and international issues 
besides the continuation of the ongoing dialogue on security and non-
proliferation issues. Regional developments, particularly Pakistan's armed 
intrusion in Kargil, the military takeover in Pakistan, the evolving situation in 
Afghanistan and the problem of terrorism, constituted important elements of 
constructive dialogue with the US the US also look steps to increase 
cooperation in the energy sector. There was also a useful exchange of views 
on WTO related issues on the context of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 
Seattle from 28 November to 3 December 1999. On the other hand, the US 
continues to maintain many of the unilateral restrictions it imposed under its 
domestic law in the wake of the nuclear tests in May 1998. India also received 
broad support from the US congress on several issue of concern to India. 
Following the nuclear tests, India had decided to engage in a more intensive 
95 
dialogue with the United States. Shri Jaswant Singh, External Affairs Minister 
and Mr. Strobe Tall bott, deputy secretary of State were designated as 
Representatives to conduct this dialogue. 
India and the US also had the opportunity to exchange views on issues 
of mutual concern during the meetings that Shri Jaswant Singh, External 
Affairs Minister, had with Ms. Madeline Albright, US Secretary of State, at 
the margins of the ARF Meetings in Singapore on 24"^  July 1999 and later on 
24:^ September 1999 in New York during the opening session of the United 
nations General Assembly. During their meetings, the US reiterated its desire 
for better relations with India. India and the US have also been engaged in 
consultations on the Problem of terrorism. As part of the dialogue on matters 
relating to terrorism, official level talks were held in Washington from 
September 2-3, 1999 which was followed by another round of official level 
talks in New Delhi on September 1?"^  1999. the two Government have agreed 
to intensify cooperation in this area. The Indo-US Extradition Treaty, signed 
on 25^ June 1997 in Washington, came into force after the exchange of the 
instruments of Ratification on 21^' of July 1999 in New Delhi. The Treaty 
represents an important step in the law enforcement cooperation between 
India and USA in the area of counter - terrorism. 
As a part of the process of regular consultations on bilateral, regional 
and international issues. Shri Brajesh Mishra, national Security Advisor, 
visited the US from 26-28 October 1999. The US Deputy trade 
Representatives, Susan Esserman visited India from 1*' to 3'^ '' November, 1999 
for discussion on WTO related issues, in the context of the WTO Ministerial 
Meeting in Seattle. From 28* November to 3"^  December 1999. the US 
Secretary of Energy, Mr. Bill Richardson visited New Delhi on 26"^  October 
1999. During his visit, the US Secretary of Energy discussed cooperation in 
the fields of energy and environment the external Affairs Minister Shri 
Jaswant Singh and the US Energy Secretary also signed a Joint Statement on 
cooperation in Energy and Related Environmental Aspects. General V.P. 
96 
Malik, Chief of the Army Staff, visited the US from 8"" to 17 November 1999 
to participate in the conference of the Defense Chiefs of Asia - Pacific 
countries in Honolulu hosted by US commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
command.^^ 
Following the nuclear tests in May 1998, the US had imposed certain 
restriction measures against India. Effective from 1^ ' December 1998, the US 
had partially lifted some of their restrictions till 21^' of October 1999. In 
partial exercise of the fresh waivers authority given by the Defence 
Authorization Act 2000, passed by the US Congress in October 1999, the US 
government once again removed some of the economic restrictions with effect 
from 21^ October 1999. However, non basic humanitarian financing from 
multilateral financial institutions are still subject to US restrictions. India 
regards these unilateral restrictions measures as unjustified and counter 
productive, which should be lifted in entirety several members of the US 
Congress, including the chairperson of the House International relations 
committee Mr. Benjamin Oilman, has written to the US President to remove 
restrictions on the US support for loans to India by the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions. 
There was a considerable increase in bilateral dialogue between India 
and the US during the period January to March 2000. The dialogue on Non-
proliferation, security and disarmament, which was resumed in London in 
Nov. 1999, was ftirther continued from sides also had extensive discussions 
on counter- terrorism, the highjacking of I-C 814, regional developments and 
president Clintons visit to India. At London, the two sides announced the 
creation of Indo-US joint working group on counter- terrorism to 
institutionalize their cooperation in combating all forms of terrorism. The 
joint working group on counter- terrorism held its first meeting from February 
7-8, 2000 in Washington D.C. the two countries agreed to share their 
expertise, experience resources and information in countering terrorism and 
97 
also agreed to work together to bring the perpetrators of the hijacking of IC-
814 to justice." 
An important but widely ignored aspect of the Indo-US nuclear deal 
was underlined, if only inadvertently by one of its leading critics, strobe 
Talbot, a senior official of the Clinton Administration who engaged India 
after the 1998 nuclear tests, writing immediately after the nuclear deal was 
announced, Talbot argued, "India and the United states have both shown a 
penchant for giving it alone - India in defying the Internationa) Committee 
(including the US) with its tests, the Bush administration in attaching Iraq 
over the objection of the United Nation and may of its own closest allies. If 
the Indians and American versions of Unilateralism reinforce one another, it 
will work to the detriment of institutions like the U.N. and risk - turning 
treaties the NPT from imperfect but usefully mechanisms into increasingly 
ineffectual ones."^"* 
India strongly opposed attempts in the 1990, to empower the United 
Nations to intervene in failing states without a reference to Sovereignty. 
White India always mouthed the slogans of muhilateralism, its conception of 
the United Nations remains as an "Inter-national" rather than a "Supra -
national" one that liberals across the Atlantic have been clamouring for. Like 
all great powers, India does not want an intrusive United Nations to interface 
in its own internal affairs: nor would it want the United Nations to constrain 
Delhi's options in dealing with security beyond its borders - Indian 
endorsement of the Bush Administration's Plans for missile defence in 2001, 
which was greeted with dismay at home and abroad, was not a rare exception 
to the past norm of inevitable disagreement between New Delhi and 
Washington on global issues. On a range of other issues, too, whether it was 
the question of managing global warming or opposing the intrusive provisions 
of the International Criminal court, India found unexpected convergence with 
Bush positions, there was a time when India was among the countries which 
noted most often against the US at the United Nations. Even the erstwhile 
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with the US than India. By sheer force of habit, India might still be voting 
against the US on many resolutions in the UN. But on important issues there 
is a new convergence with the US. This congenitally had extended to many 
issues beyond missile defence. Take for example, the idea of Pre-emption -
against terrorist groups and rogue states that could acquire weapons of mass 
destruction - that the Bush Administration unveiled in September 2002 
amidst and international uproar. But surprisingly India was among the few 
countries that welcomed the nation of Pre-emption. Jaswant Singh, who was 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee's Foreign Minister during 1999-2002 spoke of the 
justification for pre-emption and India's own interest in it.^ ^ 
The commander in Chief of the US Pacific command, Admiral Dennis 
Blair, visited India form January 8-12, 2000. This follows the visit of CO AS 
General Malik to Washington and Honolulu in November 1999 end together 
represents the first steps in revitalizing Indo-US Defence contacts. The US 
treasury secretary, Lawrence summers, visited India from January 17-19, 
2000. Issues relating to trade and investment between the two countries, the 
unilateral US restrictions imposed after the nuclear tests and the resumption 
of the dialogue process in WTO, following the collapse of the Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle, were discussed with Treasury secretary. 
Several US congressman visited India in January 2000. These included 
influential congressman such as Senator Tom Daschle, Senate Minority 
Leader; Representative Sam Gejdenson, Ranking Democrat in the House 
International Relations Committee; and Senator Sam Brownback, Chairman 
of the senate sub-committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 
President Bill Clinton visited India for five days from 20'*' March 2000. Both 
sides expect that visit of the US President will pave the way for qualitative 
new and closer relations between the two democracies.^^ 
We hope this Indian Government will soon sign the comprehensive test 
Ban Treaty, not as a favour to the United States, not as a favour for President 
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coming, but because it is in India's national interest and we take heart that 
more and more Indian leaders say that, not just in Private, but in Public. Polls 
consistently show that the overwhelming majority of Indians do not want to 
embark on a major nuclear buildup. While they support the decision to test, 
they do not support the decision to waste billions and billions on nuclear 
arms. Our senate of course made a decision to vote not to support the 
comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last year, but we should be pleased that in our 
discussions with Indian leaders, they have told us that decision does not affect 
their own calculus. Their calculus will be made on the basis of what is good 
for India, as it should be the best way for India and the United States to 
manage their differences on this and other issues is dialogue and engagement. 
Engagement must in the end be top down to be effective and that is why the 
President is going to India a month from yesterday. 
Unfortunately, events since last summer, since Kargil, the coup in 
Islamabad, and the Christmas hijacking by terrorists of an Indian airlines have 
made worse a situation already bad. The stakes here could not be higher for 
American foreign Policy. Here again, we believe engagement is absolutely 
critical. We do not seek and we do not offer to mediate between India and 
Pakistan. We do not consider them to be Siamese twins that require identical 
treatment and need to be equated and lumped together endlessly. We have 
important but very different interests in each case. But we do have a vision of 
a better future for south - Asia and indeed all Asia. It is a vision that lies at 
the heart of what Prime Minister Gujaral advocated and what Prime Minister 
Vajpayee was trying to start when he went to Lahore. It is a vision of eased 
regional tensions and greater people-to-people exchanges among south -
Asians. We urgently need to find ways to help get back to that vision, back to 
the hopes and dreams that existed in Lahore, not just for India and Pakistan, 
but for India and all of its neighbours. For example, greater cooperation in 
energy development between Bangladesh's newly found large natural gas 
resources and eastern India could be critical to bringing the economic miracle 
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of India from the west to the east of the country, where so far, it has not 
developed.^^ 
US - India relations: A Vision for the 21st Century 
Secretary of Treasury Lary summers' reports to the President was that 
with the right economic reforms, India could achieve sustained growth in the 
area of 10 percent annually in this decade which would make it not only one 
of the world's largest economic, but one of the world's fastest growing and 
the most vibrant economies. 
India today is already a global player, but is will soon be a player 
whose influence will be felt everywhere in the 21^' century on virtually every 
issue that matters to Americans, and to American foreign and economic 
policy. First, India is the world's largest democracy. That 's a phrase >'ou hear 
all the time, but it is truly a remarkable thing. India has been over 50 years of 
democratic rule, almost alone in the newly de-colonized world. India not only 
has had election after election in which leader after leader have been replaced 
peacefully, but it has a true history of democratic institutions. Political parties 
come, new ones develop, old ones go away, a judiciary that works, a 
legislature that has real power, a press that is about as vibrant as any in the 
world. This is a country that is still heavily illiterate, but has voter turnout 
regularly of over 65 percent, a remarkable history for any country, but 
particularly one that only got its independence 50 years ago. 
Secondly, India is an increasingly part of the world economy. By 
almost any measure, it is already one of the world's largest economy. And it 
has one of the world's largest middle classes. Estimates vary, but most seem 
to approach some where around 200 million. Its information technology 
economy is at the cutting edge of world developments. If you don't believe, 
ask Bill Gates. He opened up his second office outside United States in India. 
And others are following into the silicon valleys of South-India. Secretary of 
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Treasury Lary Summer's visited India in January 2000. His report to the 
President was that with the right economic reforms, India could achieve 
sustained growth in the area of 10 percent annually in this decade, which 
would make it not only one of the world's largest economy, but one of the 
world's fastest growing and most vibrant economies. 
Third, even the weakness of the Indian economy - its poverty - are 
important to the entire world. India has more than a quarter of the 
malnourished children of this world. With its neighbours in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, it has 500 million people under the poverty level, one in every 12 
people on this planet. How those people develop, how they are brought out of 
poverty, will affect everyone else on this planet, because how India feeds 
those children, how it ends poverty, will have an immense impact on the 
prospects for world energy use, climate change, the global environment, and 
the future of Public health issues like Polio and AIDS. What happens in terms 
of Indian decision - making on there issues, will affect everyone else around 
the world. 
Fourth, India is important because it will increasing be player in the 
balance of power, not just in its own neighborhood of South-Asia, but 
throughout Asia, and throughout the world. It is already becoming an 
increasingly pivotal with China, with central Asia, with Persian Gulf, and 
with South - East Asia. 
The United States and India have common interests in many of these 
parts of the world. We have a common interest in the stability of Asia and the 
stability of its sub-regions. We have a common interest in the control of 
terrorism and fighting the war against terrorists. We have a common interest 
in fighting narcotics and preventing the spread of organized criminal gangs 
selling narcotics. And we have a particularly important interest in the 
unimpeded flow of energy resources through the Indian ocean, not just to 
India, but to the worid. Unfortunately, for most of the last 50 years, the United 
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States has put India at the back end of our foreign policy. The cold-war 
played the critical role. Our relationship was scratchy through many eras. We 
talked part each other - we did not talk to each other. One example is 
President Bush's period in the White House, which most would acknowledge 
was one of the busiest periods in American foreign Policy - India, according 
to the Index of his autobiography, is mentioned once. Those days have to end. 
It made some sense to put India at the back end of our foreign policy in cold-
war, it makes no sense in the 21^' century. It is time to recognize India as the 
global power and the great power and the great civilization that it is, freed 
form the paradigms of matchings it either to Pakistan or to china. It should be 
seen in its own right as a center of a major global civilization and a major 
global player. 
For most of the cold war, India was a bystander in American Policies 
concerning Asia, a reality symbolized by the fact that the State Department 
administered it within its near East, and did not its east Asia, bureau. Indeed, 
India faces in three directions at once, looking toward the north where it 
encounters China and Russia, the west where it adjoins the parsions and 
rivalries of the Middle-East, and the east where it borders the teeming 
populations and vast economic resources of south-east - Asia. 
Throughout this period, America's relations with India suffered from 
the same cultural gap noted in some of its relations with the other Asian 
Countries. In the case of India, this seems at first sight in explicable because, 
on the surface, there appears to be every reason for the two countries to 
understand each other very well. India is a democracy, by far the best 
functioning and genuine free system of any of the nations achieving 
independence following the Second World War. Its ruling group speaks 
excellent English. The Indian civil service, though extremely bureaucratic and 
influenced by socialist theories imbibed at the London school of Economics, 
is one of the most effective in the developing world Atmost all of its leaders 
have studied in western Universities - yet Americans have, in the past, had 
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great difficulty in coming to grip with the way Indian leaders approach 
foreign policy.'''^  
India became unified in its present dimensions because Britain gave 
the subcontinent, which had been hitherto to a religious, cultural and 
geographic expression, a homogenous structure of government, 
administration, and law. It brought about an Indian state organized on the 
basis of western liberal principles of democracy and nationhood. It saddled 
India as well with the issue of its Muslim population, about one hundred 
million of them that have remained in India after Pakistan was created during 
the partition. For India, the birth of Pakistan has been a challenge not only 
because it alienated territory Indian leaders consider part of their patrimony 
but also because the proposition that Muslim can not live comfortably in India 
is perceived as a time bomb threatening permanent civil strife. For this reason, 
the United States military alliance with Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960, 
though aimed at the soviet Union and China, blighted American - Indian 
relations during the cold war. '^ 
Infact, India's conduct during the cold war was not so different from 
that of the United States in its formative decades. Like the founding Fathers, 
India's leaders of the Nehru dynasty believed they would protect their young 
country best by staying aloof from quarrels not affecting its vital interests. 
And again like the United States, India did not apply its rejection of power to 
the region affecting its immediate security interests. Whatever the United 
States in the nineteenth century proclaimed about European power politics, it 
did not shrink from using force against Mexico or in the Caribbean. Nor did 
India hesitate to insist on its power in Sikkim, Goa, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
and Nepal. And India has for at least twenty-five years worked on a nuclear 
weapons program culminating in weapons tests in 1998. When President 
Clinton visited India in 1999, he spoke with some eloquence on the bonds of 
common democratic conditions even while lecturing his hosts on the futility 
of their nuclear weapons program. Neither proposition is likely to form the 
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basis of a new relationship. India is neither about to conduct a wilsonian 
Policy nor will it abandon its nuclear weapons program.^^ 
Indian foreign Policy can best be understood by analogy to the one that 
had been conducted when Britain governed the country. And that policy was, 
infact, formulated in Calcutta (the first seat of government) and then, after 
1934, from New Delhi. It based Indian Security on naval supremacy in the 
Indian ocean, on friendly, or at least non-threatening, regimes in the area from 
Singapore to Aden, and a non-hostile regime at the Khyber pass and 
Himalayas. In north, Britain had insisted on the Mc Mohan line some 
distances beyond the historic boundaries between china and the Indian sub-
continent. Imperial china never accepted this demarcation but was too weak to 
contest it. Communist china has reclaimed the tradition border and fought to 
achieve it in 1962. The issue is at present unresolved. In the north, in the 
Himalayas, the United states has no national interest to let itself be drawn into 
border disputes between China and India as long as neither side seeks to 
achieve its objective by force. This is an issue for which American should not 
risk its relations with either country. It is a classic case of the need to 
understand the limits of American interests. The relationship between China 
and India affects the United States only if either of their states were to 
dominate the other. America should avoid presenting its objections to the 
Indian Nuclear programe in joint forums with China - as occurred during the 
Clinton administration - because it must not imply a kind of nuclear tutelage 
over the Indian sub-continent. But neither is it in America's interests to go 
along with India's justification that its nuclear programme is needed to 
contain China."'^  
The Indian nuclear weapons programme, infact, became the Principal 
point of contention between India and the United States in the last two years 
of the Clinton administration. The initial American reaction to Indian nuclear 
testing was highly emotional. President Clinton said: 
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To think that you have to manifest your greatness 
by behaviour that recalls the very worst events of 
the 2(f century on the edge of the 21^' century, 
when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear 
age behind, is just wrong. And they clearly don't 
need it to maintain their security. 
Any analysis must begin with the reaUzation that nuclear competition 
on the subcontinent has a long history. India set off its first nuclear explosion 
in 1974. China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964. In 1976, as secretary of 
State, I failed to dissuade Pakistan from its incipient nuclear programme. The 
nuclear testing thus serves to remind us that, despite the mantra of 
Globalization, there are geo-political-realities that over whelm fashionable 
reveries about universality. India and Pakistan are testing nuclear weapons 
because, living as they do in a tough neighbourhood, they will not risk their 
survival on exhortations coming from countries baring their own security on 
nuclear weapons. While the United States has every reason to pursue non-
proliferation objectives, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan are equally 
rational in pursuing their own nuclear objectives. American Policy should 
therefore move from trying to pressure India and Pakistan to abandon their 
nuclear weapons programmes to making them partners in a regime of nuclear 
restraint and in easing political tension in south - Asia. 
Nations have at least three motives for building nuclear weapons 
programme: 
• The desire to be a world power based on the be a world power based 
on the belief that a nation unable to defend itself against the fiill range 
of possible dangers can not be a world power. Such a nation will both 
acquire nuclear weapons and strive for the capability to reach any 
potential adversary. Anxious to preserve their special status, these 
states are least likely to engage in proliferation except, as in Russia, 
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due to a collapse of discipline. They are also least vulnerable to 
sanctions because the other world powers value their cooperation on 
other subjects - India is in this category. 
• States that feel threatened by neighbours with larger populations as 
greater resources may see in nuclear weapons a means to pose 
unacceptable risks or to create a deterrent against threats to their 
survival. This is especially the case if the powerftil neighbour has 
nuclear weapons. Such states could be kept from developing nuclear 
weapons only by a credible guarantee from existing nuclear powers, 
which is unlikely to be extended and less likely to be believed. Israel 
and Pakistan are in this category. 
Nations determined to wreck the balance of power on their regions and 
that see in nuclear weapons a means with which to intimidate their 
neighbours and discourage outside intervention. Iraq, North Korea, and 
other so-called rogue states are in this category.^^ 
The American decision to risk making a nuclear exception for India 
was rooted in a larger appreciation of the changing nature of the global 
balance of power and the importance of developing an enduring partnership 
with New Delhi. As it became increasingly aware of its own new power 
potential on the global stage, India instinctively understood the prospect of 
accelerating its own rise through a partnership with the United States. The 
talk of "Shared values"— a mere rhetorical device during the cold war to hide 
the absence of any substantive relationship - now reinforced the emerging 
strategic convergence in the early 21^' century. The ideas of promoting 
democracy and defining a new balance of power because the drivers of a new 
American policy towards India. 
The study pointed out that "Most forecast indicate that by 2020 
China's gross national product (GNP) will exceed that of individual western 
economic powers except for the United States. India's GNP will have 
overtaken or be on the threshold of overtaking European economics." It went 
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on to argue that "because of the sheer size of China's and India's populations 
- projected by the US census Bureau to be 1.4 billion and almost 1.3 billion 
respectively by 2020 - their standard of living need not approach western 
levels for their countries to become important economic powers." It also 
points that the importance of Chine and India will be determined not merely 
by size, but also by the fact that they are emerging as technology leaders. It 
argues, "the expected next revolution in high technology involving the 
convergence of nano-, bio-, information and materials technology could 
further bolster China and India's prospects."^'^ 
Yet, the explicit American suggestion that America would support 
India's rise surprised many in the Indian strategic community. Traditionalists 
scared on anti-Americanism argued that the past gives no reason to believe 
the Rice thesis. Prickly Nationalists, on the other hand, thundered that India 
does not need American support to become a major power. But the few 
realists in India began to see the fall significance of Rice's formulation on 
making India strong. K. Subrahmanyam, the doyen of the Indian strategic 
community, was quick to grasp the significant of Rice's formulation.^^ 
Recently the National Intelligence council of the US produced its 
forecast for 2020. It assessed that US, China and India would be among the 
first three markets of the world. Since wars are not no longer feasible among 
the major powers, the rivalry between US and China for their respective pre-
eminence in the International hierarchy is not likely to be solved through war. 
However, there can be no doubt that the US would like to continue to be the 
pre-eminent national in the world. 
Given the population of China and the inevitable rise in its per capita 
income, there is no way the US can prevent China overtaking it in the overall 
GDP to become the richest nation of the world. However, since the future 
currency of power will be the knowledge, the US does not want to forego its 
option of having the land in knowledge over China. Therefore, US, efforts are 
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concentrated on ensuring that it stays ahead of China in terms of knowledge 
generation - whether the rest of the world understands this as or not - in India 
many don't the US leadership appears to do so. 
The US strategy to deal with China, which is not an adversary but a 
rival, is radically different from that adopted towards the Soviet Union. The 
strategy is not containment but its opposite, engagement. While the US 
avoided trade and economic links with Moscow, it is the largest trading 
partner of China. It has invested heavily in the Chinese economy. It has 
succeeded in persuading the Chinese leadership to abandon communism in 
economic terms. 
The problems for the US with China is that it is the only major world 
player which does not subscribe to democracy. Its effort is to bring about 
china to make it accept democracy. US secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
had made it clear that the US will attempt to bring china round through its 
own relationship with Japan, South Korea and India. Towards this end, Asia 
must have a balance of power in Asia, in which all major economics will be 
intensively engaging each other. Those who see US strategy in terms of the 
containment of China, especially military containment, have not understood 
the US strategy. 
In any balance-of-power system (Like the one developing among the 
six power centres of the world), it is natural for powers to have different 
alignments with other from time to time. In any stable balance of power this 
will be a dynamic process. Given the preeminence of the US, the expectation 
will be that it would attempt to have better relations with each of the other 
five powers than they have with one another. 
In all probability India may prefer a preeminent US to a preeminent 
China. People have asked whether India would lean towards China on the 
basis of Asian solidarity. But soon there will be a few million Indians in the 
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u s , and it is hardly likely there would be even a few tens of thousands of 
Indian in China. That factor will decisively tilt India in favour of the US the 
time has come for the US and India to get closer and assert their natural 
friendship, validating what Bhishma said on his deathbed: "Circumstances 
determine friends and enemies." 
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An Overview 
It was the US President's feeling that this part of the world had been 
neglected for too long, and that India, in particular, was going to be one of the 
great countries in the 21^' century. 
This has been one of the longest Presidential trips in gestation period 
that may not be surely in the 41 presidencies we have had since white House 
left Philadelphia. We have looking at going to India for almost three and a 
half years. Te decision to visit was made in 1997 almost immediately after the 
President was elected-But the long and winding, and sometimes ups and 
downs, road of the last three years is very illuminating in understanding why 
we are? And where we are today? 
At the start of his second term, President Clinton asked his national 
security team to do a comprehensive review of American Policy towards 
south-Asia. It was the president's feeling that this part of the world had been 
neglected for too long, and that India, in particular, was going to be one of the 
key emerging countries of the 21^' century and needed a quantum leap in its 
relationship with the United States. US policy towards south - Asia had been 
framed largely in cold-war terms and our relationship with India was very 
much, I think, a victim of the cold-war. The US President asked his team to 
come up with different vision. And so in mid 1997, US concluded that policy 
review. 
The fundamental conclusion of the review was that American 
conclusion of that review was that American policy with India had to be 
broken from the constraints on one-issue problem - that India was just too 
important to be viewed solely through the prism of American non 
proliferation policy. While American non-proliferation policy is important, 
and should not be neglected, it could not be the end all-be all of US 
relationship with India. Rather US had in mind what we call a multi-basket 
..^^0' 
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approach, in which US should deal with India across a wide range issues. 
Among these non-proliferation and our concerns about arms control and 
disarmament would be one, but economics and trade, energy, regional 
security, global security, the environment, climate change, everything would 
be on the table and US would deal with each issue without holding any one 
hostage to progress on others. The US first laid this approach out in New 
York in late 1997, at a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 
where the President met with the their Prime Minister Gujral. The US also 
had an opportunity to lay it out with Prime Minister Sharif. Almost 
immediately India had new elections, and US hopes of going to India in 1998 
were put on the back burner. 
The election of the BJP government in 1998 gremed a new era in the 
Indian Politics and a new era in the way India looked at the world. Some 
voices were raised in academia and in the press, both here and in India, about 
the direction the BJP Government would take, and whether or not a dialogue 
could be conducted with a government perceived to be supporting something 
called Hindu nationalism. The US President and his team decided that the 
important thing was to engage and to find out the nature of the new leadership 
in India. In early 1998, the US - President sent then US Ambassador to the 
United Nation Bill Richardson to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and briefly 
Afghanistan on a mission to lay out our new vision on how this part of the 
world and the United states would work together in the 21^' century. It seemed 
to be a very promising start. Among other things, Indian Prime Minister 
Vajpayee nominated of his closest advisors, Jaswant Singh, to be a special 
channel to work with the United States. 
May of 1998, of course, brought India's decision to conduct nuclear 
tests and the new beginning in US - India relations suffered a blow. The US 
spent much of the next month trying to persuade Pakistan not to follow suit, 
but it chose to do so as well. The President had no option under the law but to 
impose congressionally mandated sanctions on India and Pakistan, known as 
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the Glenn Amendment sanctions. The relationship was back to one issue -
Proliferation and arms control. There was as well quickly an international 
consensus that supported sanctions and asked of India strong assurances about 
its future policy towards tests and the development of a nuclear program/ the 
G8, the 09, the P5, virtually every alphabet soup of international relations 
stood together. The US President decided that our relationship with India was 
too important to languish, however, and that it was radical to find a way to 
overcome differences, even as large as the ones that emerged in the spring of 
1998. 
A new effort was undertaken by Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe 
Talbott, to see if US could find a common understanding, a common 
dialogue, and a common language with the Government of India. A member 
of strobe Talbott's negotiating team over the course of the last two years 
because one of the most remarkable efforts in Indo-US negotiations and 
dialogue that has ever occurred. 
Talbott team had many long rounds of discussions with our Indian 
counterparts, led now by foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, the U.S. met in 
Germany, Italy. The United Kingdom, India, Washington, New York -
virtually everywhere. And from those discussions, a much improved 
atmosphere has emerged in Indo-US relations and much impressed 
understanding about where each of us is coming from and the common road 
that both of us want to go on in the 21^' century. US ceased talking past each 
other and around each other and we have talked to each other. The US laid out 
its strategic concerns on both sides in ways, which in US experience at least, 
are unprecedented in US - Indian dialogue. 
At the same time, Prime Minister Vajpayee embarked upon a process 
that would take him to Lahore and dialogue with India's neighbour to the 
west, a dialogue that promised to bring much in terms of regional peace and 
stability. The US strongly supported that effort. The US saw in it the kind of 
113 
brave diplomacy that is needed as the world enters the new millennium. The 
President sent messages of support privately and messages of congratulation 
publicly to both Prime Ministers. The US President met with Prime Minister 
Sharif in Amman, Jordan, just before the visit to Lahore, to encourage him to 
grasp this opportunity. Unfortunately events intervened again to disrupt this 
very promising start. Lahore led not to dialogue, but to kargil and to a war in 
the Himalayas, a war that ended only when the President met with Prime 
Minister Sharif at an extra-ordinary summit at Blair house on the fourth of 
July, 1999. Through a long weekened a negotiations directly with Prime 
Minister Sharif and on the phone with Prime Minister Vajpayee, the US is 
able to play some role in helping these countries walk back from a conflict 
that was very dangerous. Kargil had a silver lining in retrospect. From it 
emerged the new sense of confidence between Indian leaders and American 
leaders, particularly between the leaders at the top, the prime Minister and the 
President, the National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and his Indian 
Counterpart Brijesh Mishra, Foreign Minister Singh, and Secretary of State 
Albright and Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. The reflection of the BJP 
Government, in 1999, finally paved the way to move forward on this much -
delayed Presidential Trip. 
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Chapter - 5 
The Politics of Globalization 
Abstract & Introduction 
The term Globalization describes the contradictory economic. Political 
and cultural processes of the world capitalist integration; Although capitalism 
has been of a Global Character since the 1400s, the current phrase of 
Globalization is the manifest by emergent transitional institutions, changing 
relations between multinational corporations and sovereign nation- states, and 
the development of a Global monocuhure of consumption. In order to 
articulate the contradictory process of Globalization. 
The term globalization is increasingly used to describe the ongoing 
integration of the world within a capitalist political economy. Advocates of 
globalization point to the emergence of the "middle-class" in developing 
countries, economic growth within peripheral economies, the continued 
expansion of Global stock markets, democratization and emergence of a 
"Global culture" as indicators of the benefits of this process. Critics of 
globalization point to the rising gaps of inequality between nations and within 
all nations of the global economy, increased environmental degradation, 
especially in the developing world, the loss of sovereignty, cultural 
imperialism and the rise in extreme nationalism as Indicators of the downside 
of the process. 
The Dialectics of Globalization 
As man advances in civilization and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to 
extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same 
nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached. 
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there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the 
men of all natives and races. 
Globalization refers to a historical process which transforms the special 
organization of social relations and transaction, generating trans-continental 
or inter-regional networks of interaction and the exercise of Power. It is 
possible to identify for analytical purposes different historical forms of 
Globalization from the epoch of world discovery in the early modem period 
to the present era of the neo-Iiberal Global Project. These can be characterized 
by distinctive spatio - temporal and organization attributes. Thus to talk of 
Globalization to acknowledge that, over the longue duree, there have been 
distinctive historical forms of Globalization which have been associated with 
quite different kinds of historical world order. Although contemporary 
Globalization share much in common with Past Phrases it is nevertheless 
distinguished by unique spatio - temporal and organization attributed; that is, 
the extensity, intensity, velocity and infact of global flows, alongside 
distinction patterns of institutionalization, modes of contestative, stratificative 
and reproductive. Moreover, since contemporary process of Globalization and 
regionalization articulate overlapping networks and constellations of power 
which cut across territorial and political boundaries, they present a unique 
challenge to a world order designed in accordance with the westphalian 
principles of sovereign, exclusive rule over a bounded territory. 
Of course the character and significance of this challenge is wholely 
debated. For some, refused to here as the hyperglobalizers. there 
developments invite the demise of sovereign statehood and undermine a 
world order constructed upon the basis of westphalian norms. Amongst those 
of a more sceptical mind. Globalization is conceived as the great myth of our 
times; accordingly, the proposition that it prefigures the emergence of a new, 
less state - centric world order is dismissed.^ by comparison, others argue that 
contemporary Globalization is reconstituting or transforming the power, 
functions and authority of the nation-state. For these 'Transformationalist,' 
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the Globalization is associated with the emergence of a post-westphalian 
world order in which the institutions of sovereign statehood and political 
community are being re-formed and reconstituted. In this post-westphalian 
order, there is marked shift towards hiararchy - a divided authority system -
in which states seek to share the tasks of Governance with a complex array of 
institutions, Public and Private, regional, transnational and Global, 
representing the emergence of overlapping communities of fate. 
This is not the place to review the claims, counter - claims and 
historical evidence relating to these competing accounts; that has been 
accomplished elsewhere. Rather the central task is to examine the particular 
pattern of contemporary Globalization in what czar conceived as the key 
domains of power - the political, economic, cultural and the military. This 
exercise is a prelude to assessing the central normative, institutional, and the 
intellectual challenges which contemporary patterns of Globalization present 
to the organizing principles of existing world order; namely, sovereign 
statehood and political continuity. On this basis of such an assessment a 
taxonomy of the possible feature shapes the world order will be developed. 
Dimensions of Globalization 
Capitalism has been of a Global character seen the term European 
began setting up colonies in the 1400s. Colonial economies were organized to 
suit the needs of the core countries of the capitalist world system. Although 
the principles of Globalization have been around for the long time. There are 
nonetheless several elements of Globalization that are widely accepted as 
separating the current phase of Global capitalist development. The increasing 
inter-connectedness of markets, finances, goods and services, and the growing 
stature of transnational corporate networks heavily influence the economic, 
political and cultural processes of Globalization today notes that this influence 
involves creating a new world market, new transnational political 
organizations and a new Global culture. This process of Globalization is not 
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linear but rather involves a dialectical relationship between its economics, 
political and cultural dimension that often appears contradictory. 
MNCs, however, are the linchpins of the contemporary world 
economy. Around 44,000 N4NCs account for 25-33 per cent of world output 
and 70 per cent of world trade. Despite regional concentrations of production, 
transnational business networks span the three core regions of the world 
economy, linking the fortunes of desperate communities and nations in 
complex webs of interconnectedness. Contrary to the sceptics, MNCs are not 
simply 'national firms with international operations' nor are they, as the 
hyperglobalizers argue, 'footloose corporations', which wander the globe in 
search of maximum profits. Rather, MNCs playa much more central role in 
the operation of the world economy than in the past and they figure 
prominently in organizing extensive and intensive transnational networks of 
coordinated production and distribution that are historically unique. MNCs 
and global production networks are critical to the organization, location and 
distribution of productive power in the contemporary world economy. 
Despite some obvious continuities with the past, such as the lasting 
impact of imperial ties on European FDI and MNCs, the contemporary 
globalization of business and production has transformed 'what goods and 
services are produced, how, where and by whom'. Of course, multinational 
production still only accounts for a minority of total world production. 
Nevertheless, its growing significance has profound implications for the 
economic autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states, although this is 
mediated by national patterns of enmeshment in global production networks. 
(a) Political Globalization 
Economic globalization has not occurred in a political vacuum, 
although it is too often interpreted as if it has. Alongside processes of global 
economic transformation there have been parallel but-distinct political 
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changes. Two terms - 'political globalization' and 'global politics' - can 
usefully be clarified to help understand these developments. By political 
globalization is meant shifting processes of political power, authority and 
forms of rule which reach across space and time, while the term 'global 
politics' captures the increasingly extensive or 'stretched' form of political 
relations and political activity. Political decisions and actions in one part of 
the world can rapidly acquire world-wide ramifications. In addition, sites of 
political action and/or decision-making can become linked through rapid 
communications into complex networks of decision-making and political 
interaction. Associated with this 'stretching' is a frequent 'deepening' impact 
of global political processes such that, unlike in ancient or modem empires, 
'action at a distance' permeates with greater intensity the social conditions 
and cognitive worlds of specific places or policy communities. As a 
consequence, developments at the global level -whether economic, social or 
environmental -can frequently acquire almost instantaneous local 
consequences and vice versa. 
The idea of 'global politics' challenges the traditional distinctions 
between the domestic/international, inside/outside, territorial/non-territorial 
politics, as embedded in conventional conceptions of 'the political'. It also 
highlights the richness and complexity of the interconnections which 
transcend states and societies in the global order. Although governments and 
states remain, of course, powerful actors, they now share the global arena 
with an array of other agencies and organizations. The state is confronted by 
an enormous number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international 
agencies and regimes which operate across different spatial reaches, and by 
quasi-supranational institutions, like the European Union. Non-state actors or 
transnational bodies, such as multinational corporations, transnational 
pressure groups, transnational professional associations, social movements 
and so on, also participate intensively in global politics. So to do many 
subnational actors and national pressure groups, whose activities often 
121 
spillover into the international arena. Global politics today, moreover, is 
anchored not just in traditional geopolitical concerns, but also in a large 
diversity of economic, social and ecological questions. Pollution, drugs, 
human rights and terrorism are amongst an increasing number of transnational 
policy issues which cut across territorial jurisdictions and existing political 
alignments, and which require international co-operation for their effective 
resolution. Defense and security issues no longer dominate the global agenda 
or even the political agendas of many national governments. These 
developments, accordingly, challenge the conventional Westphalian (and 
realist) principles of world political order.'* 
Nations, peoples and organizations are linked by many new forms of 
communication and media which range in and across borders. The revolution 
in microelectronics, in information technology and in computers has 
established virtually instantaneous world-wide links which, when combined 
with the technologies of the telephone, television, cable, satellite and jet 
transportation, have dramatically altered the nature of political 
communication. The new forms of communication enable individuals and 
groups to 'overcome' geographical boundaries which once might have 
prevented contact; and they create access to a range of social and political 
experiences with which the individual or group may never have had an 
opportunity to engage directly.^ The intimate connection between 'physical 
setting', 'social situation' and politics which has distinguished most political 
associations from pre-modem to modem times has been ruptured: the new 
communication systems create new experiences, new modes of understanding 
and new frames of political reference independently of direct contact with 
particular peoples or issues. At the same time, unequal access to these new 
modes of communication has created novel patterns of political inclusion and 
exclusion in global politics. 
The development of new communication systems generates a world in 
which the particularities of place and individuality are constantly re-presented 
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and re-interpreted by regional and global communication networks. But the 
relevance of these systems goes far beyond this, for they are fundamental to 
the possibility of organizing political action and exercising political power 
across vast distances. For example, the expansion of international and 
transnational organizations, the extension of international rules and legal 
mechanisms their construction and monitoring - have all received an impetus 
from the new communication systems and all depend on them as a means to 
further their aims. The present era of global politics marks a shift towards a 
system of multilayered global and regional governance. Although it by no 
means replaces the sedimentation of political rule into state structures, this 
system is marked by the internationalization and transnationalization of 
politics, the development of regional and global organizations and 
institutions, and the emergence of regional and global law. 
States are increasingly enmeshed in novel forms of international legal 
and juridical regimes. As Crawford and Marks remark, 'international law, 
with its enlarging normative scope, extending writ and growing 
institutionalization, exemplifies the phenomenon of globalization'. 
Increasingly aspects of international law are acquiring a cosmopolitan form. 
By cosmopolitan law, or global law, or global humanitarian law, is meant 
here a domain of law different in kind from the law of states and the law made 
between one state and another for the mutual enhancement of their 
geopolitical interests. Cosmopolitan law refers to those elements of law -
albeit created by states - which create powers and constraints, and rights and 
duties, which transcend the claims of nation-states and which have far-
reaching national consequences. Elements of such laws define and seek to 
protect basic humanitarian values which can come into conflict, and 
sometimes contradiction, with national laws. These values set down basic 
standards or boundaries which no political agent, whether a representative of 
a government or state, should, in principle, be able to cross.^ 
Human rights regimes and human rights law, for example, sit uneasily 
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with the idea of accepting state sovereignty alone as the sole principle for the 
organization of relations within and between political communities. They can 
be thought of as an element of an emerging cosmopolitan legal framework, 
along with the law of war, the law governing war crimes and environmental 
law (for example, the Convention on the Law of the Sea and elements of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development). Together, these domains 
of law constitute a developing set of standards and constraints which bear 
upon and qualify the notion of an untrammelled principle of state sovereignty. 
While commitment to these standards often remains weak, they signal a 
change affecting the concept of legitimate state power in regional and global 
law. For the rules of war, laws governing crimes against humanity, the 
innovations in legal thinking concerning the use of resources and human 
rights regimes all mark out a shift in the direction of the subject and scope of 
international law. Opinion has shifted against the doctrine that international 
law must be a law 'between states only and exclusively' (Oppenheim). At 
issue, is the emergence of a vast body of rules, quasi-rules and legal changes 
which are beginning to alter the basis of co-existence and cooperation in the 
global order. The legal irmovations referred to challenge the idea that the 
supreme normative principle of the political organization of humankind can 
and should remain simply that of sovereign statehood. Most recently, 
proposals put forward for the establishment of an International Criminal Court 
add fiirther testimony to the gradual shift toward a 'universal constitutional 
order', The new legal frameworks aim to curtail and to delimit state 
sovereignty, and set basic standards and values for the treatment of all, during 
war and peace. Of course, this body of law is by no means subscribed to 
systematically; but it points to the development of a post- Westphalian order -
setting down a new regulatory framework for the conduct of relations among 
political communities.^ 
At the end of the second millennium, political communities and 
civilizations can no longer be characterized simply as 'discrete worlds'; they 
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are enmeshed and entrenched in complex structures of overlapping forces, 
relations and movements. Clearly, these are often structured by inequality and 
hierarchy. But even the most powerful among them ~ including, the most 
powerftil nation-states - do not remain unaffected by the changing conditions 
and processes of regional and global entrenchment. A few points can be 
emphasized to clarify further the changing relations between political 
globalization and modem nation-states. All indicate an increase in the 
extensiveness, intensity, velocity and impact of political globalization, and all 
suggest important questions about the evolving character of the democratic 
political community in particular. 
Today the locus of effective political power can no longer be assumed 
to be national governments - effective power is shared and bartered by diverse 
forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels. Furthermore 
the idea of a political community of fate - of a self-determining collectivity -
can no longer meaningfully be located within the boundaries of a single 
nation-state alone. Some of the most fundamental forces and processes which 
determine the nature of life-chances within and across political communities 
are now beyond the reach of individual nation-states. The late twentieth 
century political world is marked by a significant series of new types of 
'boundary problem'. In the past, of course, nation-states principally resolved 
their differences over boundary matters by pursuing reasons of state backed 
by diplomatic initiatives and, ultimately, by coercive means. But this power 
logic is singularly inadequate and inappropriate to resolve the many complex 
issues, from economic regulation to resource depletion and environmental 
degradation, which engender at seemingly ever greater speeds-an 
intermeshing of 'national fortunes'. In a world where powerful states make 
decisions not just for their peoples but for others as well, and where 
transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national 
communities in diverse ways, the questions of who should be accountable to 
whom, and on what basis, do not easily resolve themselves. Political space for 
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the development and pursuit of effective government and the accountability of 
power is no longer coterminous with a delimited political territory. 
Contemporary forms of political globalization involve a complex 
deterritorialization and re-territorialization of political authority. 
(b) Economic Globalization 
Today all countries trade internationally and with the odd reception 
like North Korea, they trade significant proportions of their national income. 
Around twenty per cent of world output is traded and a much larger 
proportion is potentially subject to International competition: trade has now 
reached unpresented levels, both absolutely and in proportion to world output. 
If, in the first, trade sometimes formed an enclave largely isolated from the 
rest of the national economy it is new an integral part of the structure of 
rational production in all modem states. 
During the middle ages, Venice imported spices, medicines, perfumes 
and silk from the east, while, in the Black Sea, Genova traded grain, fur and 
slaves with southern Russia. There was both a land-route from China and the 
Indian Ocean sea-route, which transited via Egypt, In terms of volume of 
trade, the latter seems to have been more significant. This was presumably 
because of the higher cost of overland than maritime transport, which 
remained true until the coming of the railways in the nineteenth century. 
Genoan ships, writes Professor Findlay, 'took raw materials such as alum and 
cotton, as well as spices and other luxury products from the East, to the ports 
of the English Channel and the North Sea, bringing back wool and woollen 
cloth for Italy as well as re-export to the East. The Venetians, not to be 
outdone, followed suit.' In sum, 'the period from 1260 to 1350 saw the 
emergence of a genuine "world economy'". 
Yet this was a modest beginning. The European voyages of discovery 
of the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries were the most significant economic 
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events of the last millennium, after the move to Promethean growth in Britain 
in the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A number of 
peripheral European countries - Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain and 
France exploited superior military organization and technology, developed in 
intra-European conflict, to achieve control over much of the world. They 
sought wealth through plunder and trade. Out of their quest came great 
empires. In the long run, however, commerce proved more enduring and more 
fruitful: empires came and then went, as the costs of control rose and the 
rewards fell; but trade and investment remained. The result was the 
incorporation of much of the world into an economic system whose centre 
was, until the twentieth century, Europe, then Europe and North America, and 
today, though dominated by the west, includes advanced East Asian countries, 
particularly Japan. 
The European conquest of the Americas was the big event. It gave the 
Europeans what Eric Jones has called the 'ghost acreage' of two new conti-
nents. From a population of 100 million and an area of 3.75 million square 
miles, the Europeans suddenly found themselves with an additional 20 million 
square miles. If the Chinese had discovered it first, the world would now look 
very different. As Professor Jones has said, 'what had happened was that the 
Europeans had discovered an unprecedented ecological windfall. Europe was 
sufficiently decentralized and flexible to develop in response, and not merely 
to consume the raw gains. This conjunction of windfall and entrepreneurship 
happened only once in history.'^ 
This is not quite true. In the long run, their vast possessions did rather 
little for Spain or Portugal, except give them an opportunity for slumber. l\or 
did Spain and Portugal do much for their vast possessions, which they treated 
a sources of plunder. The decisive shift was from imperial exploitation by the 
Iberians in Latin America to colonization and trade, under British legal and 
political institutions, in North America. That was, in time, to engender a new 
power, the United States, whose rise was to be the decisive geopolitical event 
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of the nineteenth century. Today, the economy of erstwhile British North 
America (the United States and Canada) is three times bigger than that of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, at purchasing power parity, and more than 
five times bigger in current US dollars. This is a reversal of the situation three 
centuries ago and reflects the triumphant success of British America with 
industrialization and the equally striking failure of Latin America. 
In addition to straightforward plunder, primarily the search for silver, 
the possession of both the Americas and maritime power created the basis for 
a trade in sugar, tobacco, indigo (an important natural dye) and, in the 
nineteenth century, cotton. African slaves were brought to the New World to 
produce these commodities, after the Europeans had succeeded in wiping out 
the indigenous inhabitants by disease and cruelty. Out of this grew the 'trian-
gular trade' of the seventeenth and, above all, eighteenth centuries, which 
linked Europe to Africa and the New World, with the exchange of manufac-
tures from the first to slaves from the second and commodities from the third. 
Eric Williams argued that the profits from this exploitation of African 
labour financed the industrial revolution.'° This remains controversial. A well-
known study concluded that the profits from the slave trade were about half a 
per cent of British national income in 1770,8 per cent of total investment and 
about 39 per cent of commercial and industrial investment." Whether this 
was crucial is a matter of judgement. Certainly, such profits were not a 
sufficient condition for the industrial take-off As Findlay remarks, none of 
this debate about the role of trade 'should be taken to imply that the Industrial 
Revolution could simply have occurred as a natural outcome of the expansion 
of overseas trade, however profitable. The acceleration of technical progress 
and productivity growth that has been sustained ever since depended upon a 
fortunate combination of circumstances and creative response that was unique 
to the northwestern comer of Europe.'^ Opportunities do not create wealth. 
Only seizing them does. 
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For all these important economic developments, the direct impact of 
long-distance commerce on the economies of the world was relatively minor 
until the nineteenth century, because of the cost of transport and 
communications. This did not make it in any way irrelevant. It afforded an 
excellent living to Venice, for example. It generated the celebrated Silk Road. 
Most important, perhaps, the search for luxuries in the east Indies - spices, in 
particular - drove the Europeans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
towards their successftil experiment with long-range naval commerce, backed 
by force, that ultimately transformed the entire world. The political economy 
of the seventeenth century Netherlands and Britain would have been quite 
different without the role of an enriched mercantile class. London's support 
for parliament was decisive in the civil war and without trade there would 
have been no London. 
(c) Cultural Globalization 
Many of the complaints of today," are about the cultural impact of 
global capitalism. But long-distance cultural impacts are hardly new. The 
great religions of humanity emanated either from the Middle East or from 
India. Jesus Christ was a Jew of the first century. The Roman Catholic 
Church, perhaps the most significant European cultural insfitution, emerged 
fi-om a marriage of Jewish religion, Greek philosophy and Roman power. 
Islam has been an equally successftil cultural export, to the point of 
eradicating the pre-Islamic cultures of the countries it has engulfed. But the 
spread of ideas and the clerisies that attend them is not just an old 
phenomenon. The most successful European religious export of the twentieth 
century was Marxism-Leninism. No better example of cultural globalization 
can be found than the communist revolution in China. In that most enduring 
of empires, Mao Zedong triumphed in the name of an ideology developed just 
a century earlier of such an assessment a taxonomy of the possible ftiture 
shapes of world order will be developed. 
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(d) Military Globalization 
Over the last century globalization in the military domain has been 
visible in, amongst other things, the geo-political rivalry and imperialism of 
the great powers (above all, from the scramble for Africa circa 1890s to the 
Cold War), the evolution of international alliance systems and international 
security structures (from the Concert of Europe to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization - NATO), the emergence of a world trade in arms together with 
the worldwide diffusion of military technologies, and the institutionalization 
of global regimes with jurisdiction over military and security affairs, for 
example, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Indeed, it is 
possible to argue that all states are now enmeshed, albeit to varying degrees, 
in a world military order. This world military order is highly stratified, highly 
institutionalized, and shaped by a relatively autonomous arms dynamic. It is 
stratified in that there is broadly a first tier (with superpower status), second 
tier (middle-ranking powers) and third tier (developing military powers): and 
it is institutionalized in that military-diplomatic and multilateral arrangements 
define regularized patterns of interaction. Military globalization can be 
conceived initially as a process which embodies the growing extensity and 
intensity of military relations amongst the political units of the world system. 
Understood as such, it reflects both the expanding network of worldwide 
military ties and relations as well as the impact of key military technological 
innovations (e.g. steamships to reconnaissance satellites) which, over time, 
have reconstituted the world into an increasingly unified geo-strategic space. 
Historically, this process of time space compression has brought centres of 
military power into closer proximity and potential conflict, as the capability to 
project enormous destructive power across vast distances has proliferated. 
Simultaneously, military decision and reaction times have shrunk with the 
consequence that permanent military machines, along with their permanent 
preparation for war, have become an integral feature of modem social life. 
With the end of the Cold War the pattern of global military and 
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security relations has been further transformed In some respects, the structure 
of world military power at the end of the twentieth century reflects a return to 
a traditional pattern of multipolar power politics, but, in other respects, 
especially in relation to the sole military superpower status of the US it is 
historically unique. As the Cold War has ended and the foreign military 
presence of the US and Russia has contracted (by quite spectacular 
proportions) the reassertion of regional and local patterns of inter-state rivalry 
has been intense. One consequence of this is the visible tendency towards 'the 
decentralization of the international security system' - the fragmentation of the 
world into relatively discrete (but not entirely self-contained) regional 
security complexes.''* This is evident, amongst other cases, in the resurgence 
of nationalist conflicts and tensions in Europe and the Balkans, in the Indo-
Pakistan rivalry in South Asia, and in the rivalry over the South China seas in 
Southeast Asia. As the overlay of Cold War conflict has been removed a 
significant external restraint upon regional conflicts (whose origins often 
predate even the age of the European empire) has disappeared. In some cases, 
such as South East Asia, the consequences to date have been relatively benign 
but in many regions rivalries and tensions have escalated. This 
'regional ization' of international security represents an important 
distinguishing feature of the post Cold War world military and security order. 
One interpretation of this altering military landscape is that the global 
security and military order is undergoing a process of 'structural bifurcation'; 
that is, fragmentation into two largely separate systems each with different 
standards, rules of conduct and inter-state behaviour.'^ The likely implications 
and costs of (conventional or nuclear) war among advanced industrial states, 
argues Mueller among others, are now so overwhelming that major war has 
become obsolescent; it would be counterproductive either as a mechanism for 
resolving interstate conflict or as a mechanism for transforming the 
international status quo. In contradistinction to this, states in the periphery 
(i.e., states in the developing world) operate within a system in which political 
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instability, militarism and state expansion remain endemic, and in which there 
is no effective deterrent to war as a rational instrument of state policy. 
Accordingly, patterns of international military and security relations are 
radically diverging as the post Cold War world order becomes increasingly 
bifurcated. 
These processes of fragmentation and regionaiization, however, can be 
counterposed to powerful centripetal forces reinforcing the unified character 
of the world military order. Four factors in particular deserve mention in this 
respect: 
First, in most global regions, aside from the Middle East, there is a 
gradual shift taking place towards co-operative defence or co-operative 
security arrangements. The desire to avoid inter-state contlict, the enormous 
costs, technological requirements and domestic burdens of defence are 
together contributing to the historic strengthening, rather than weakening, of 
muhilateral and collective defence arrangements as well as international 
military co-operation and co-ordination. The end of the Cold War has not 
witnessed the demise of NATO, as many predicted in 1990, but rather its 
expanding role and significance. Moreover, in many of the world's key 
regions multilateral frameworks for security and defence co-operation are 
beginning to emerge alongside existing bilateral arrangements. These, like the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARP) in Asia-Pacific, may be at a very early stage 
of development and beset by all kinds of rivalries, but historically they 
represent a significant institutionalization of military and security relations. 
Moreover, many of these arrangements are becoming less regionally specific 
as the US has strengthened its global engagements (e.g., NATO & ARF). At 
the global level too, the peacekeeping activities of the UN and its more 
general collective security functions have become more visible, although not 
necessarily more effective. These developments retlect a realization that the 
end of the Cold War, and against the background of recent military 
technological change, 'the capacity of the state to defend territorial boundaries 
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against armed attack' may have considerably weakened.'^ Certainly, many 
states now recognize that national security can no longer be achieved simply 
through unilateral actions alone. 
Second, the rising density of financial, trade and economic connections 
between states has expanded the potential vulnerability of most states to 
political or economic instability in distant parts of the globe. Accordingly, 
many states, not simply the world's major powers, remain acutely sensitive (if 
not vulnerable) to security and military developments in other regions. Such 
sensitivities may be highly selective, and certainly not all parts of the globe 
are perceived as of comparable strategic importance. Nevertheless, as the 
1990 Gulf crisis demonstrated, military developments in strategically critical 
regions continue to be of global significance. Regionalization and 
globalization of military/security relations are by no means contradictory 
processes but may be mutually reinforcing. 
Third, threats to national security are becoming both more diffuse and 
no longer simply military in character. The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction poses a potential threat to all states. But proliferation is in part a 
product of the diffusion of industrial and technological knowledge as well as 
hardware. Preventing proliferation is thus a classic collective action problem 
in that it demands world wide action. Similarly, environmental, economic, 
narcotics, terrorist, cultural criminal and other threats to national security 
cannot be resolved solely through either military or national means. 
Accordingly, there is a continuing demand for global mechanisms of co-
ordination and co-operation to deal with the expanding penumbra of security 
threats. 
Fourth , in the global states system the military security of all nations is 
significantly influenced by systemic factors. Indeed, the structure of power 
and the actions of the great powers remain dominant influences upon the 
military postures of each other and of all other states. At one level this is 
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simply because the great powers set the standards, be it in miUtary technology 
or force levels, against which all other states ultimately calibrate their defence 
capability. Thus, US defence policy has more wide-ranging global effects 
than does that of Kiribati. How the great powers act or react affects the 
security of all the world's regions. 
These points suggest that the contemporary geo-political order, tar 
from simply fragmenting, remains beset by problems of global strategic 
interconnectedness. The lack of any serious global political and military 
rivalries of the kind represented by the Cold War, or the New Imperialism of 
the 1890s, should not be read as a process of military de-globalization. 
Despite the ending of Cold War rivalry there has not been a detectable return 
to earlier forms of national military autarky; nor has the world broken up into 
discrete regional security complexes. Globalization and regionalization in the 
military domain appear to be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually 
exclusive processes. Moreover, there are growing (financial technological, 
industrial and political) pressures on states to engage in multilateral co-
operative efforts to achieve the rationalization of their defence industrial base. 
This is contributing to the (admittedly slow) de-nationalization of defence 
industries in most advanced states, and to a globalization of defence 
production.'^ 
The transnationalization of the defence industrial base represents a 
distinctive new stage in the organization of defence production and 
procurement akin to (but on a very different scale from) the global 
restructuring of industrial production. It is also reinforced by the fact that 
many of the most critical defence technologies are produced in those very 
civil industrial sectors, such as electronics or optics, which have been subject 
to increasing globalization. These developments have quite profound, 
although not necessarily completely novel, implications for the orthodox 
approach to defence-industrial organization, which traditionally has privileged 
- alongside national strategies of defence and procurement - the national 
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defence industrial base as the necessary underpinning to an 'autonomous' 
national defence capability. Both the regionalization and globalization of the 
defence-industrial sector compromise such autonomy in a fairly direct way 
since they make the acquisition (and crucially the use) of arms and weapons 
systems (not to mention defence industrial policy) potentially subject to the 
decisions and actions of other authorities or corporations beyond the scope of 
national jurisdiction. 
In some contexts, however, such regionalization and globalization may 
be exploited to enhance defence industrial and military autonomy. Sweden, 
for instance, by engaging in collaborative and licensing arrangements with 
both American and European aero-space defence contractors, has been able to 
sustain a highly advanced defence industrial capability which it might 
otherwise have been unable to support. Japan too has reduced its military 
dependence on the US by exploiting an intensely competitive world market in 
military technology transfer and licensing. In the realm of defence production 
and procurement globalization and regionalization by no means automatically 
prefigure the demise of a national defence industrial base, but they do alter the 
strategies and policies which governments have to pursue in order to sustain it 
as well as the patterns of industrial winners and losers. In the case of 
European states, the consolidation of 'national champions', through 
government supported (but not necessarily initiated) mergers and acquisitions, 
has complemented the emergence of 'European champions' to compete in the 
global and regional arms market with their American rivals. Autonomy is, 
thus, sought through a strategy of internationalization rather than 
nationalization alone. This in itself represents a significant departure from 
orthodox notions of military autonomy defined and pursued in essentially 
national terms. 
In the contemporary era of declining defence procurement budgets, the 
internationalization of defence production provides one solution to the 
maintenance of a 'national' defence industrial capacity. Accordingly, this is 
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not simply a process which is confined to Europe, or the trans-Atlantic region, 
where it is most evident, but is a part of a secular trend in defence industrial 
restructuring. This is largely because, for many big defence companies, 
'internationalization is one strategy of consolidation for long-term survival in 
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the market'. Restructuring of the national defence industrial base unfolds 
alongside a global restructuring of defence production. In varying degrees, all 
countries engaged in defence production are gradually being touched by these 
twin developments. As a consequence, in parallel to many political 
phenomena, the distinction between the 'foreign' and 'domestic' is breaking 
down. Indeed, the enormous complexity of cross-border intercorporate and 
production networks involves a 'shift away from traditional, single-country 
patterns of weapons production towards more transnational development and 
manufacture of arms'. Global sourcing of defence production, as in the 
commercial sector, is a growing practice as cost containment becomes more 
critical. For industrializing states with an indigenous defence production 
capability, global sourcing remains essential to meeting defence interests.'^ 
But this is also supplemented by other forms of collaboration, sometimes with 
the governments of developing countries or other advanced states, in the 
development or production of 'indigenous' military systems. In the post Cold 
War era, the global diffusion of military-technology and defence industrial 
capacity are becoming closely associated with a transnational ization of 
defence production. 
The spread of both defence industrial capability and military 
technology is facilitated by the increasingly central role acquired by 
commercial (civil) technologies (and civil technological innovation) in the 
development and manufacture of advanced weapons systems. The military 
technological revolution (MTR) of the late twentieth century is a product of 
the 'information age'. The same technologies which are revolutionizing 
aspects of everyday life, from the supermarket checkout to personal 
communications, are transfonning the logistics of war and the modem 
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battlefield which, as the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated, is now'constructed' as 
'a blizzard of electronic blips' rather than simply a 'storm of steel'. Strategic 
technologies are today largely dual-use technologies. Dual-use technologies, 
by definition, are commercial technologies and the industries that produce 
them are considerably more globalized than the defence industrial sector. As a 
result, most dual-use technologies are intensively traded across the globe 
whilst the capability to produce them is actively dispersed through the 
operations of transnational corporations. According to Carus, the result is that 
an 'increasingly large number of countries have access to many of the 
technologies needed to exploit the military technological revolution'.^' This in 
turn is transforming the stratification 0/ military-technological power within 
the global system. 
Military power has been fundamental to the evolution and the 
institutional form of the modem sovereign, territorial nation-state. The 
independent capacity to defend national territorial space by military means is 
at the heart of the modem conception of the institution of sovereign statehood. 
But, as discussed here, contemporary military globalization poses quite 
profound questions about the meaning and practice of state sovereignty and 
autonomy. For in the contemporary age, the traditionally presumed 
correspondence between the spatial organization of military power and the 
territorial nation-state appears to be changing. 
The doctrine of national security remains one of the essential defining 
principles of modem statehood. The autonomous capacity of the modem state 
to defend the nation against extemal threats is a cmcial (to some the essential) 
ingredient of traditional conceptions of sovereignty. For if a state does not 
have the capacity to secure its territory and protect its people then its very 
raison d'etre can be called into question. National security has, therefore, 
been understood traditionally in primarily military terms: as the acquisition, 
deployment and use of military force to achieve national goals. Without such 
a capacity the very essence of the institution of modem statehood would be 
137 
decidedly altered. 
Of course, the ideology of modem statehood has not always been 
replicated in the political practices of states. But in the military domain, above 
all others, modem states have always sought to maintain their independence. 
However, in the contemporary era, military globalization and pattems of 
national enmeshment in the world military order have prompted a serious 
rethinking about the idea and the practice of national security. Although the 
discourse of national security dominates political and popular debate about 
military matters it acts more as a simplified representation or legitimating 
device than a reflection of the actual behaviour of states. For many states the 
strategy for achieving 'national security' has become almost indistinguishable 
from an international security strategy. This is evident amongst Western states 
which collectively constitute a 'security community' within which military 
force plays no active role in the relations between member states. 
Within this 'security community' national defence and the exercise of 
military force is decided within an institutionalized alliance system (NATO) 
in which collective discussion and multilateral diplomacy complement 
existing national mechanisms of security policy. The development and pursuit 
of national security goals are, therefore, inseparable, in most key respects, 
from the development and pursuit of alliance security. National security and 
alliance security can be conceived as mutually constituted. Even for states 
such as France, which has historically sought to pursue a highly autonomous 
defence posture, or Sweden, which retains a declared policy of neutrality, post 
war national security policy effectively has always been shaped (and in the 
post Cold War context increasingly so) by the functioning of this broader 
'security community'. Moreover, for the United States membership of 
NATO represents an historic shift in national security posture away from 
autarky, isolationism, and the avoidance of extemal military commitments. 
For the US, along with other members of the Western 'security community', 
the practice of co-operative security is redefining the traditional agenda of 
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national security. 
The widening agenda of security, combined with the 
institutionalization of cooperative defence (and security) and the global 
regulation of military power, through arms control and other regimes, has 
contributed to a broadening of defence and security politics. The notion that 
the politics of defence and security issues are coterminous with national 
political space is belied by such diverse phenomena as the existence of global 
campaigns to ban land mines or to establish an International Criminal Court 
for crimes against humanity, and defence contractors within NATO and 
Europe lobbying for changes in defence industrial policy or government 
regulations on both sides of the Atlantic or in the East. Political activity 
focused on 'national security' matters is no longer simply a domestic affair. 
Political Evolution and Globalization 
Many thoughtful observers rely on economic growth and the new 
information technology to move the world more or less automatically into the 
new era of global well-being and political stability. But this is an illusion, 
world order requires consensus, which presupposes that the differences 
between the advantaged and those disadvantaged who are in a position to 
undermine stability and progress, be of such a nature that the disadvantaged 
can still see some prospect of raising themselves by this own effort. In the 
absence of such a consciousness, turbulence, both within and among societies 
will mount. 
The world's leaders - especially in the industrialized democracies -
carmot ignore the fact that in many respect, the gap between the beneficiaries 
of globalization and the rest of the world is growing, again both within and 
among societies. Globalization has become synonymous with growing; 
growth requires capital, and capital seeks the highest possible restum with the 
lowest risk, gravitating to where there is the best trade - off between risk not 
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return. In practice, this means that, in one form or another, the United States 
and other advanced industriaUzed countries will absorb overwhelming 
percentage of the world's available investment capital. Because the great bull 
market of the 1990s, reflected this reality - indeed was based on it - the gap 
between industrialized and developing countries has widened even as 
unprecedented wealth is being created. Without adequate capital developing 
countries cannot grow and create jobs. In the absence of rising employment, 
politicians will eventually lose their appetite for reforms that are 
preconditions for the globalization model - since campanies based in 
emerging market find it increasingly difficult to achieve access to 
international capital markets, they must raise capital at home, and they cando 
so only by paying higher interest rates than are available at financial centres. 
National companies of developing countries thus become increasingly 
uncompetitive, particularly in sectors of the economy where the barriers to 
trade are in the process of being dismantled. Emerging - market companies 
exposed to international competition face the twin prospects of either failing 
or foeing multinational enterprises. This is precisely the opposite of what 
advocates of protectionism in industrial countries have been predicting when 
they warried of the low-wage competition from the developing countries.""* 
Developing countries seeking to join the Globalization process have no 
choice in the long run except to restructure. This effort to become as much 
like the United States or Europe or Japan as possible is an difficult as it is 
time - consuming, though it can be accelerated through such institutions as 
NAFTA, which has proved a great boon to Maxico, or by special trade 
agreements and by pegging their currency to the dollar as did Argentina and 
Ecuador. Some countries are even considering making the dollar their official 
currency - whatever road is chosen, multinational companies based in the 
United States or Europe emerge increasingly as the engines driving 
globalization. For them, rush to size has turned into a goal in itself, almost 
comparatively pursued, because the ability to drive-up the stock prices of their 
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company is becoming the standard by which chief executives are increasingly 
being judged. As executives turn from being long-range builders into 
financial operators driven by shareholder value determined in daily stock 
market quotations, the vulnerability of the entire system grow, its long-term 
vitality could be weakened, and even more so, its resilience in times of crisis. 
Alan Greenspan's reunization about "Irrational exuberance" reflect the fear 
that, when markets become decoupled from the along postponed,^^ and that 
the exuberance might drive a downward cycle further than the underlying 
realities suggest. 
Not until mid 1990s did most ordinary people encounter the benefits 
and shortcoming of Globalization. Widespread use of the Internet (nearly 100 
millions users in the United States by 2000, an estimated 304 million around 
the world), facilitated information flows and heightened public invest when 
added to the Clinton administrations highly. Visible efforts to expand 
American trade and investments overseas, establish NAFTA and the WTO, 
and facilitate the integration of financial markets, globalization acquired a 
certain each among Americans of all political stripes and economic status. 
But surging imports and the growing tendency of corporate America to 
shift manufacturing to foreign locafions with ample quantities of cheap labour 
aroused blue-collar workers. In Indonesia, even workers in state-of-the-art 
tech plants earned only 60 dollar per month. US professionals also began to 
question the benefits of globalization when companies began moving 
engineering, research, and back-room operations to countries like India with 
large numbers of English-speaking engineers and other college-trained 
workers in order to cut costs. Engineers in India and other South East Asia 
countries earned less than $20,000 per year, less than one fourth of an 
American Engineer. 
American's were not only ones turn between the benefits and 
dislocations of Globalization. In Western Europe and in many developing 
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countries, Globalization became a dirty word, associated in the Public mind 
with American sneakers, blue jeans, burgers and videos: the French were 
most skeptical. In one poll, 65 Percent said Globalization increased the gap 
between rich and poor; 65 percent thought it threatened the national identity. 
Proud of their language and cultural traditions, many French thought 
Globalization a US. Conspiracy to "dumb down the world" and export its way 
of life. The French Ministry of culture sought to rely Europeans and to restrict 
access for Hollywood films and American television programmes. In 1989, 
France persuaded the European community to stipulate that domestic 
programming constitute 40 percent of T.V. fare. And during the Uruguay 
Ramd, it insisted that audiovisual materials be exempt from trade 
agreements.^^ 
Around the world - especially in Muslim countries - defenders of 
traditional values sought to block the spread of American - style pop-culture. 
Iranians religions fundamentalists raided homes to consficate videos and 
satellite dishes, and in neighbouring Afghanistan the Taliban closed movies 
theaters, burned films, denied schooling to women, and halted sports Try as 
they might, the fundamentalist could not eradicate the "Sway of alien and 
infidel culture." Their controls benefited counterband smugglers. In both Iran 
and Afghanistan, the movie Titanic proved a blockbuster; underground videos 
stores flourished. Some discreetly hid satellite dishes to access western 
television, the failure of Islamic fiindamentalists to stamp out western 
influences, like the inability of state-controlled societies in Eastern Europe to 
block the appeal of western democracy and consumerism, demonstrated the 
power of mass communication in the era of satellites and video cassettes. It 
also underscored the global appeal of U.S. values to the young, the well 
educated, and the affluent, and amorphous yet tangible element of American 
power in the world. 
American Pop culture celebrated several universal themes: 
individualism, consumerism, democracy, materialism, optimism. Pragmatism, 
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Progress, technology, tolerance, wealth and youth. Author Salman Rushdie, 
the target of an Iranian death warrant, defended Pop culture and globalization 
from fundamentalist attack. "Sneakers, burgers, blue jeans and music videos 
are not the enemy," he says. "These are fundamental freedoms to fight for, 
and it will not do to doom the terrorized women of Afghanistan or the 
circumcision - happy lands of Africa by calling their oppression their 
'culture,'" David Rothkopf, an associate of former secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger, carried the point a step beyond to defend American Cultural 
imperialism. "America should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the 
history of the world, their's is the most just, the most tolerant, the most 
willing to constantly reassess and improve itself, and the best model for the 
future." While America tended to glorify the individual at the expense of 
community interests, its pop culture was more open to foreign influences -
such as the Beatles - and more tolerant of diversity. Even Hollywood was not 
so much an American industry as it was a world - class entertainment 
business that attracted foreign stars (such as Arnold Schwar-Zenagger) and 
foreign capital. Indeed, Joseph Nye dean of Harward's Kennedy school 
described America as a "Cultural sponge, a syncretic society that can 
assimilate influences from all over the world and send them back home." But, 
high-cost Hollywood could not escape the inexorable logic globalization and 
outsourcing. Digital technology meant that movies could be shot anywhere, 
and in 2002 none of the movies nominated for 2002 best film Oscar was made 
in Hollywood. There were filmed overseas to reduce Production costs.^^ 
No economic system can be sustained without a political base. The 
challenged for those who believe in Globalization is to match economic 
growth with political imagination, to navigate between those who see the 
world only in technical economic terms and their critics who yearn to return 
to same quasi - socialist and discredited model of government control. An 
international sense of social responsibility must be fostered without strangling 
a successful economic system in Regulations imposed by bureaucrates.^^ 
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The proposition that GlobaHzation makes states unnecessary is even 
less credible then that it makes states important. If anything, exact opposite is 
true, for at least three reasons, First, the ability of a society to take advantage 
of the opportunities offered by international economic integration depends on 
the quality of Public goods, such as protection of property rights, personal 
security, a non-corrupt civil service and education - without the legal 
arrangements, in particular the potential Web of rewarding contracts is vastly 
reduced. This may seem a trivial point, but a very large proposition of the 
world's economics have failed to achieve these essential preconditions of 
success. Second the state normally defines the identity of human beings. A 
sense of belonging is a part of people's sense of security. It is perhaps not 
surprising that some of the most successfully internationally integrated 
economics are small, homogenous countries with a strong sense of collective 
identity. Third, all forms of internal government rest on the ability of 
individual states to provide and guarantee order. The WTO for example, is not 
a body of self-executive rules. On the contrary, they can be exercised only by 
sovereign states. The bedrock of international order is the territorial state, 
with a monopoly of coercive power within its jurisdiction. Cyberspace does 
not fundamentally change this, since economics are ultimately concerned with 
and sum for human beings, who have physical presence and, in consequence, 
physical location. Since states are territorial jurisdiction, they are the bedrock 
of Global order.^^ 
The implication is that, just as globalization does not make states 
impotent, it does not make them unnecessary either. On the contrary, for 
people to be successful in exploiting the opportunities afforded by 
international integration, they need states, at both ends of their transactions. 
This is why failed states disorderly states, weak states and corrupt states are 
shunned State they are black holes of the global economic system.^° 
Yet, the great changes in history, almost without exception, were 
driven by mankind's need for some kind of political vision and pursuit of a 
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standard of justice. While much of the self-righteousness, nihilism, and 
violence associated with the demonstrations against Globalization that are 
now spreading around the world is abhorrent, these outbreaks represent a 
warning that the international economic system may come to face a crisis of 
legitimacy. The industrial democracies must preserve and extend the 
extraordinary accomplishments that fostered globalization. But they can do so 
in the long run only if they endow the economic aspects of Globalization with 
a potential construction of a comparable sweep and vision. 
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An Overview 
The global system rewards and penalizes its participants by economic 
criteria. But, for the Public, these criteria are far too eroteric to evoke loyalties 
and commitments. In a crisis, the population will turn to its political leaders to 
care the impact of the economic Penalties. This is all the more true because 
even period of expansion take their toll on parts of the population, so that 
there exists in most countries and especially in the developing world - a near 
permanent minority ever waiting in the wings to act out the validity of its 
sentiments. 
To achieve global competitiveness, political leaders in developing 
countries are obliged to use up Political capital by restructuring their 
economics, eliminating waste and reducing overhead. This frequently implies 
massive dislocations and (hopefiilly temporary) unemployment for the sake of 
long - range benefits not demonstrable at the moment scarifies are being 
demanded. Such an equation is often anathema to political or economic 
leaders if the promised benefits will arrive only long after they have 
themselves left the scene. 
The massive changes in the structures and procedures of most of the 
societies participating in Globalization are strongly encouraged and frequently 
insisted upon as a condition of assistance - by the United States government 
as well as by leading international financial and economic institutions. Yet the 
advocates of the new gospel often seem oblivions to the historical record, 
which shows that the practices of reform took many decades to evolve in their 
own countries. Adopting the American model is not primarily a technical 
challenge; for most developing countries, it implies nothing less than a 
revolutionary upheaval in familiar patterns. Only a very few nations have ever 
managed to combine conservative fiscal and monetary policy, government 
intervention through regulation rather than ownership or control, deregulation 
of financial institutions, encouragement of flexible labour markets, and a 
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widely accepted and transparent legal framework. The American model 
presupposes that capital is relatively cheap and labour is relatively expensive, 
so that competitive success in the end depends on improvements in 
productivity sustained by constant technological progress. Comparative 
advantage is achieved by reducing the labour content of most productive 
processes to the greatest extent possible. 
The American experience demonstrates that, when all these factors 
combine and however difficult the initial stages, early dislocations will be 
justified by dramatic improvements in the standard of living. But the 
experience of most other countries has also shown that it is not easy to make 
the American model work rapidly. Continental Europe is still struggling with 
major domestic obstacles to the necessary structural reforms (especially in the 
labour market and agriculture) - though it now seems well launched on the 
process of adjustment. Ten years after the defeat communism, Russia, despite 
all western exhaustations and many billions of dollars in aid, is no closer to a 
normally functioning market economy than it is to domestic institutions, 
China's rate of growth is extra-ordinary, but it has been achieved at the price 
of giving governmental stability priority over democratic reform. Even in 
countries with a less inhibiting past - in south-east Asia and Latin America, 
for example - Globalization has proceeded in fits and starts. During the 1990s 
the United States, almost alone in the world, solved the problems of how to 
create jobs while revolutionizing its industrial technology. 
All developing countries have faced the challenge that 
industrialization, by drawing people from the countryside to the cities, brings 
with it the weakening of traditional political and social support systems. The 
urban working and lower middle class becomes a fertile re-cruiting ground for 
radical politics or religious fundamentalism. This phenomenon was familiar 
even before globalization; it contributed to the emergence of Marxism in the 
nineteenth century and to the Iranian revolution in the Twentieth. Even when 
material conditions of the poor and lower middle classes improve in absolute 
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terms, the migrants become increasingly conscious of tiie gap between rich 
and poor, which the early stages of modernization magnify and which 
television and other media being graphically into the homes and 
consciousness of nearly everyone. Political and economic indices therefore 
frequently slip out of phase with one another. Even when the aggregate 
economic data indicate growth, benefits may not reach the urban population 
sufficiently rapidly, or on a large enough scale, to remove the sense of 
rootlessness and dependence at the core of contemporary unease. 
Of course, these phenomena are not entirely novel. Displacement by 
technology has probably occurred since the invention of the shovel. And 
migration have\ taken place in every economic revolution. What is unique in 
our age is the scale of the global impact and the rate of technology change. 
The challenge of humanizing the process is, therefore, unprecedented. 
Free market capitalism remains the most effective and, thus far, the 
only demonstrated instrument for sustained economics growth and for raising 
the standard of living. But just as the unrestrained laissez-faire capitalism of 
the nineteenth century spawned Marxism, so too literal a version of 
Globalization of the Twenty-first century could generate a worldwide assault 
on the very concept of free markets. Globalization views the world as one 
market in which the most efficient and competition will prosper. It accepts -
and even welcomes - the fact that the free market will relentlessly shift the 
efficient from the inefficient, even at the cost of economic and social 
dislocation. 
But the extreme versions of globalism tend to neglect the mismatch 
between the world's political and economic systems. Unlike economics, 
politics divides the world into national units. And while political leaders may 
accept certain degree of suffering for the sake of growth in their economies, 
they cannot survive as advocates of near permanent austerity, especially if 
their policies can be presented as imposed from abroad. The temptation to 
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reverse - or at least to buffer - austerity by political means can become 
overwhelming. Protectionism may prove ineffective or even backfire in the 
long term, but political leaders frequently necessitates. 
Even well-established free market democracies do not accept limitless 
suffering in the name of the market and have taken measures to provide a 
social safety net and curb market excesses by regulations. The international 
financial system does not as yet have comparable firebreaks. 
The demonstrations against globalization at meetings of the 
international Monetary Fund and the world Bank in 2000 and at the Seattle 
meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999 were early warning signs of 
the potential Political weight of those who believe themselves at the mercy of 
forces they feel powerless to influence. To be sure, many of these 
demonstrations follows an all too familiar liftest, Anti-American and anti-
capitalist script from the 1960s and early 1970s, even down to some of the 
personalities involved. The exaltation of violence and self-indulgence of some 
of the demonstrators reflects ideological disdain for existing political and 
economic institutions that is, to a considerable extent, independent of specific 
grievances. 
Nevertheless, the leaders of the industrialized world must not ignore 
the emotional vacuum which the protests reflect, at least in past, least 
globalization, the most effective engine of growth the world has ever seen, 
becomes sub-merged in the political assault polarizing especially the 
developing societies most in need of its benefits. And if there is a serious 
secession in the industrialized world, it may spread even there. 
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Chapter - 6 
Concluding Thoughts 
To assess the relationship between the two largest democratic countries 
of the world, India and America, it is essential not only to assess the 
relationship in the context of only the present or the recent past, but in the 
larger perspective of past history and future prospects. It is imperative to bear 
in mind both the similarities and the dis-similarities in outlooks and in 
attitudes. One should not be unduly swayed by the passing phases, sometimes 
the differences are exaggerated. 
In 1941, India and the United States initiated diplomatic relations when 
India's Agent - General Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai and US Commissioner 
Thomas Wilson presented their letters of introduction to President Roosevelt 
and Viceroy Lord Linlithgow. India was already engaged in world war second 
at the behest of the viceroy and without the consent of the Indian people. The 
United States would be at war before the year was over. By the end of the 
decade India would become free, but in the process lose a quarter of its 
population to the newly created state of Pakistan, work which it would fight 
three wars. After the defeat of the Axis powers, the allied wartime coalition 
would crumble and the United States would find itself engaged in a global 
struggle with the Soviet Union that lasted forty-five years. 
Inspite of the moving ups and downs in Indo-American relations the 
fiindamental feeling of friendship and sympathy between the people of the 
two countries has remained more or less unchanged. Since in a democratic 
country the people can not be ignored, their feelings and aspirations are bound 
to have an effect on the thinking, the attitudes and policies of their 
Governments. Both India and American are secular democratic countries, 
who believe in the fi-eedom of the press and individual liberty. The rule of law 
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prevails in both these two countries. People of different cultures, races and 
religions reside in both the countries. 
In this environment, a half century of relations between India and the 
United States have been uneven - on occasion friendly, sometimes hostile, 
but more often, just estranged. Given their different historical, social and 
economic experiences, India and the United States were almost certainly 
destined to adopt conflicting policies on many issues. Their differences, 
however, might not have been as jagged in the absence of more profound 
sources of friction. Why have there two nations, both democracies, so often 
found themselves at odds with each other in the international arena? What lies 
behind their difficulties in getting along politically? 
This history suggests that the root course can be found in the clash over 
national security issues of major importance to each country. For India, the 
principal stem stumbling block has been the US-Pakistan relationship. In 
assuming and aligning itself with Pakistan, the entity bom of the traumatic 
partition of British India, the United States linked arms with the country 
which independent India considered its principal security threat. For the 
United States, the decisive problem has been India's attitude towards the 
Soviet Union. In establishing the Policy of non-alignment under Nehru, India 
annoyed the United States by reftising to agree with America's perception of 
the Soviet threat. Under Mrs. Gandhi, India went much further, establishing 
close security and political ties with Moscow, making common cause with the 
nation which the United States regarded as the major threat to its security and 
to global peace and stability. 
India and America have different historical and cultural backgrounds 
and different geographical and geo-political factors. So, its but natural that 
there are bound to be differences between the two countries. But what is 
important is that they should be able to respect each others point of view. 
There should be mutual understanding between the two countries. Differences 
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have arisen when there has been a lack of understanding and respect and when 
uherior motives have been attributed to such differences. So from time to time 
Indo-American relations got strained. America achieved her independence 
much before India achieved her's. Since independence, however, India has 
made rapid progress in the fields of industrialization and technological 
environment: 
In the relatively short span of time since 
independence, India has emerged as a major 
actor in the world politics with a deep 
involvement in international affairs. India's 
foreign policy formulations and attitudes have had 
an impact for beyond its own borders, not least 
because of the country's geostrategic importance. 
Like wise in working out her foreign policy 
objectives, India has always sought to promote 
India's security and further its developments. 
Certain factors have, however, limited how far Washington and New 
Delhi have been willing to let their relationship deteriorate. For India, the 
United States has had great economic importance - for two decades, from 
1951 until 1971, as the major donor of bilateral aid and, more recently, as a 
result of US influence over the decisions of international financial institutions. 
The United States has become India's largest trading partner and an 
importance source of investment and technology even though, conversely, 
India has played only a major role in US external commerce. Politically and 
cooperation Treaty with Moscow in 1971, India needed at least the semblance 
of a working relationship with the United states to land credibility to its policy 
of non-alignment and to avoid being tagged as a soviet camp follower. 
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For its part, as a global power pursuing global interest, the United 
States has needed India less than India has needed the United States. Ever 
since Washington lowered the priority accorded south - Asia ate rte 1965 
Indian - Pakistan war, this unbalanced equation of needs has been a fact life. 
The United States, However, has not been able to ignore New Delhi. With 
one-sixth of the globe's population, India's on - going and - despite all its 
domestic troubles - so far largely successful experiment all its domestic 
troubles - so far largely successful experiment in democracy has obvious 
relevance for the United States and the entire community of nations. Until the 
collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, half of the people under 
democratic rule were Indians. Its geographical location astride the strategies 
oil supply routes of the Indian Ocean and along the southern - rim of China 
has reinforced India's own sense of national importance as heir to one of the 
world's great civilizations. Growing military power has also made India a 
factor to bereckoned with as the preeminent force not only in south - Asia, 
but in the Indian Ocean region at large. 
As the fifty years reviewed in this history of Indo-US relations 
concluded in 1991, the global strategic environment underwent a fiindamental 
change. Gorbachev's reforms and the accelerating disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and its version of communism brought to an end the cold-war which 
had decisively shaped US and Indian policies. The United States emerged as 
the sole superpower, its ideology of democratic capitalism victorious over 
Marxist communism. 
US Relations with Indian slowly improved during the 1980, but a 
legacy of suspicious and mistrust remained. Although Washington wished 
New Delhi well in tackling its enormous domestic problems, the United States 
showed little disposition to rethink its relationship with India. Washington 
seemed uncertain - some would say uninterested in - how to fit India into the 
Post-cold war policy framework. It was almost as if the United States did not 
know what to make of India. The continued poverty of a majority of the -
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country's vast population of 850 million contrasted with the rising affluence 
of the burgeoning middle classes. Unrest and terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir 
and Hindi-Muslim communal tensions contrasted with the resilience and 
strength of Indian democratic institutions. India's growing military power, the 
world's fourth largest army, the beginnings of a blue water navy, and the 
presumption of a nuclear weapons capability contrasted with an economy that 
continued to progress for more slowly than most other Asian - countries and 
remain hobbled by bloated and inefficient public sector industries. 
India did not criticize the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in ver>' 
Strong words while in Pakistan there was public opposition to Soviet 
intervention. Moreover, Pakistan has been a loyal member of the Western 
bloc. Pakistan facilitated negotiations that produced the Sino - American 
detente "'the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has reinforced United States view 
of Pakistan as a key geo-strategic assert and "Front line" state, which has 
made the backing of Pakistan strategic and imperative. Pakistan has adroitly 
played upon the US antipathy to Russia to boost the level of American Aid". 
Indira Gandhi returned to power in early 1980. In America it was fell 
that her strong Pro-Soviet tih, might deepen differences between the two 
countries. Such doubts were set at rest by the pronouncements of both the 
government that change of leadership in Washington and New Delhi would 
not reverse the friendly ties evolved during the Carter administration. The 
United States spokesman, Robert F. Goheen, the then United States 
Ambassador to India declared that: "with Mr. Reagan's election I see no 
change in the desire of the United States to continue a policy of friendly co-
operation based on mutual respect."^ 
Eventually, the Reagan administration did realize that India could not 
be ignored as it was the most important state in the area of the Indian ocean. 
In the same way, Indira Gandhi realized that India's policy of non-alignment 
was coming to be viewed by the world community as titling more and more 
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towards the Soviet Union. This could lessen India's credibility among the 
third world countries. To protect the entire world from the Soviet threat, the 
United States realized that this could not be done single handedly. It did need 
India, the only stable power in the area. While on its past Indira Gandhi stated 
that India was not a satellite of the Soviet Union. Infact, on her very first visit 
to Washington. Indira Gandhi stated her willingness to accept a limited 
amount of weapons from America. 
Inspite of all these declarations, Reagan's policy of "containment of 
communism" came in the way of the smooth functioning of Indo-American 
relations. The significant aspects of Reagan's foreign policy guidelines were 
to promote American interests, halt soviet expansion and to regain military 
superiority over the Soviet Union. Former secretary of state, Alexander Haig, 
in his 19 March 1981 testimony before the senate Foreign Relations 
Committee state, "that the Reagan Administration's Middle Eastern Policy 
would centre around the development of the 'Strategic consensus" to oppose 
the Soviet Union in an area extending from Pakistan to Egypt, and including 
Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia."'' 
The second cold-war which had already started assumed serious 
dimensions after the soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It left a serious 
impact on Indo-American relations. Pakistan, which had receded to the back 
ground where America was assigned a significant role in the strategy of the 
United States against Soviet expansionism. This alarmed India as Pakistan has 
always been an enemy of India. Testifying before the senate committee on 
foreign Relations in March 1981 Jane coon. Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Near East and South-Asia, said: 
We are deeply concerned over Pakistan's security. 
Pakistan's strategic location at the eastern flank 
of the Persian Gulf, makes its very important that 
we and our allies undertake a major effort to help 
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Pakistan resist Soviet Pressures and to become 
stranger and more self confident. 
Indo-American relations were strained considerably over this issue as 
both countries proved the problem differently. For India, the soviet 
intervention was Secondary while the re-awning of Pakistan more of 
importance. Whereas, the United States formulated its policies with a global 
view of the security relationships in the region. India perceived the problem 
from a regional and national secretary angle. At the same time the United 
States wanted to seek increased cooperation with Indian. "Such policies 
would appear contradictory because of the deep animosity between India and 
Pakistan. This had the effect turning United States relations with South Asia's 
two largest entities into a zero sum game; if Washington impressed relations 
with Pakistan, relations with India worsened, and vice-versa. "^  
If Washington lacked interest, New Delhi seemed hesitant as it tried to 
address relations with the United States in the Midst of domestic turmoil and 
after the disappearance of its long-time anchor, the Soviet Union. Many 
foreign policy and security specialists and economists were in favour of 
building on the gradual improvement in relations with Washington during the 
1980s in order to press ahead with the development of friendlier ties, 
including expanded security cooperation. The rapid growth of the Indian 
immigrant community in United States, numbering some 850,000 in the 1990 
US census - almost three times the 1980 count - reinforced this view. An 
alternated approach, reflect in the outburst of Anti - US sentiment during the 
Gulf war, was for India to remain antagonistic to the United States. 
Washington was seen as continuing to be unfriendly, trying to "keep India 
down," and unwilling to respect India's position as the preeminent power in 
South - Asia or as spokesman for the world's poorer nations. 
For Washington, the most logical policy would be to continue along 
the trial begin in the late 1970s and resumed in the mid-1980s: to treat India 
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as a significant Asian power with which the United States should seek 
friendly relations, including expanded security cooperation. India and the 
United States now have a shared interest in stability in the Indian Ocean 
region and a viable balance of power in Asia. India is large enough, that the 
Indo-US relationship could have strategic importance in its own right. 
For India, a better relationship with the United States requires a 
strengthening of the approach initiated by the Janata Government in the late 
1970s and resumed after Mrs. Gandhi's 1982 visit to Washington - without 
the double burden of the US Pakistan and the Indo-Soviet relationship, the 
pace of improvement could quicken if encouraged by the government of 
India. But relations are unlikely to become more cooperative if India decides 
almost viscerally that opposing the United States is the natural state of affairs 
for Indian policy. Related to this is the future of non-alignment, after the end 
of the cold-war more a slogan than a guide to policy. The prospects for 
improved relations would dim Should New Delhi redefine non-alignment in 
North-South terms - positioning itself as a leader of the third world in a 
strident struggle against the United states and the industrialized west. 
One of the most difficult issues before the two countries in the 1990s is 
the nuclear question. With both India and Pakistan now acknowledged as 
nuclear weapon capable countries, the proliferation issue and the related 
problem of missile capability are certain to remain major bilateral pre-
occupations. This development has made conflict - avoidance between the 
two antagonists a key US regional security interest in South - Asia. The goal 
is to avoid a crisis that could lead to nuclear was between India and Pakistan 
and if possible, to induce New Delhi and Islamabad to renounce nuclear 
weapons. The quasi - nuclearization of the sub-continent could indeed mark 
as important a change in South-Asia as the end of the cold-war. A nuclear 
Pakistan has, in effect, achieved strategic parity with India, something it could 
never have hoped for with conventional weapons. How effectively and calmly 
Washington and New Delhi with this difficult and dangerous problem is 
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certain to have a major impact on the future course of the US-Indian 
relationship. 
The first century of relations between the United States and India, in 
retrospect, has been disappointing - the clash of interests that began during 
World War II when Indian and Americans differed on basic priorities 
continued through the more than forty years of the cold-war. The two 
countries found themselves on opposite sides of major foreign and security 
policy issues dispute their common adherence to the democratic system. With 
the cold-war over, Indo-US relations could become more positive. It is 
uncertain, however, that the two governments will take advantage of this 
opportunity. Even though past problems are for the moment out of sight, they 
are not out of mind. New Delhi and Washington need to study and absorb the 
lessons of the past five decades if India and the United States are to forge a 
more constructive relationship in the years ahead. 
The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both India and Pakistan to 
the former princely state, divided by a military line of control since 1948, into 
the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan - controlled Azad (Free) 
Kashmir. Since late 1989, a separatist war, costing more than 30,000 live, has 
been waged in the Indian- controlled Kashmir valley between Muslim 
separatists and their supporters and Indian security forces. India blames 
Pakistan for fomenting rebellion, as well as supplying arms, training, and 
fighters. Pakistan claims only to provide diplomatic and moral support. The 
longstanding US position on Kashmir is that the whole of the former princely 
state is disputed territory, and the issue must be resolved through negotiations 
between Indian and Pakistan, taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri 
people. 
A series of kidnappings and general strikes in the Kashmir valley, 
beginning in 1989, led India to impose President's rule (rule by the central 
government) on the state in 1990, and to send in troops to keep order. 
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Following a number of incidents in which Indian troops fired on 
demonstrators. Kashmir flocked to support a proliferating number of military 
separatist groups. Some groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation 
front (JKLF), continue to seek an independent or autonomous Kashmir. Other 
local groups, including the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), seek union with 
Pakistan. In 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat (freedom) conference was formed 
as an umbrella organization for groups opposed to Indian rule in Kashmir, 
Hurriyat membership includes about 22 political and religious groups, 
including; JKLF (now a political group); Jamat-e-Islami (Political wing of the 
HM); Awami Action Committee; People's Conference; Muslim Conference; 
and People's League. The Hurriyat Conference, which states is committed to 
seeking dialogue with the Indian government on a broad range of issues, 
Proposes convening a tripartite Conference on Kashmir, including India, 
Pakistan and representatives of the Kashmir people. Hurriyat leaders also 
have demanded Kashmiri representation at any talk between Indian and 
Pakistan on Kashmir. 
In 1995, the government of then - Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 
began efforts to restart the political process in Kashmir, where state elections 
had last been held in 1987; in May 1996, elections to full the six seats for 
Jammu and Kashmir state were held as part of the General parliamentary 
elections called by the Rao government. Voter turnout in the state was about 
40%, with some reports of voters being harded to polling stations by the 
security forces. The elections served as a rehearsal for Jammu and Kashmir 
state assembly elections, which were held in September 1996. The National 
Conference (NC), the longstanding mainstream Kashmiri party led by Farooq 
Abdullah, along with other national and local parties, took part in the 
elections. The Hurriyat conference, calling the Polls a sham, refused of the 
state in early October. The Polling, according to unofficial observers, fell 
somewhere between the Indian government's description of "a free and fair 
election" and the Hurriyat characterization of "a military operation." In March 
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- April 1998, Jammu and Kashmir state again took a part in general 
parliamentary elections. Pre-election violence and a boycott by the Hurriyat 
kept voter turnout in the state at an estimated 35% - 40% voter turnout in the 
state declined even further in the 1999 parliamentary elections. 
India was concerned about the Afghanistan crisis and about the 
presence of Soviet troops so close to the sub-continent. Yet, India did not 
condemn the presence of Soviet troops - she abstained from voting against 
the Soviet Union in the United Nations General Assembly. This naturally did 
not please America. But the new strategic arrangement between America and 
Pakistan was bound to make India look to Moscow for arms supplies - this in 
turn led to and arms race in the sub-continent. 
The Indo-Soviet military ties were discussed during two visits to India 
of Marshal Dmitriustinov the then Soviet Defence Minister - in March, 1982 
and again in March, 1984. India got from the Soviet Union a pledge of 
unrestricted access to the next generation of soviet armament including those 
on Moscow's drawing board. 
There were some of the consequences of the Afghan crisis on the 
subcontinental. 
According to the Reagan administration it was necessary to give 
military aid to Pakistan so that it could feel secure. But this made India 
insecure on the other side. After all, weapons supplied by America to Pakistan 
had earlier been used against Indian in 1965 and 1971, and America had done 
nothing about it. Therefore America was hardly justified in providing arms to 
Pakistan. 
To meet Soviet threat, Pakistan should have normalized its relations 
with India further. India's offer of a "no war" pact was rejected by General 
Zia-ul-Haque who was more interested in castling in on the global security 
concerns of the United States. It helped him to prolong ties military regime 
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and to arm Pakistan with higiily sophisticated weapons. The rearming of 
Pakistan cause tension in Indo-American relations due to the insensitivity 
shown to New Delhi by America. An experienced south-Asia observer Selig 
Harrison noted in early 1981: 
They frankly acknowledge that Pakistan wants help mainly to build up 
its military posture vis-a-vis India, and they have pointedly refused to give 
public or private assurances to New Delhi that Washington would not permit 
American arms to be used in an Indian - Pakistan: conflict. At bottom, the 
Administration's Policy reflects a belief that India has become a virtual soviet 
ally.* 
During the 1979-89 period the arms supplied by the United States to 
Pakistan was induced by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, at 
the end of the cold-war, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Eventually, 
the Soviet Union broke-up and this changed the global politics and the 
strategic environment in the region the significance of Pakistan as a strategic 
partner of America declined considerably. "There was no longer a need for a 
pipeline of weapon supplies to the Afghan resistance groups: Infact, the US 
has been increasingly concerned about regaining weapons, such as stringer 
missiles, that it has supplied to the resistance."^ 
Due to the American military aid to Pakistan, it appeared that Indo-
American relations would worsen. Surprisingly, efforts were made by both 
India and American to prevent relations from souring further. A present effort 
to patch-up India's ties with America was made by Indira Gandhi when she 
met Reagan at the North-South Economic summit in Cancum, Maxico. She 
agreed to visit Washington. Moreover, India did try not to emphasize in its 
global and regional differences with the United States. India also tried to 
strengthen the existing bilateral relations as well as develop new areas of 
cooperation. 
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The most significant irritant in Indo-American relations was the belief 
in America that India was a close ally of the Soviet Union. Indira Gandhi took 
pains to remove this notion. First of all she refused to hold celebrations of the 
tenth anniversary of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and cooperation. 
They she visited Washington before Moscow and was cool towards soviet 
offers of military assistant. Upon arriving in Washington Indira Gandhi 
attempted to directly placate the United States on the soviet score. She said: 
We are friends with the Soviet Union, although 
people have tended to read much more in our 
treaty of friendship and cooperation. We do not 
agree with everything the Soviets do. We do not 
approve of the communist system. We are having 
difficulties with our communists and Marxists 
within India but this does not affect our overall 
policy of co-existence with as many countries as 
possible. 
According to the U.S. state Department Indian Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices for 2001 (March 2002), these continued to be 
significant human rights abuses, despite extensive constitutional and statutory 
safeguards. 
Many of these abuses are generated by a traditionally hierarchical 
social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country's many ethnic and 
religious communities, violent secessionist movements and the authorities' 
attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods and training. These 
problems are acute in Jammu and Kashmir, where judicial tolerance of the 
Government's heavy handed anti-mutant tactics, the refusal of security forces 
to obey court orders, and terrorists threats have disrupted the Judicial systems. 
Some 350,000 - 450,000 Indian security forces remained in Jammu and 
Kashmir in 2001. Insurgency related deaths in the state civilians, militants. 
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and security forces - totaled more than 2700 in 2000, and human rights 
abuses by both security forces and militants continued to be a serious 
problem. 
In dealing with regional dissidence, the Indian government has 
employed a wide range of security legislation, including laws that permit 
authorities to search and arrest without warrant and detain person for a year 
without charge or bail. Other security laws prescribe sentences of not less 
than 5 years for disruptive speech or actions. Special courts have been 
established minority of more than 120 million (12%). Christians, Sikhs, 
Buddhists, Jains, and others each total less than 3%. Although freedom of 
religion is protected by the Indian government, human rights observers have 
noted that India' religious tolerance is susceptible to attack by religion 
extremists. Governments Policy does not favour any group, but some years 
have been raised by the coming to power of the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya 
Janata Party (BJP) since 1998. In 1999-2000, the BJP government came under 
increasing criticism, both domestically and internationally, as a result of a 
number of incidents in which Indian Christians were attacked of killed and 
their places of worship destroyed, particularly in Gujarat, Orissa, and Tamil 
Nadu states. According to Indian Press reports, most of the attacks allegedly 
were carried out by Hindu nationalist organizations associated with the BJP 
other incidents of violence and tolerance toward religious group - Muslims, 
Sikh, Christian and Hindu - continue to occur in many parts of the country, 
including Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Bihar and the North-east. 
A National Human Rights Commission (established in 1993) has 
investigated abuses in Punjab, Kashmir, and the North-east, supported 
training programmes for security forces, and made recommendations to the 
central and the state governments. Seriously understaffed, the NHRC received 
an estimated 40,700 complaints in 1998-99. The Supreme Court also has 
become more active in combating the custodial excesses of the Police by 
placing stringent requirements on arrest procedures and granting 
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compensation for Police abuse victims. In 1997, the Supreme Court ordered 
prison reforms addressing overcrowding, torture, and neglect of health and 
hygiene of prisoners. In 1997, India signed the UN convention Against 
Torture and other cruel Inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 
According to many economic observes, India's most pressing need is 
for a stable government that will complete its five year term and be strong 
enough to make tough economic decisions. The political uncertainly of four 
Prime Ministers in less than two years reportedly has cast a Pall over foreign 
investors confidence and weakened the rupee. The congress party in created 
with instituting economic reforms in 1991, and turning around the Indian 
economy, which had been on the brink of default. Under Finance Minister 
Manmohan Singh, India at that time began that meet in secret and are immune 
from the usual laws of evidence. In some cases, security forces are given 
permission to shooter to kill. As reported 5,000 Kashmiris currently are in jail 
under anti-terrorist laws. In general, India has denied international human 
rights groups, including amnesty International and Human Rights watch, 
official access to Kashmir, Punjab, and other sensitive areas. In 1995, 
however, the Indian government allowed the International committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) permission to begin a prgramme of prison visits in Jammu 
and Kashmir. ICRC representatives also continued to begin a programme of 
prison visits in Jammu and Kashmir. ICRC representatives also continued 
training Police and border security Personnel in International humanitarian 
law. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights watch have expressed 
grave concern over serious human right abuses by militant groups in Kashmir 
and Punjab, including Kidnapping, extortion and killing of civilians. In July 
1995, four western tourists, including American Donald Hutchings were 
kidnapped in Jammu and Kashmir state by Al-Faran, allegedly part of a 
Pakistan - based militant group, Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) - since 1997, the 
HUA - which later renamed itself the harkat-ul-Mujahideen - has been on the 
US State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations. In August 2001, a 
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little known militant group, Lashkar-e-Jabbar, issued an edict that all 
Kashmiri women must wear a Burqa - a gown that covers them from head to 
foot, similar to what the Taliban government in Afghanistan forced women to 
wear - "as be dealt with sternly." Kashmiri women traditionally have not 
worn the Burqa - the Lashkar-e-Jabbar reportedly have since claimed credit 
for throwing acid in the faces of several women teachers and students not 
wearing burqas in Srinagar. In the back drop of the current military standing 
between India an Pakistan which began after Islamic militants attacked the 
Indian parliament in December 2001, American journalist Daniel Pearl was 
abducted in January 2002 and then killed one month later by extremists 
believed directly or indirectly connected with Pakistan based Kashmir Jihadi 
groups. 
A secular nation, India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with 
occasional lapres), which is protected under its castigation. India's population 
includes a Hindu majority of 82% as well as a large Muslim the task of 
restructuring its economy and opening its markets to foreign trade and 
investment. As a result of these Policy changes, annual direct foreign 
investment rose from about $100 million in 1990 to $2.4 billion in 1996 more 
than one-third of these investments were by US companies, including IBM, 
Motorola, Enron, Coca Cola, Pepsico, Morgan, Stanley, Merrill Lynch, AT & 
T, Raytheon, Kellogg, Proctor & Gamble, Ford, and Mobile. Most analysts 
expect economic reforms to remain in place, but question the rate at which 
they will move foreward. 
The new BJP government is faced with an economy in the midst of a 
slowdown. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew an estimated 5% for the 
fiscal year ending March 31, 1998, down for 7.5% in 1996-97. The 
agriculture - fishing - forestry sector growth rate slumped to an estimated -
2% compared to 7.9% the previous year - the manufacturing growth rate 
declined from 7.4% in 1996-97 to an estimated 6.1% for 1997-98. Foreign 
direct investment for the period April - December 1997 reportedly was $2.5 
168 
billion, compared $2.7 billion for the same period in 1996. India's foreign 
reserves dropped from $30 billion in August 1997 to $27.3 billion in late 
February 1998. The Centre for monitoring Indian Economy secretary reported 
some 150 new Public and private sector projects were stalled or abandoned in 
the past two years, including power and industrial projects, for causes ranging 
from Political and environmental opposition to a slowdown in economic 
reforms and sluggish market conditions. 
The BJP, a pro-business party, by and large has supported India's 
economic system reforms but with a nationalist caveat. The party supports 
foreign investment in such areas as infrastructure but opposes any foreign 
investment where it would compete with the Indian industry, such as in 
consumer goods production. BJP leaders have stated that they would prefer to 
slow down the face of India's globalization in order to gain domestic industry 
5-10 years to integrate with the global economy - the new BJP government, 
formed in late March 1998, has sent out mixed signals on its economic gave 
plan. The new Finance Minister, Yashwant Sinha, served in that post in a 
short-lived socialist coalition government in 1990, and is viewed as a 
moderate, but not a strong economic reformer. In his early statements, he 
promised to cut red-tape and streamline policies in order to woe foreign 
investment mainly in the infrastructure sector. A clearer vision of the BJP 
government's economic Policy as well as its chances for political survival 
will emerge when it puts forth, and attempts to pass, its first budget in June. 
U.S. exports to India for 1997 were $3.6 billion, while the U.S. imports 
from India for 1997 totaled $7.3 billion. Despite significant tariff reductions 
and other measures taken by India to improve market access, according to the 
report of the limited state trade representatives (USTR) for 1997, a number of 
foreign trade barriers remain. US exports that reportedly would benefit from 
lower India tariffs include fertilizers, wood products, computers, medical 
equipment, scrap metals and agricultural products. The import of consumer 
goods in restricted and other items, such as agricultural commodities and 
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petroleum products, may only be imported by government trading 
monopolies. The USTR also cited barriers that continue to exist in India's 
financial services sector. Almost all insurance companies are government 
owned, as are most banks. Largely dominated by the state, India's banking 
industry has been widely criticized for its in efficiency and poor services and 
regarded as a stumbling block in India's efforts to open up the economy. 
Public sector banks, which include 90% of India's bank branches, handle 85% 
of the country's banking business, which include 90% of India's bank 
branches, handle 85% of the country's banking business. In a sign that India's 
banking industry may by opening up, approval has been given for 25 new 
foreign banks and bank branches to operate in India since 1993. Five US 
banks non have a total of 16 branches in India. 
Inadequate intellectual property rights protection, by means of patents, 
trade marks and copyrights has been a long-standing issue between the United 
States and India. Major areas of irritation have included pirating of US 
pharmaceuticals, books, tapes and videos. US motion picture industry 
representations estimated their annual losses due to audiovisual piracy in 1997 
to be $66 million. In May 1991, the USTR cited India as a "Priority foreign 
country" under the special 301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act for its lack of 
protection and enforcement of Intellectual property rights. After a 9 month 
investigations the USTR fiirther determined that, although India had 
strengthened its trademark and copyright laws, patent protection remained 
weak, adversely affecting US commerce. As a result, the Bush Administration 
in 1992 suspended duty - force privileges under the Generalized system of 
preferences (GSP) for about $80 million in Indian exports of Pharmaceutical 
and related products. In April 1993, the SUTR again named India as a 
"Priority foreign Country" under "special 301." The Indian Parliament, in 
May 1994, passed amendments to the country's copyrights law designed to 
strengthen intellectual property rights protection. In view of the new 
copyright law and proposed legislation on trademarks, the USTR in June 1994 
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moved India from the priority foreign country list to the less stringent 
"Priority Watch list," while containing to urge Indian' adoption of patent 
protection legislation. India remained on the priority watch list in 1998. 
U.S. Aid 
The relatively small US aid programme for India FY-1998 includes an 
estimated $51.35 million in development assistance, $91,874 million in P.L. 
480 fiinds, and $475,000 for international Military Education and Training 
(IMET). For FY-1999, the Clinton Administration has requested $56.5 
million for development has requested $56.5 million for development 
assistance, $91,752 million in PL-480 funds, and $450,000 for IMET. In 
recent years, the US Agency for International Development (AID) 
increasingly has focused on sustainable development programmes that 
support India's efforts to restructure and privatize its economy. The major 
AID goals in India for FY-1997 include: encouraging broad-based economic 
growth; stabilizing population growth; enhancing food security and nutrition; 
protecting the environment; reducing transmission of HIV infection; and 
expanding the role and participation of women in decision - making PL-480 
funds go to providing, Food assistance, largely through private voluntary 
agencies. First lady Hillary Clinton visited Indian 1995 as part of a five-nation 
tour of South-Asian projects in support of women's economic and social 
development. The first lady announced that India would received the first 
grant, for $500,000 of a new US. Agency for International Development 
Inifiative for educating girls and women. In 1997-98, the United States 
provided about 2.5% of the %6.6 billion in donor assistance to India and in its 
sixth largest donor. Major donors include, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the European Union, Japan, Germany and the United 
States. 
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Narcotics 
India is the world's largest producer of opium for Pharmaceutical 
purposes, some of which reportedly is diverted illegally to heroin production. 
The country has an estimated 1.2 million for drugs originating in both 
Pakistan and Burma, and also is a major supplier to both countries of the 
chemical used in manufacturing heroin. Thousands of gallons of acetic 
anhydride reportedly are shipped by camel through Rajasthan state to 
Pakistan, where some of it is passed on to drug manufacturers in Afghanistan. 
Smaller amounts of the chemical, which is produced in the New Delhi area, 
are also smuggled through India's North - east to heroin producers in Burma. 
Counter narcotics efforts in both India and Pakistan are hampered by 
lack of political and budgetary support, lack of infrastructure in drug-
producing areas, and corruption among Police, government officials and local 
politicians. US Counter - narcotics assistance to India consists mainly of 
funding training programmes for enforcement personnel and the Indian coast 
- Guard. Major counter - narcotics efforts by the Indian government in 1996 
included improved cooperation with Pakistan on counter-narcotics efforts and 
implementation of new policies aimed at reducing the diversion of legally 
produced of opium to the illegal market. Although the Indian government is 
becoming more concerned about the drug problem, observes note there needs 
to be an increase in political support and resources for counter-narcotics 
efforts. 
Although the end of the cold-war has freed US India relations from the 
constraints of a bipolar world, relations continue to be affected by the burden 
of history, most notably the longstanding India - Pakistan regional rivalry. 
The main areas of U.S. and congressional interest in India include nuclear 
weapons and missile proliferation, regional stability human rights and 
economic policy issues. 
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The major U.S. concern in South-Asia is the prevention of nuclear and 
ballistae missile proliferation and the reduction of tensions between India and 
Pakistan, which centre on their compelling claims to the former princely state 
of Kashmir. India and Pakistan, both of which are believed to have nuclear 
weapons capability have so far ignored U.S. and international pressure to sign 
the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty or comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). Neither sanctions applied to India nor a cutoff of aid to Pakistan 
appears to have dampened the drive by both countries to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction and the means to deploy them. Partly through US 
encouragement, India and Pakistan have adopted some confidence - building 
measures such as periodic meetings of senior military commanders and a 
pledge not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Despite these steps, India-
Pakistan relations continued to deteriorate in 1996. 
Congress has been particularly concerned with human rights issues 
related to regional dissidence and separatist movements in Kashmir, Punjab 
and India's North-east region. Strife in these areas over the Past several years 
has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, militants and security 
forces. International human rights groups, as well as congress and the US 
state Department, have criticized India for alleged human rights abuses by its 
security forces, including mass arrests, indiscriminate firing on civilian 
crowds, rape, burning of business and residential neighbourhoods, and torture 
and execution of prisoners in custody. In recent years, congress has expressed 
its concern over human rights violations in Kashmir and Punjab in numerous 
resolutions, amendments and committee reports. 
The United States has been highly supportive of India's efforts to 
transform its formely quasi - socialist economy through fiscal reform and 
market opening. After coming to power in 1991, the Narasimha Rao 
government, under the guidance of Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, began 
reducing inflation and the budget deficit, privatizing state owed industries, 
reducing tariffs and industrial licensing controls, and instituting incentives to 
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attract foreign trade and investment. Rapidly expending US India economic 
relations were a major focus of the May 1994 visit of Ron to the United 
States, as well as Subsequent visits to India by several US cabinet level 
delegations. A United Front Coalition Government, led by Prime Minister 
Deve Gowda, that came to Power following Indian parliamentary elections in 
May-June 1996, continued India in the path of economic reform and market 
opening. I.K. Gujral, who succeeded Deve Gowda as Prime Minister in April 
1997, pledged to continue economic reforms. However, India's market access 
barriers in some sectors, as well as its inadequate intellectual property rights 
protection for pharmaceuticals, books, tapes and videos, continue to be 
concern. 
US and congressional interest in India includes a wide spectrum of 
issues, ranging from nuclear and missile proliferation concerns through 
human rights, trade and economic Policy questions. In recent years these 
interests have been particularly affected by three developments: 
1) The end of the cold-war and India's subsequent need to diversify its 
international relationships; 
2) The adoption of seeping economic policy reforms by the Narasimha 
Rao government beginning in 1991; and 
3) Deepening bitterness in ties between India and Pakistan over the 
Kashmir dispute and ongoing Indian pre-occupation with china as a 
long-term source of strategic threat. Congress has been particularly 
focused on nuclear proliferation, human rights and trade issues. 
Numbers of member have backed measures that would seek cuts In 
U.S. aid to India as means of expressing dissatisfaction with Indian's 
human rights policies. 
Caught off guard by the precipitous and of the cold-war, India has 
sought over the past several years to adopt to new global realities that have 
antiquated many of its former policies, roles and alliances. With the demise of 
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the Soviet Union, India lost a reliable source of economic assistance and 
military equipment, a key trading partner, and the promise of political support 
in its adversarial relationship with neighbouring China and Pakistan. 
Moreover, the end of a bipolar world has made India's traditional role as a 
leader of the non-aligned world something of an anachronism. 
Both India and the United States are actively exploring the opportunity 
presented by the end of the cold-war for a more normal relationship between 
the worlds two largest democracies. The 6-day visit to the United States by 
Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, in May 1994, marked the beginning of 
a significant improvement in U.S. India relations. Rao addressed a joint 
session of the congress and met with President Clinton. Although discussions 
were held on nuclear non-proliferation, human rights and other issues, the 
main focus of the visit was rapidly expanding U.S. India economic relations. 
Heading the list of U.S. objectives in south Asia in the prevention of 
nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation along with the reduction of regional 
tensions that could trigger the use of such weapons. Both India and Pakistan 
are believed by analysts to have crossed the nuclear weapons capability 
threshold, although most open - source information suggests that of a nuclear 
device in 1974. In October 1990, the United States cut off aid to Pakistan 
device, "as required under section 620 E(C) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA), the so-called "Pressler amendment. "A Pakistan government official 
acknowledged in February 1992 that the country has enough enriched 
uranium for 10-15 weapons. Statements in August 1994 by then former Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif that Pakistan has an atomic bomb were denied by 
Prime Minister Bhutto. India is thought to have enough enriched uranium for 
75 or more nuclear weapons. 
To date, the cutoff, of US aid to Pakistan and sanctions applied to an 
Indian space research company for the proposed purchase of Russian booster 
rockets have done little to slow the pace of either country's nuclear and 
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missile programmes. Both India and Pakistan have combat aircraft that with 
modification, would be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Both countries 
are believed to be seeking to develop as acquire ballistic missiles with the 
capability of striking each other's major population centres. Indian has tested 
both its short-range Printhvi Surface-to-Surface missile and its Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), Agni. Pakistan also has tested both short and 
intermediate range missiles, the technology for which was reportedly obtained 
from China. 
Attempts to pressure the two countries to sign the NPT so far have 
been met by India's insistence on a non-discriminatory global nuclear non-
proliferation regime, including the abandonment of nuclear arms by the 
Chinese, and Pakistan safe stance that it will sign the NPT when India does. 
On September 10, 1996, India was one of only three nations to vote against 
the adoption of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the United 
Nations General Assembly. In the 158-3 vote, Libya and Bhutan also voted 
no, while five other nations abstained. Then Prime Minister Deve Gowda said 
that India would not sign the treaty in its present form as it was highly 
discriminatory. This has been reiterated by Prime Minister Gujral on several 
occasions. Pakistan, which voted for the CTBT, has stated that it will not sign 
the treaty unless India does. 
The United States responded to increasing friction between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir, beginning in early 1990, by strongly encouraging both 
governments to continue to institute confidence-building measures in order to 
reduce tensions. Measures adopted to for include: agreement on advance 
notice of military movements; establishment of a military commander 
"hotline"; an exchange of lists of nuclear installations and facilities; a joint 
ban on use and Production of chemical weapons; and measures to prevent air 
Space violations. 
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Since 1993, the United States lias held several reminds of high-level 
talk on south-Asian regional security and non-proliferation issues with both 
India and Pakistan. U.S. officials have urged the two countries to adopt 
additional confidence-building measures, including an agreement not to 
conduct nuclear detonations, a cut-off of fissile material Production, and the 
placement of safeguards on nuclear facilities. Recognizing that real regional 
security is dependent on reduction of underlying tensions, the United States 
has also suggested that India and Pakistan consider the following steps: the 
opening of an Indo-Pakistani dialogue on Kashmir, leading initially to the 
demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier area; a mutual reduction of 
conventional arms and defence expenditures; an agreement by both countries 
to step involving themselves in each other's regional unrest; restarting talks at 
the foreign secretary level; and the opening of trade ties between India and 
Pakistan. 
In a move to strengthen U.S. Secretary ties with India and Pakistan, 
U.S. Secretary of Defence William J. Perry visited both India and Pakistan in 
early Janury 1995, the first visit to the region by a US Defence Secretary 
since the waning days of Cold-War. Parry's visit focused on ways to further 
peace and stability in the region, as well as expands areas of closer defence 
cooperation, including peacekeeping efforts. Both countries were urged to 
adopt a commitment to greater transparency with each other by exchanging 
defence budgets and planning, as a means of mutual confidence - building. 
Noting that a solution to the Kashmir problem is necessary before India and 
Pakistan can develop a normal relationship, Perry restated the U.S. offer to 
provide whatever help it can if requested by both parties. 
By early 1996, however, the United States had became concerned over 
signs a increasing tensions and nuclear and missile proliferation in south-
Asia. In December 1995, U.S. Press reports, based on US. Intelligence leaks, 
suggested that India might be preparing to test a nuclear weapon at Pokaran in 
the Rajasthan desert, where it conducted its first and only nuclear test in 1974. 
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India promptly denied the reports. In January, India tested a longer range, 
nuclear - capable version of its Prithvi missile. The U.S. Press reported in 
early February on leaked U.S. intelligence reports that China sold to Pakistan, 
in 1995, ring magnets that can be used in enriching uranium for nuclear 
weapons. Through out much of 1996, India and Pakistan traded heavy fire 
along the line of control (LOC) that divided their forces in the disputed area 
of Kashmir. There also were frequent accusations by both Islamabad and New 
Delhi of harassment and intimidation of each other's diplomats, as well as 
expulsions of members of each other's diplomatic corps on charges of 
espionage. 
By early 1997, there were signs of a thaw in India-Pakistan relations 
related, in past to changes of relationship in the two countries. Foreign 
secretary talks, which had been broken off since January 1994, were 
reinstated, and three sets of talks were held in 1997. Prime Minister Gujral 
met with Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif several times during the year for 
talks that were reportedly cordial and upbeat. In May the two leaders agreed 
to set-up a hotline between them; exchange civilian prisoners, including 
several hundred fishermen, and resume foreign secretary talks. 
On June 3, the Washington post reported that India had moved Prithvi 
missiles to a site in north-west Punjab state. Pakistan foreign Minister Gohar 
Ayub Khan responded to the report on June 4, saying "India has created a 
dangerous security environment." U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas 
Bums stated on June 4, "we would see that the deployment by either (India or 
Pakistan) of ballistic missiles would be fundamentally contrary to the recent 
good progress made in the relationship. We hope this will be one of the 
central issues in their own discussions - the prevention of a deployment of 
ballistic missile in either country." On June 11, Indian Prime Minister I.K. 
Gujral denied that India had deployed missiles on the border with Pakistan. 
According to various unconfirmed nears reports, fewer than a dozen Prithvi 
missiles have been stored, but not deployed, in Punjab state. 
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Despite the reported movements, in India and Pakistan foreign 
secretaries met in June and agreed on an agenda for future talks to set up 
working groups. These groups are seated to tackle a range of issues, 
including: Peace and security Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen Glacier; 
Terrorism and drug- trafficking; economic and commercial cooperation; Sir 
Creek estuary on the Arabian Sea; and waller barrage/Tulbul Navigation 
Project in Kashmir. In November, a Political crisis in India resulted in the 
resignation of the Gujral government. Foreign secretary talks were again put 
on hold until after the Indian Parliamentary elections in February - March 
1998. 
On September 1997, President Clinton met with both Prime Minister 
Gujral and Prime Minister Sharif at the United Nations in New York. The 
meetings were followed by a series of visits to the sub-continent by High-
level Clinton Administration officials, including secretary of state Madeline 
Albright, who visited India and Pakistan in November 1997. The visits were 
billed as part of a Clinton Administration initiative to increase U.S. 
engagement in South-Asia. In New Delhi, Albright met with Prime Minister 
I.K. Gujral President K.R Narayanan, and other officials on the whole range 
of bilateral and regional issues. Albright signed an updated and expanded 
overseas Private Investment corporation agreement. President Clinton is 
expected to visit India an Pakistan in September 1998, the first U.S. President 
to do so since President Carter's visit in 1978. 
Unlike U.S. Pakistan military ties, which date back to the 1950s, 
military cooperation between the United States and India is in the early stages 
of development. In recent years, joint Indo-U.S. steering committees have 
been established to coordinate relations between the two countries' armed 
services, including exchange visits, technical assistance, and military exercise. 
Naval cooperation so far has included a 20-day special operations joint 
exercise focused on marine counter-terrorism and Peace-keeping operations at 
Ratnagiri in 1994. Indo-U.S. naval focus also conducted joint exercises 1995 
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and 1996. An Indian naval contingent supported the U.S. led U.N. peace-
keeping mission in Somalia starting in December 1992. India's ground troops 
in Somalia, which numbered 5,000 in mid 1994, received high praise for their 
humanitarian as well as peace-keeping efforts. In 1997, India had about 900 
U.N. peace keeping forces, mainly serving in Angola and Bosnia. 
Hercegovina. In June 1997, on high-level team of Indian official was in 
Washington to sign a U.P. India treaty for the extradition of fugitive 
offenders. The Treaty was described by both sides as an important step in 
efforts to combat the Problems of international terrorism and narcotics 
trafficking. 
An important but widely ignorant aspect of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal 
was underlined, if only inadvertently, by one if it's landing critics, strobe 
Talbott, a senior official of the Clinton Administration was engaged India 
after the 1998 nuclear tests. Writing immediately after the nuclear deal was 
announced, Talbott argued, "India and the United States have both shown a 
Panchant for going it alone - India in defying the international community 
including the US with its tests, the Bush administration on attaching Iraq over 
the objections of the United Nationals and many of its own closest allies. If 
the Indian and American versions of unilateralism reinforce one another, it 
will work to the detriment of institutions like the United Nations and risk 
turning treaties like the NPT from imperfect but useful mechanisms into 
increasingly ineffectual ones. It is not criticism of the nuclear pact from 
Talboolt that detains us here; it is the insight that the "Penchant for going it 
alone" that brought the Bush Administration together with India. Attacks on 
the Bush Administration for its unitateralism and rejection of multilateralism 
are legion. But few would association India with unilateralism. But Talbolt 
is right in underlining the unilateralist streak in India's foreign policy. 
India's decision to conduct the tests in May 1998 when much of the 
world had agreed on ending nuclear tests in 1996 only accidentally points to 
Indian unilateralism which goes deeper. If the truth be told, India is much 
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closer to the Bush Administration in the debate on unilateralism and 
multilateralism that grapped the world when President Bush came to power in 
2001. In India largely ducked the debate between the conservatives in the 
United states on the one hand and the liberals across the Atlantic on the role 
of the United Nationals and multilateralism. Having gone to the United 
Nationals with its Kashmir problem with Pakistan immediately after 
independence, India was inculcated against the periods of multilatrialism 
believes the power to use military force in defence of national security cannot 
be handed over to a bunch of the unelected bureaucrats in the UN, and 
democracies like itself should have the power to decide, unilaterally if 
necessary, on use of force. Indians portion is not dissimilar. As a large 
nations, India sees sovereignty as supreme and has refused to let the UN 
middle in matters of security concerns to New Delhi, Kashmir, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka to name a few. In 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh, India did not 
await permission from the United Nations. Few nations, and none of its 
fellow travelers in the Non Aligned Movement stood up for Indian when it 
vivisected Pakistan in the name of a humanitarian intervention. 
Yet, India strongly opposed attempts in the 1990s to empower the 
United Nationals to intervene in failing states without a reference to 
sovereignty while India always mouthed the slogan of multilateralism, its 
conception of the United Nations remains as an "Inter-national" rather than a 
"supra national" one that liberals across the Atlantic have been clamounring 
for like all great powers, India does not want an intrusive United Nations to 
interfere in its own internal affairs, nor would it want the United Nations to 
constrain Delhi's options in dealing with security beyond its borders. Indian 
endorsement of the Bush Administration's Plans for missile defence in 2001, 
which was greeted with dismay at home and abroad, was not a rare exception 
to the past norm of inevitable disagreement between New Delhi and 
Washington on global issues. On a range of other issues, too, whether it was 
the question of managing global warming or opposing the intrusive provisions 
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of the International criminal court, India found unexpected convergence with 
many Bush Positions. There was a time when India was among the countries 
which voted most often against the US at the United Nations. Even the 
erstwhile Soviet Union and China were more in agreement with the US then 
India. By sheer force of habit, India might still be voting against the US on 
many resolutions in the UN. But on important issue there is a new 
convergence with the US. 
Underlying this trend appear to be a real parallelism between Indian 
foreign policy interests and those more identified as American interest by the 
Bush Administration. In the past India was enthralled by the American 
liberal, who were critical of the US neglect of democratic India during the 
cold war. But since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberal 
internationalists in the US had become too interventionslist for Indian 
comfort. For many liberals in Washington preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons had become religion. On top of it they called for American 
diplomatic activitism on India - Pakistan relations and the resolution of the 
Kashmir conflict. The Bush Administration came from the other end of the 
spectrum with a hand off approach on Kashmir. It was ready to live with and 
manage the reality of nuclear weapons in the sub continent rather then seek a 
roll back. And the Bush administration was willing to treat India as a major 
power and give it a higher billing in the global strategic calculus. No wonder 
India found the Bush Administration very congenial to its own national 
interests. 
Security 
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation : On May 11 and 13, 1998, India 
conducted a total of five underground nuclear tests, breaking a 24 year self 
imposed moratorism a nuclear testing. Pakistan followed, claiming 5 tests on 
May 28, 1998, and an additional test on May 30 the unannounced tests 
created a global storm of criticism as well as a serious set back for decades of 
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u s nuclear non proliferation efforts on South Asia. On May 13, 1998, 
President Clinton imposed economic and military sanctions on India, 
mandated by Section 102 of the Arms export control Act (AECA), and 
applied the assume sanctions to Pakistan on May 30. Some effects of the 
sanctions on India included, termination of $ IV million in FY - 1998 
economic development assistance, postponement of $ 1.7 billion in lendering 
by the international Financial Institutions (IFI). As supported by the group of 
Right (G - 8) leading industrial nations; Prohibition on loans or credit from 
US banks to the government of India, and termination of Foreign Military 
Sales under the Arms Report control Act. Humanitarian assistance, food, or 
other agricultural commodities are accepted from sanctions under the law. 
U.S. policy analysts consider the continuing arms race between India 
and Pakistan as Foreign perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of 
nuclear weapons. India conducted its first and only, previous nuclear test in 
May 1974, following which it maintained ambiguity about the status of its 
nuclear programe. Pakistan probably gained a nuclear weapons capability 
some time in the 1980s. India is believed to have enough Plutonium for 75 or 
more nuclear weapons. Pakistan may have enough enriched uranium for 25 
nuclear weapons. Both countries have aircraft capable of deterring weapons. 
India has short range missiles (Prithvi) and is developing on intermediate 
range ballistic missile (Agni) with enough payload to carry a nuclear warhead. 
Pakistan reportedly has acquired technology for hort range missiles (Shaheen) 
from China and medium range missiles (Ghauri) from North Korea, capable 
of carrying small nuclear warheads. 
Proliferation in South Asia is part of a chain of rivalries - India 
seeking to achiever deterrence against China , and Pakistan seeking to gain an 
equalizer against larger and conventionally stronger India. India began its 
nuclear programme in the mid 1960s, after its 1962 defeat in a short border 
war with China and China's first nuclear test in 1964. Despite a 1993 Sino 
Indian troop reduction agreement and some casing of tensions, both nations 
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continue to deploy forces along their border. Pakistan's nuclear Program was 
prompted by India's 1974 nuclear test and by Pakistan's defeat by India in the 
1971 wars and consequent loss of East Pakistan, now independent 
Bangladesh. 
U.S. Non Proliferation Efforts: Neither India nor Pakistan are 
signatories of the Nuclear non proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the 
comprehensive test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India has consistently rejected both 
treaties as discriminatory, calling instead for a gJoba) nuclear disarmament 
regime. Pakistan traditionally has maintained that it will sign the NPT and 
CTBT only when India does so. Beside from security concerns, the 
governments of both countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to 
their nuclear programs and the domestic unpopularity of giving them up. 
Following the 1998 tests, the United States set forth five steps India and 
Pakistan need to take in order to avoid a de-stablising and missile 
competition, they include the following: 
Halt further nuclear testing and sign and ratify the CTBT: US and 
international pressure after the 1998 nuclear tests produced resolutions by the 
UN Security Council and the group of Eight (G-8) urging India and Pakistan 
to sign the CTBT. Japan the largest bilateral aid donour for both countries -
made resumption of its aid programmes contingent on signing the CTBT and 
assurances not to transfer nuclear technology or material to any other country. 
In October, 2001, however, Japan suspended sanctions against both countries 
in recognition of their support for the US led war on terrorism. Although both 
India and Pakistan currently observe self imposed moratoria on nuclear 
testing, they continue to resist signing the CTBT a position made more 
tenable by US failure to ratify the treaty in 1999. 
Halt Fissile Material Production; Cooperate in FMCT negotiations: 
Both India and Pakistan have agreed to participate in negotiations on the 
fissile material control treaty. Both countries, however, have expressed 
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unwillingness to halt fissile material production at this state in the 
development of their nuclear weapons programmes. 
Refrain from deploying or testing missile or nuclear weapons: The 
United States has urged India and Pakistan - with little success - to adopt 
constraints on development, flight testing, and storage of missiles, and barring 
of nuclear - capable aircraft. On April 11, 1999, India tested its intermediate 
range Agni II missile, firing it a reported distance of 1,250 miles. On April 
14-15, Pakistan countered by firing it Ghauri II and Shaheen missiles with 
reported ranges of 1,250 and 375 miles, respectively. India tested a longer 
versions of its short range Prithvi missile in December 2001 and claims it 
successfully tested a new short range version of the Agni on January 25, 
2002. 
In August 1999, India's Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) government 
released a draft report by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on 
India's nuclear doctrine. The report, although retaining India's "no first use" 
policy, called for creation of a credible nuclear deterrence and adequate 
retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. It proposed nuclear weapons 
"based on a trial of aircraft, mobile land barred missiles and sea bared assets." 
The United States and other countries criticized the documents as 
destabilizing, noting that, if adopted the proposed policy would ratchet-up 
nuclear arms racing in the region. 
Maintain and Formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and 
technologies with other countries: Both India and Pakistan apparently have 
good records on non proliferation of sensitive technologies and have issues 
regulatory orders on export controls. Since May 1998, both countries have 
continued to hold export levels talks with US officials on export controls. 
U.S. concern was raised in late 2001 by disclosures that two retired Pakistani 
nuclear scientists had briefed bin laden and other Al Qaeda officials on 
several occasions the war in Afghanistan also heightened fears of instability 
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in Pakistan that could lead to Islamabad's nuclear assets being compromised 
in the event of a radical Islamist military coup. This has resulted in renowned 
US policy debate on transfer of nuclear weapons safeguards technologies to 
Pakistan and / or India. India also continues to press for ending of export 
controls on daily use technologies that it needs for its civilian nuclear and 
space programs, which has raised US Policy debates on export controls and 
technology transfer. 
U.S.-Assistance 
The United States is the third largest bilateral aid donor to India, after 
Japan and Britain. According to the US Agency for International 
Development, India has more people living in object poverty - upwards of 
300 million - than do Latin America and Africa combined. From 1947 
through 2003, the United States provided more than $ 14 billion in economic 
loans and grants to India. Current USAID programmes in India concentrate 
on five areas. 
1. Economic growth: (increased transparency and efficiency in the 
mobilization and allocation of resources). 
2. Health: (improved overall health with a greater integration of food 
assistance, reproductive services, and the prevention of HIC /AIDS 
and other infectious diseases); 
3. Disaster management; 
4. Environmental Protection: (improved access to clean energy and 
water; the reduction of public subsides through improved cost 
recovery; promoting more efficient technology and management), and 
5. Education: (improved access to elementary education, and justice and 
other Social and economic services for vulnerable groups, especially 
women and children). 
6. Security: From 1947 through 2003, the United States provided $ 153 
million in military assistance to India (94% of this amount was 
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distributed from 1962-1966). Security related assistance for FY 2003 
military training and non - proliferation export control enhancement 
was $ 2 million, with greater emphasis on training in FY - 2004. An 
April 2002 request for a new $ 50 million FY 2003 FY - 2003 FMF 
Program to promotion cooperation and interoperability among the US 
and Indian militaries was later renounced as was a $ 5 million FMF 
request for FY 2004 that was to include high tech surveillance 
equipment, ground sensors for use along the Kashmir LOC, and 
nuclear / biological / chemical discontinuation equipment the United 
State also provided funds for Indian counter - narcotics efforts. 
US Aid 
Some time in 1999, the population of India crossed the 1 billion mark 
and is projected to exceed that of China by 2035. One - third of India's 
people live below the poverty line India have more poor people than Africa 
and Latin America combined and half its children are malnourished. India 
has more HIV infected people (4 million) than any other country. The already 
low country wide female literacy rate of 39% dips to 30% in some regions 
and rural areas. Nearly 40% of India's urban population lives in slums with no 
access to clean water and sanitation services. 
The US foreign aid appropriation for India for FY 2002 will devote $ 
70-9 million in Development Assistance / Child Survival and Health 
Programms (DA/ CSH); $ 7 million in Economic support Funds (ESF; $ 86.4 
million in P.L. 480 food assistance, $ 1 million in IMET; and $ 900,000 in 
Non proliferation, Anti terrorism, demising and related programs (NADR-
ECA), the major USAID goals in India for FY 2002 include , encouraging 
broad barred economic growth; stabilizing population growth); enhancing 
food security and nutrition; protecting the environment; reducing transmission 
of AIDS / HIV and other infections diseases; and expanding the role and 
participation of women in decision making. PI 480 funds go to providing 
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food assistance, largely through private voluntary agencies. In 2001, the 
office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID / OFDA) gave $ 3.6 million 
in disaster assistance for flood relief in West Bengal, $ 1 million for floods in 
Orissa, $ 12.8 million for earthquakes, and $ 1.2 million for drought relief 
The United States is the third largest bilateral aid donor to India, after Japan 
and the United Kingdom. The FY - 2003 add request includes $ 75.2 million 
for DA / CSH; $ 25 million for ESF; $ 1 million for IMET and $ 50 million 
for Foreign Military Financing (FMF). 
Globalization is defined in what follows as integration of economic 
activities, via markets. The driving forces are technological and policy 
changes falling costs of transport and communications and greater reliance on 
market forces. The economic globalization discussed here has cultural, social 
and political consequences (and preconditions). 
In his book When Corporations Rule the World, David C. Korten 
warns that the "globalised economic system has an inherent bias in favour of 
the large, the global, the competitive, the resource extractive and the short 
term". The Government of Indian therefore, ought to be cautions of its diving 
thrust for the liberalization of the economy and opening it to foreign capital 
and to MNCs and in particular guarantees that the traditional social cultural 
values are not permitted to erode. 
Globalization means eclipse of state authority in regulation and control 
of the economy and leaving it completely at the mercy of the market forces. 
In such a situation the determination of employment, prices interest rates, 
exchange rates, wages rates and all that are left at the hands off from all such 
responsibilities. It is argued in favour of globalization that it would and 
attracting foreign capital in our country that would accelerate our growth rate. 
Examples of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysias etc., 
are cited in this connection. In my point of view such almost city like states 
would not be path setters to such a vast country like India is still only a 
188 
market for their manufacturers. They feel introverted of inventing their capita 
in high tech and manufacturers. Most of the foreign capital that has come in 
India after the declaration of this policy is in the shape of portfolio investment 
that is highly unstable and may fade away from this country at the slightest 
alleged reason. Thus, foreign capital investments, in fact, have less to do with 
our national priorities and they create volability in the economy. 
Since the Second World War, the advanced economies have all 
become liberal democracies. Today's globalization is ultimately a 
consequence of that choice. Their governance has not been the same as 
nineteenth century laissez-faire. States are far more interventionist. But 
acceptance of the basic logic values of liberal democracy elections, property 
rights, liberal trade and, increasingly, liberal movement of capital has been 
common to all the advanced market economies. They have differed, however, 
on the role of the state in income redistribution, regulation of private 
transactions and provision of public services. All such differences within 
countries are negotiable, just as differences among them are manageable. 
Thus, it is evident that the move to economic liberalization and 
democratization since the early 1980s has been a political economic 
catastrophe. 
Good markets need good governments. Unfortunately, good 
governments are not easy to find. Even in advanced liberal democracies, 
where governments work relatively well, political and bureaucratic processes 
are as flawed as markets, if not far more so. In general, it is a case of 
balancing defective markets against defective political processes. In 
developing countries, however, governments are generally still worse. Many 
governments are grossly incompetent, corrupt, or both. This is both a cause 
and consequences of poor policy performance. Decentralized, competitive 
corruption, including state capture by corrupt private interests, is particularly 
damaging. Improvements will not occur unless and until these constrains are 
at least partially lifted. One important way of doing so, it happily turns out, is 
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to open up economies to global competitive forces. Reforms in the 
governance of the advanced liberal democracies have been designed to make 
them more effective. An important element in those reforms has been the 
mirror image of the observation above that good markets need good 
governments. Good governance also needs good markets. More precisely, 
the more the government focuses on its essential tasks and the less it is 
engaged in economic activity and regulation, the better it is likely to work and 
the better the economy itself is likely to run. This is an important argument 
for privatization. 
In the case of ordinary productive enterprises, nationalization tended to 
mean political interference and waste, but also a diversion of attention and 
effort by governments. In the case of utilities, privatization allowed the 
creation of a far more transparent and rule government regime than that in 
place beforehand. Again, this has important economic benefits. But it is also 
improves the quality of regulation. It I almost impossible to be both a 
producer and a regulator at the same time. The two activities are inherently 
different. 
The economies today are so interlinked and economic life now has 
become so competitive and mutually dependent that the national markets 
almost have turned into a world market and economies have partially or fully 
willy nilly been globalised or are moving towards globalization. 
Globalization is a term that has recently come into use, along with 
liberalization and privatization covering all facts of life political, economic, 
social and cultural. Economic context it may be defined as the global 
dimension of the evolving world economy. Globalisation is an unavoidable 
process, which is taking place independent of us. It forces us to cope with it. 
There is no room in a globalised world for an economy de linked from world 
trade and foreign investment. The truth is that if we do not reform rapidly, 
and position ourselves to compete we will be marginalized. There is no 
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divine dispensation that gives India alone the power to survive and prosper as 
an isolationist island in a globalised world. 
A start has to be made by reducing the opportunities for corruption. 
Critics of the market and of global economic integration seem to be entirely 
unaware that a control, regulation or restriction creates an opportunity for 
corruption. Wherever there is gap between the market value of some thing 
and an official price or the price government is prepared to allow, there is an 
incentive to cheat and to bribe. If the black market price of foreign currency 
is twice the official rate, people will bribe officials to let them sell on the back 
market. Similarly, if imports of certain much desired commodities are 
restricted or under a very high tariff, business people will bribe officials to let 
them take the commodities in or evade the tariff. Again, if one needs a large 
number of bureaucratic permissions to do something in business, the officials 
have an opportunity to demand bribes. But there is worse, once it is known 
that a government is prepared to create such exceptional opportunities, there 
will be lobbying to create them. Then there is not just the corruption of the 
government, but the waste of resources in such 'rent seeking' or directly 
unproductive profit seeking activities. Broadly defined, globalization is a long 
run process with powerful forces behind it. Economics, traditionally defined, 
is a vital component of a wider range of positive sum activities that compel 
ever wider exchanges and with those exchanges, construct bigger and more 
complex political institutions. 
In a progressively more competitive world economy, the market 
fiiendly trends are visible spreading. Since 1991 India's New Economic 
Policy (NEP) itself has to be viewed as an imperative ingredient in a changing 
world polity and economy. The new economic policy aims at making the 
Indian economy competitive and much better integrated with the world 
economy. The main characteristics of a globalised economy are that state 
intervention is replaced to a large extent by market forces, nationalization 
yields places to privatization and restrictions are replaced by freedom of 
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choice and actions. The significant impact of globaUzation has two folds. 
Firstly, interdependence of countries, that is, countries become very much 
dSependent on each other in a globalised set up due to inter linkages of 
markets, not merely in terms of goods, services, and capital but also in terms 
of policy interaction. That is in a globalised economy, countries while 
formulating and implementing their own policies will have to consider the 
likely impact of policies pursued in other countries. Secondly, in a globalised 
economy, competition would mean that producers, traders, investors from any 
country should be able to compete in any market, any sector and in any 
country. 
In fact, consumers all over the Third World would probably derive 
some economic benefits from the free entry of consumer goods from the First 
World. But the national economies of the poor countries would fail to 
develop resulting in their economic, military and political dependency, 
probably in that order. Besides, several scholars have drawn the indisputable 
conclusion from empirical studies that cooperative game between rich and 
poor countries in international oligarchy this is a politically unacceptable. 
To successfully contribute in the world economy we need build 
strategic agreements not just between trading blocks but also between 
corporation and not just between foreign partners and Indians but also 
between corporations and not just itself Therefore, while opening up our 
economy to the world the Government must clearly lay down the terms and 
conditions and the sectors in which foreign capital and technology would be 
welcomed and in what way, what method and procedures they would have to 
accept and what factors they must have to keep in their mind. More 
particularly the government policy must assume a new dimension now to 
ensure a comprehensive and effective appraisal of technological needs and 
priorities in India's key growth centers and to strengthen and promote 
investment and technology. Thus, we have to put our own house in order as 
otherwise in the name of globalization and global competition import of 
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foreign technology is sure to pave the way for colonial exploitation in a new 
grab. 
The proposition that globalization makes state unnecessary is even less 
credible than that it makes states impotent. If any thing, exact opposite is 
true, for at least three reasons. First, the ability of a society to take advantage 
of the opportunities offered by international economic integration depends on 
the quality of public goods, such as protection of property rights, personal 
security, a non corrupt civil service and education. Without the legal 
arrangements, in particularly, the potential web of rewarding contracts is 
vastly reduced. This may seem a trivial point, but a very large proportion of 
the world's economies have failed to achieve these essential preconditions of 
success. Second, the state normally defines the identity of human beings. A 
sense of belonging is a part of people's sense of security. It is perhaps not 
surprising that some of the most successfully internationally integrated 
economies are small, homogeneous countries with a strong sense of collective 
identity. Third, all forms of international governance rest on the ability of 
individual states to provide and guarantee order. The WTO, for example, is 
not body of self executing rules. On the contrary, they can be exercised only 
by sovereign states. The bed rock of international order is the territorial state, 
with a monopoly of coercive power within its jurisdiction. Cyberspace does 
not fundamentally change this, since economies are ultimately concerned with 
and run for human beings, who have physical presence and, in consequence, 
physical location. Since states are territorial jurisdiction, they are the bed 
rock of global order. 
The implication is that, just as globalization does not make states 
impotent, it does not make them unnecessary either. On the contrary, for 
people to be successfully in exploiting the opportunities afforded by 
international integration, they need states, at both ends of their transactions. 
This is why failed states, disorderly states, weak states and corrupt states are 
shunned state they are black holes of the global economic system. 
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Therefore, it is necessary for India and other Third World countries to 
formulate a strategy of resistance against the hegemonic policies and practices 
camouflaged as globalization and to espouse precise strategy for each issue 
consistent with this strategy. India and other LDCs should insist on 
fundamental question of the free international movement of labour. For there 
is no valid reason why the globalization of free trade should include free 
international movement of capital and commodities, but not of labour. 
In the changed economic environment and deregulation measures, 
business and government will be working together for projecting India as the 
nation having capabilities for producing goods at competitive prices. The 
marketing aspects of a product which has received little attention so far 
should be accorded more importance in future. There is a need for making 
the domestic industry contestable. Competition after a long period of control 
would pose difficulties for the Indian Industry, but the problem could be 
overcome in due course. The government should pick up the best 
businessmen and help them to become internationally competitive. Indian 
management is slow to respond to changes in the world market. Global 
integration demands enlightened transportation, power and 
telecommunications policies. A competitive market structure with domestic 
and foreign competition is the route to globalization. We need to be 
competitive on all front i.e. prices quality and tight delivery as per schedule. 
The key to globalization is not how much ground is covered but how well it is 
covered. Strategic alliances among Indian partners could be a way to secure 
global orders. We need to take advantage of the market expansion in Asia, 
EEC, South Africa and Caribbean countries. Industry should sell by applying 
through consortiums and deliver the goods it promises to deliver. A search 
for consumer markets outside the country is essential. Globalization of the 
Indian economy is a step in the right direction. We should utilize the 
recessionary situation abroad to establish business links. The free flow of 
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foreign goods is desirable in order to make domestic industry globally 
competitive. 
The neo-liberal thought found favour with donor agencies such as the 
World Bank and the IMF that were engaged in funding development projects 
of debt ridden Third World countries. The convergence of thoughts in regard 
to change reached its zenith in the newly emergent phenomenon of 
globalization, facilitated by the free flow of funds, goods, and services as 
dictated by the new conditionaJities laid down by the World Bank, WTO and 
other overseas donors, and by the new IT revolution (Internet, fax, and web -
based communication). This is also the moment of mergence of good 
governance' as a novel conceptual rubric a mixture of politics, management, 
and ethics, Sound development management was at the core of the good 
governance idea. Its desired attributes such as accountability, transparency, 
rule of law, and respect of human rights served as yardsticks for governmental 
reform and performance appraisal. 
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